GIFT   OF 
MICHAEL  REESE 


SOCIAL   LAWS 

AN   OUTLINE  OF  SOCIOLOGY 


SOCIAL  LAWS 

AN  OUTLINE  OF  SOCIOLOGY 


BY 

G.   TARDE 

TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  FRENCH 
BY 

HOWARD   C.   WARREN 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY 
IN  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 

WITH  A   PREFACE  BY 
JAMES  MARK  BALDWIN 


gorfc 
THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  &  Co.,  LTD. 


All  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,  1899, 
BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


NorfoooU 

J.  S.  Gushing  &  Co.  -  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EDITOR'S  PREFACE vii 

AUTHOR'S  PREFACE ix 

INTRODUCTION i 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  REPETITION  OF  PHENOMENA         .        .        .  .   u 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  OPPOSITION  OF  PHENOMENA         ...  68 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  ADAPTATION  OF  PHENOMENA        .        .        .  144 

CONCLUSION 202 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE 

IT  goes  without  saying  that  no  intro- 
duction of  M.  Tarde  is  necessary  to 
English  and  American  readers  who  are 
versed  in  current  sociological  discussions. 
To  the  general  reader,  therefore,  and  to 
him  alone,  I  venture,  on  the  insistent 
request  of  the  publishers,  to  say  that  in 
this  little  book  he  will  find  the  leading 
ideas  of^one  of  the  most  authoritative 
and  distinguished^Jiving  writers  in  sociol- 
ogy and  social  psychology}  M.  Tarde's 
larger  works  are  summarized  and  his 
system  shown  to  be  a  system  in  these 
pages  —  in  a  way  that  he  humorously 
describes  in  his  preface.  In  fulfilling  the 
purpose  of  systematization,  however,  the 
(book  makes  a  contribution  to  the  theory 
of  science  at  the  same  time  that  it  ex- 


: 


viii  Editor's  Preface 

hibits  a  way  of  treating  sociological  data 
under  certain  general  laws.  Whether  or 
no  these  laws  —  "  repetition,  opposition, 
adaptation  "  —  be  established  in  the  form 
proposed  by  the  author,  at  any  rate  they 
are  likely  to  be  much  discussed  and  to 
take  rank  as  brilliant  formulations  in  the 
development  of  a  branch  of  knowledge  in 
which  synthesis  and  constructive  hypothe- 
sis are  sorely  needed. 

Readers  of  this  little  volume  will  cer- 
tainly turn  to  M.  Tarde's  larger  books, 
and  it  is  interesting  to  know  that  a  trans- 
lation of  his  remarkable  work,  Les  Lois 
de  r Imitation,  is  under  the  favorable  con- 
sideration of  one  of  the  leading  American 
publishing  houses. 

I  may  add  that  the  fine  quality  of  Pro- 
fessor Warren's  translation  has  made  the 
"editorial"  function  a  piece  of  pleasant 
form. 

J.   MARK    BALDWIN. 
PRINCETON, 
July,  1899. 


PREFACE 

IN  this  little  volume,  which  contains  the 
substance  of  some  lectures  delivered  at 
the  College  libre  des  sciences  societies,  in 
October,  1897^  I  aim  to  give,  not  a  mere 
outline  or  re'sumt  of  my  three  principal 
works  on  general  Sociology,1  but  rather 
the  internal  bond  that  unites  them}  Their 
real  connection,  which  has  possibly  es- 
caped the  reader's  notice,  is  here  made 
evident  through  arguments  of  a  more 
general  character,  which  enable  us,  I 
think,  to  embrace  within  a  single  point 
of  view  these  three  parts,  published 
separately,  of  a  common  thought  —  these 
disjecta  membra,  as  it  were,  of  a  single 

1  Les  Lois  de  f  Imitation  (The  Laws  of  Imitation), 
L?  Opposition  universelle  (Universal  Opposition),  and 
La  Logique  sociale  (Social  Logic). 


x  Preface 

body  of  ideas.  I  may  possibly  be  told 
that  it  would  have  been  quite  as  well 
had  I  first  presented  as  a  systematic 
whole  that  which  I  have  actually  cut  up 
into  three  separate  publications.  But, 
aside  from  the  fact  that  a  work  in  sev- 
eral volumes  is  apt  (and  with  reason)  to 
alarm  the  modern  reader,  why  should 
we  wear  ourselves  out  in  the  work  of 
building  up  such  great  structures  —  such 
complete  edifices  ?  Since  our  successors 
will  have  nothing  more  pressing  to  do 
than  demolish  these  structures  in  order 
to  make  some  other  use  of  the  materials  or 
take  possession  of  a  detached  wing,  it  is 
surely  as  well  to  spare  them  the  task  of 
demolition,  by  delivering  our  thought  in 
fragments  only.  At  the  same  time,  for 
the  sake  of  those  few  who  take  the 
same  pleasure  in  putting  together  what 
is  offered  them  in  fragments,  that  others 
do  in  tearing  down  what  is  presented  to 
them  in  completed  form,  it  is  perhaps  not 
altogether  bootless  to  add  to  the  scat- 


Preface  xi 

tered  parts  of  one's  work  a  sketch  or 
outline,  indicating  the  general  plan  which 
the  author  would  like  to  have  carried 
out  had  he  possessed  the  requisite 
strength  and  boldness.  This  is  the  only 
excuse  offered  for  this  little  volume. 

APRIL,  1898.          *  G.  T. 


SOCIAL   LAWS 


INTRODUCTION 

iHEN  we  traverse  the  gallery 
of  history,  and  observe  its  mot- 
ley succession  of  fantastic  paint- 
ings—  when  we  examine  in  a 
cursory  way  the  successive  races  of  man- 
kind, all  different  and  constantl}^Qhanging, 
our  first  impression  is  apt  to  be  that  the 
phenomena  of  social  life  are  incapable  of 
any  general  expression  or  scientific  law, 
and  that  the  attempt  to  found  a  system  of 
sociology  is  wholly  chimerical.  But  the 
,  first  herdsmen  who  scanned  the  starry 
heavens,  and  the  first  tillers  of  the  soil 
who  essayed  to  discover  the  secrets  of 
plant  life,  must  have  been  impressed  in 
much  the  same  way  by  the  sparkling  dis- 


2  Social  Laws 

order  of  the  firmament,  with  its  manifold 
meteors,  as  well  as  by  the  exuberant  diver- 
sity of  vegetable  and  animal  forms.  The 

'  idea  of  explaining  sky  or  forest  by  a  small 
number  of  logically  concatenated  notions, 
under  the  name  of  astronomy  or  biology, 
had  it  occurred  to  them,  would  have  ap- 
peared in  their  eyes  the  height  of  extrava- 
gance. And  there  is  no  less  complexity 
—  no  less  real  irregularity  and  apparent 
caprice  —  in  the  world  of  meteors  and  in 
the  interior  of  the  virgin  forest,  than  in  the 
recesses  of  human  history. 

How  is  it,   then,   that   in  spite  of   this 

\  changing  diversity  in  the  domain  of  sky 
and  forest,  among  physical  objects  and 
living  beings,  we  have  seen  the  birth  and 
gradual  growth  of  the  sciences  of  physics 
and  biology  J  There  are  three  essential 
elements  involved  in  the  development  of 
these  branches,  and  these  must  be  care- 
fully distinguished  before  we  can  form  a 
complete  and  exact  notion  of  what  is 
meant  by  a  certain  noun  and  adjective 


Introduction  3 

that  are  very  widely  used,  namely,  science 
and  scientific.  V 

In  the  first  place,  then,  men  began  to 
perceive  some  sijrmlajitjss  in  thejmdst  of 
x  these  differences,  some  repetitions  among 
these  variations.  Such  are  the  periodic 
return  of  the  same  conditions  of  the 
heavens,  the  cycle  of  the  seasons,  the 
regularly  repeated  succession  of  ages 
among  living  creatures, —  youth,  maturity, 
and  old  age,  —  and  the  traits  common  to 
individuals  of  the  same  species.  There  is 
no  science  of  the  individual  as  such ;  all 
science  is  general ;  that  is,  it  considers  the 
individual  as  repeated,  or  as  capable  of 
\  indefinite  repetition. 

Science  is  the  coordination  of  phenom- 
ena  regarded  from  the  side  of  their 
repetitions.  But  this  does  not  mean  that 
differentiation  is  not  an  essential  mode  of 
procedure  for  the  scientific  mind.  It  is 
the  duty  of  science  to  differentiate,  as  well 
as  to  assimilate  f  but  only  to  the  extent  that 
the  object  differentiated  is  a  type  in  nature 


4  Social  Laws 

yielding  a  certain  number  of  copies,  and 
capable  of  indefinite  reproduction.  A  spe- 
cific type  may  be  discovered  and  carefully 
defined ;  but,  if  it  be  found  to  belong  to  a 
single  individual  only,  and  to  be  incapable 
of  transmission  to  posterity,  it  fails  to  in- 
terest the  scientist,  except  as  a  curious 
monstrosity.  CRepetition  means  the  pro- 
duction of  something  that  at  the  same 
time  preserves  the  original}  it  implies  sim- 
ple and  elementary  causation  without  cre- 
ation. The  effect  reproduces  the  cause 
point  by  point,  just  as  in  the  case  of  trans- 
mission of  movement  from  one  body  to 
another,  or  the  transmission  of  life  from  a 
living  being  to  its  progeny.  JuM^' 

But  in  addition  to  the  question  of  repro- 
duction, the  phenomena  involved  in  de- 
struction are  of  interest  to  science.  And 
hence,  in  every  sphere  of  fact  to  which 
she  directs  her  attention,  science  must  en- 
deavor to  discover,  in  the  second  place,  the 
appwsiti&ls  that  exist  there  and  are  ger- 
mane to  her  object.  Thus,  she  must  con- 


Introduction  5 

sider  the  equilibrium  of  forces,  the  symme- 
try of  forms,  the  struggles  of  living  organ- 
isms, and  the  strife  among  all  creatures. 

But  this  is  not  all,  nor  even  the  most 
important  element.  The  adaptations  of 
phenomena,  and  their  relations  in  crea- 
tive production,  must  above  all  be  dealt  ^ 
with.  The  scientist  labors  continually  to 
detect,  disentangle,  and  explain  these 
harmonies.  With  their  discovery,  he  suc- 
ceeds in  establishing  a  higher  adaptation, 
namely,  the  harmony  of  his  system  of  no- 
tions and  hypotheses  with  the  interrela- 
tions of  facts. 

Thus   science  consists   in  viewing   any 

fact  whatsoever  under  three  aspects,  corre- 

i^     |. 
spending,  respectively,  to  the  repetitions,  V 

oppositions,  and  adaptations  which  it  con-  * 

tains,  and  which  are  obscured  by  a  mass 
of  variations,  dissymmetries,  and  dishar- 
monies. The^r elation  of  cause  to  effect, 
in  fact,  is  not  the  only  elemenJlSEicElprop* 
erly  constitutes  scientific  knowledge.  If 
it  were  so,  pragmatic  history,  the  merfe 


6  Social  Laws 

concatenation  of  causes  and  effects,  which 
simply  teaches  that  certain  battles  and 
certain  insurrections  had  such  and  such 
consequences,  would  be  the  most  perfect 
example  of  science^  Yet  history,  as  we 
know,  becomes  a  science  only  when  the 
relations  of  causality  which  it  reveals  are 
shown  to  exist  between  a  general  cause>> 
capable  of  repetition  or  actually  repeating 
itself,  and  a  general  effect,  also  repeated 
or  capable  of  repetition. 

Again,  mathematics  never  reveals  cau- 
r-  saiity^inorjeratign.     When  a  cause  is  pos- 
tulated under  the  name  of  function,  it  is 
always   disguised   as   an   equation.       Yet 
mathematics  is  certainly  a  science ;  in  fact, 
it  is  the  prototype   of   all  science.     And 
why  ?     Because  nowhere  has*a  more  com-") 
plete  elimination  of  the  dissimilar  and  in-  ( 
dividual  side  of  phenomena  been  effected/ 
and  nowhere  do  they  present  a  more  exact 
and  definite  repetition,  and  a  more  symmet- 
rical opposition.     The  great  faul^ofjnath- 
ematics  lies  in  it 


Introduction 


adequately  into  aje€oiinJL--the.  adaptations 
of^  phenomgn.cL_  Hence  arises  that  insuffi-  ' 
ciency  of  the  science,  so  strongly  felt  by 
philosophers,  especially  the  geometricians 
among  them,  such  as  Descartes,  Comte, 
and  Cournot.  .  .  ^-^ 

Repetition,  opposition^  and  ^adapjtation, 
I  repeat,  are  the  three  keys  which  science 
employs  to  open  up  the  arcana  of  the  uni- 
verse. She  seeks,  before  all  else,  not  the 
mere  causes,  but  the  lawsjhat  govern  the 
repetition,  opposition,  and  adaptation  of 
phenomena.  These  are  three  different 
species  of  laws,  which  must  certainly  not 
be  confounded;  yet  they  are  quite  as 
closely  connected  as  they  are  distinct.  In 
biology,  for  example,  the  tendency  of  spe- 
cies to  multiply  in  geometric  progression 
(a  law  of  repetition)  forms  the  basis  of  the 
struggle  for  existence  and  natural  selection 
(a  law  of  opposition) ;  and  the  appearance 
of  individual  variations,  the  production  of 
various  individual  aptitudes  and  harmonies, 
and  the  correlation  of  parts  in  growth 


8  Social  Laws 

(laws  of  adaptation)  are  necessary  to  the 
proper  functioning  of  both.1 

But,  of  these  three  keys,  the  first  and 
third  are  far  more  important  than  the 
second.  The  first  is  the  great  pass-key; 
while  the  third,  of  finer  construction, 
gives  access  to  treasures  deeply  hidden 
and  most  precious.  The  second,  an  in- 
termediary, of  lesser  importance,  reveals 
certain  strifes  and  collisions  of  temporary 
utility,  which  are  destined  to  fade  away 
little  by  little,  though  never  completely, 
even  this  partial  disappearance  being 
effected  only  after"  numerous  transforma- 
tions and  attenuations. 

These  reflections  were  needed  in  order 
to  show  what  sociology  must  be,  if  it  is 

1  It  will  be  noted  that  Cuvier  and  the  naturalists  of 
his  time.,  including  even  his  opponent  Lamarck,  sought 
out  primarily  the  laws  of  adaptation,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  Darwin  and  his  evolutionist  disciples  preferred  to 
consider  the  phenomena  of  life  from  the  standpoint  of 
repetitions  and  oppositions  (the  Malthusian  law  and  the 
law  of  the  struggle  for  existence),  though  they  certainly 
took  into  account  organic  adaptation  also,  which  is  the 
most  important  fact  of  all. 


Introduction  9 

to  deserve  the  name  of  science,  and 
along  what  paths  sociologists  must  guide 
its  course,  if  they  wish  to  see  it  assume, 
unchallenged,  its  proper  rank.  Like 
every  other  science,  it  will  attain  this 
only  when  it  has  gained^  and 
scious  of  possessing,  its  own 


repetitions,  its  own  domain  of  oppositions,  ^ 
and  its  own  domain  of  adaptations,  each 
characteristic  of  itself  ancT  belonging- 
wholly  to  itself.  /  Sociology  can  "'  only 
make  progress  when  it  succeeds  in  sub-  \ 
stituting  true  repetitions,  oppositions,  and 
harmonies  for  false  ones,  as  all  the  other 
sciences  have  done  before  it.  And  in 
place  of  repetitions,  oppositions,  and 
adaptations  that  are  true  but  vague,  it 
must  find  others  that  become  ever  more 

exact  as  it  advances.  * 

\u^/v)  /^ 

Let  us  place  ourselves  at  eacn  of  these 
standpoints  in  turn,  first^of  all  to  ascer- 
tain ^whether or  not  the  ^yolution_  of 

science — ift-^^enera],     and     sociology     in 
particular,  has  taken   place   in   the   man- 


10  Social  Laws 

ner  which  I  have  already  imperfectly 
defined,  and  which  I  shall  be  able  to 
define  more  fully  as  we  proceed ;  in  the 
second  place,  to  point  out  the  laws  of 
social  development  under  each  of  these 
three  aspects. 


CHAPTER   I 

THE    REPETITION    OF    PHENOMENA 

IMAGINE  ourselves  in  the  pres- 
ence of  some  great  object,  such 
as  the  starry  sky,  the  sea,  a 
forest,  a  crowd,  or  a  city.  From 
every  part  of  such  an  object  emanate  im- 
pressions which  strike  the  senses  of  the 
savage  as  well  as  those  of  the  scientist; 
but  to  the  latter  these  manifold  and  inco- 
herent sensations  suggest  certain  logically 
correlated  notions,  which  together  make 
up  a  bundle  of  p.xpjarmtory  principles. 
How  has  this  gradual  elaboration  of  mere  } 
sensations  into  notions  and  laws  come 
about?  By  what  process  has  our  knowl-  L* 
edge  of  such  phenomena  become  more  and 
more  scientific  ?  The  change,  I  contend, 


12  Social  Laws 

has  come  about,  in  the  first  place,  because 
we  have  been  constantly  discovering  a 
greater  number  of  resemblances  among 
these  phenomena,  and  because,  in  place  of 
the  merely  superficial,  apparent,  and  de- 
ceptive resemblances  among  them,  we 
have  come  to  discern  certain  other  resem- 
blances, at  once  deeper  and  more  real. 
In  fact,  we  have  passed  from  complex 
and  confused  resemblances  and  repeti- 
tions of  the  whole  to  resemblances  and 
repetitions  of  the  parts.  These  latter 
are  more  difficult  to  discover,  but,  once 
found,  they  prove  to  be  more  exact  and 
elementary;  they  are  at  once  infinitely 
numerous  and  infinitely  small.  It  is  only 

resemblances   are 


perceived  that_the  Jhigher,  broader^rnore^ 
complex,  andj/aguer  resemblances  can 
be  explained^and^  assigned^thgjr^rjrpper 
value.  Such  an  advance  occurs  when- 
ever a  number  of  fundamental  differences 
that  have  previously  been  considered  sui 
generis  are  resolved  into  combinations  of 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         13 

resemblances.  By  this  we  do  not  mean 
to  say  that  science,  as  it  advances,  tends 
to  eliminate  the  fundamental  differences, 
or  to  diminish  in  number  the  unrepeated 
aspects  of  phenomena.  For,  while  the 
grosser  and  more  obvious  distinctions  of 
the  mass  dissolve  under  the  searching 
glance  of  the  scientific  observer,  their 
place  is  taken  by  others  which  are  at 
once  more  subtle  and  more  profound,  and 
which  multiply  indefinitely,  thus  keeping 
pace  with  the  uniformities  among  the  ele- 
ments. 

To  apply  this  principle  to  the  realm  of 
stars.  The  science  of  astronomy  dates 
its  origin  from  the  moment  when  idle 
or  curious  herdsmen  noticed  the  peri- 
odicity of  the  apparent  revolutions  of 
the  heavens,  the  rising  and  setting  of 
the  stars,  the  circular  courses  of  the 
sun  and  moon,  and  the  regular  succes- 
sion and  recurrence  of  their  positions  in 
the  sky.  But  in  those  early  times  cer- 
tain stars  appeared  to  be  exceptions  to 


14  Social  Laws 

the  general  order  of  this  one  magnificent 
revolution,  namely,  the  wandering  stars, 
or  planets;  each  of  these  was  supposed 
to  follow  a  capricious  course,  which  va- 
ried at  every  moment  from  its  own  pre- 
vious course  and  that  of  the  rest;  later 
on  it  was  observed  that  there  was  some 
regularity  even  in  these  anomalies.  More- 
over, all  stars  —  fixed  and  wandering,  suns 
and  planets,  including  even  the  shooting 
stars  —  were  held  to  be  essentially  alike  ; 
the  only  striking  difference  admitted  was 
between  the  sun  and  moon,  on  the  one 


hand,  and  allMjia-j^thgrSy  on  the  other; 
the  two  former  being  considered  the  only 
really  distinctive  bodies  in  the  firmament. 
Now  astronomy  made  its  first,  step  in 
advance  when  for  this  one  immense,  ap- 
parent rotation  of  the  entire  heavens  there 
was  substituted  the  conception  of  a  host 
of  lesser  real_  rotations,  which  _  differed 
greatly  from  one  another,  and  were  in 
no  wise  synchronous,  but  each  of  which 
repeated  itself  indefinitely.  The  second 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         1 5 

step  occurred  when  the  peculiar  distinc- 
tiveness  of  the  sun  vanished,  to  be  re-  - 
placed  by  a  more  subtle  differentiation 
of  each  separate  star,  as  the  luminary  of 
an  invisible  system,  and  centre  of  a  plan- 
etary world  analogous  to  the  whirling 
concourse  of  our  own  planets.  A  still 
greater  step  in  advance  was  made  when 
the  Differences  of  apparent  sidereal  rota- 
tion which,  though  general  and  without 
exception,  admitted  irregularities  in  ve- 
locity,  radius,  eccentricity  of  orbit,  etc., 
vanished  before  the  Newtonian  law  of 
attraction  —  the  latter  representing  all 
these  periodicities  of  movement,  from  the 
most  minute  up  to  the  greatest,  and  from 
the  swiftest  to  the  most  slow,  (as  due  to 
endless  and  continual  repetitions  of  one 
and  the  same  fact,  namely,  attraction  di- 
rectly proportional  to  the  mass  and  in- 
versely to  the  square  of  the  distance.^ 
And  it  were  far  better  could  we  explain 
this  fact  in  turn  by  the  bold  hypothesis, 
constantly  rejected,  yet  ever  besetting  us 


16  Social  Laws 

anew,  which  attributes  gravitation  to  the 
impacts  of  ether  atoms,  resulting  from 
atomic  vibrations  of  inconceivable  minute- 
ness and  multiplicity. 

Am  I  not  correct,  then,  in  saying  that 
the  science  of  astronomy  has  ever  been 
concerned  with  resemblances  and  repeti- 
tions ;  that  it  started  out  with  a  single 
resemblance  and  repetition,  immense  and 
obvious  in  character,  or  with  a  small  num- 
ber at  most,  to  arrive  ultimately  at  an  in- 
finite number  of  infinitesimal  resemblances 
and  repetitions,  real  and  elementary  in 
character,  which,  when  they  appeared, 
furnished  an  explanation  of  the  former? 

Now  does  this  necessarily  imply,  by  the 
way,  that  the  sky  has  lost  any  of  its 
picturesqueness  with  the  advances  of 
astronomy  ?  By  no  means.  For,  in  the 
first  place,  the  increased  precision  of 
apparatus  and  exactness  of  observations 
(have  enabled  us  to  discern  among  the 
repetitions  of  stellar  movements  many 
differences,  hitherto  unperceived,  which 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         17 

have  led  to  many  new  discoveries  — 
notably  that  of  Leverrier.  /  And  in  the 
second  place,  our  celestial  horizon  has 
been  constantly  extended,  and  as  its 
vastness  has  increased,  the  differences 
existing  among  various  stars  and  groups 
of  stars  in  respect  to  size,  velocity,  and 
physical  characteristics  have  become  much 
more  marked.  The  varieties  of  form 
among  the  nebulae  have  multiplied,  and 
when,  at  length,  the  spectroscope  enabled 
us  to  analyze  in  so  extraordinary  a  man- 
ner the  chemical  composition  of  the 
heavenly  bodies,  such  differences  were 
found  among  them  that  men  were  led  to 
believe  in  the  existence  of  radical  differ- 
ences between  their  respective  inhabitants. 
Finally,  the  geography  of  the  nearest 
planets  has  been  revealed  more  clearly, 
and,  judging  the  rest  from  these  (after 
studying  the  canals  of  Mars,  for  instance),  / 
we  may  conclude  that  each  of  the  count- 
less planets  which  circle  above  and 
beneath  us  possesses  its  own  special 
c 


18  Social  Laws 

characteristics,  its  own  world-chart,  and 
its  own  local  features,  and  that  these 
individual  peculiarities  give,  there  as  here, 
a  distinctive  charm  to  each  particular 
region,  and  no  doubt  engrave  the  love 
of  country  on  the  hearts  of  its  inhabit- 
ants, whoever  they  may  be. 

Nor  is  this,  in  my  opinion,  all,  though 
I  shall  only  whisper  it,  lest  I  incur 
the  serious  rharge  of  becoming  a  meta- 
physician, yl  believe  that  none  of  the 
above-mentioned  differences,  including 
even  the  mere  variety  of  arrangement 
and  random  distribution  of  matter 
throughout  space,  can  be^explained  on 
the  theory  of  exactly  similar  atomic 
elements) — an  hypothesis  so  dear  to 
chemists,  who  are  in  this  respect  the 
real  metaphysicians ;  I  do  not  see  that 
^  Spencer's  so-called  law  of  the  instability  of 
the  homogeneous  explains  anything.  And 
hence,(J  believe  that  the  only  means  of 
explaining  this  exuberant  growth  of 
individual  differences  upon  the  surface 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         19 

of  phenomena  is  by  assuming  that 
they  spring  from  a  "motley  array  of  ele- 
ments, eacrTpossessing  its  own^individual 
characteristics.  Thus  in  the  same  way 
that  the  mass  resemblances  have  been 
resolved  into  resemblances  of  detail,  so 
the  gross  and  obvious  mass  (differences 
have  been  transformed  into  infinitely 
minute  differences  of  detail. )  And,  just 
as  resemblances  among  the  details  alone 
furnish  an  adequate  explanation  of 
whatever  resemblances  appear  in  the 
whole,  so  the  elementary  and  invisible 
distinctions,  which  I  believe  exist,  alone 
furnish  an  adequate  explanation  of  those 
greater  and  more  apparent  differences 
that  lend  picturesqueness  to  the  visible 
universe. 

So  much  for  the  physical  world.  In 
the  world  of  life  the  same  is  true.  Im- 
agine ourselves  placed,  like  primitive 
man,  in  the  midst  of  a  forest.  All  the 
fauna  and  flora  of  a  certain  zone  are 
there,  and  we  now  know  that  the  phe- 


20  Social  Laws 

nomena  revealed  by  these  divers  plants 
and  animals,  however  dissimilar  they 
may  seem,  resolve  themselves  ultimately 
into  a  multitude  of  infinitesimal  facts 
which  are  summed  up  in  the  laws  of 
biology  —  whether  it  be  animal  or  vege- 
table biology  matters  little,  since  the  two 
are  at  present  classed  together.  But  at 
the  outset  men  drew  broad  distinctions 
between  many  things  that  we  now  place 
in  the  same  category,  while  they  asso- 
ciated together  many  that  we  now 
differentiate.)  The  resemblances  and  rep- 
etitions which  were  then  perceived,  and 
on  which  the  infant  science  of  the 
organism  was  nourished,  were  superficial 
and  deceptive.  Men  classed  together 
plants  that  had  no  kinship,  because  their 
leaves  and  general  form  revealed  some 
rough  similarity;  while  they  drew  sharp 
distinctions  between  plants  of  the  same 
family  which  were  of  different  shape 
and  outline.  The  science  of  botany 
made  an  advance  when  it  learned  the 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        21 

relative  value  of  different  characteristics, 
and  discovered  that  the  most  important 
of  these  (that  is,  the  most  repeated  and 
significant,  because  accompanied  by  a" 
host  of  other  resemblances)  are  not  those 
which  are  most  obvious,  but  rather  those 

J/t^vV* 

which  are  most  sjibtle  and  minute;  espe- 
cially those  pertaining  to  the  generative 
organs,  such  as  the  fact   of   having  one  / 
cotyledon,  two,  or  none  at  all. 

And  biology,  the  synthesis  of  zoology 
and  botany,  was  born  when  the  cell 
theory  demonstrated  that  in  both  animals 
and  plants  the  constantly  repeated  ele- 
ment is  the  cell  —  in  the  first  place,  the 
germ  cell  and  then  the  others  that  pro- 
ceed from  it  —  when  it  showed  that  the 
fundamental  phenomenon  of  life  is  an 
indefinite  repetition  by_each  cell  of  the 
functions  of  nutrition  and  activity,  growth 
and  fertilization,  whose  mould  or  cast 
each  cell  inherits  and  transmits  in  turn 
to  its  own  posterity.  This  conformity  to 
precedent  may  be  called  either  habit  or 


22  Social  Laws 

heredity.     For  simplicity's  sake,  let  us  call 
i   it  all  heredity,  since  habit  is  merely  a  sort 
I   of   internal   heredity,    just   as   heredity  is 
)  J  only  externalized   habit.     Hfesedify,  then, 
js   the  form  of   repetition   appropriate  to 
Y      life,  just  as  undulation,  or  periodic  move- 
ment,  is  its  physical,  and  imitation  (as  we 
shall  find)  its  social  form. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  progress  of  the 
science  of  living  things  has  resulted  in 
gradually  removing  all  barriers  raised  on 
the  side  of  their  resemblances  and  repe- 
titions, and  substituting  for  these  few, 
gross,  and  obvious  resemblances,  countless 
others,  far  more  exact,  though  infinitely 
minute,  which  alone  serve  to  explain  the 
former.  But  at  the  same  time  hosts  of 
new  distinctions  appear,  and  not  only 
does  the  distinctive  individuality  of  each 
organism  become  more  salient,  but  we 
are  forced  also  to  admit  certain  differen- 
tiations of  the  cells  themselves,  and  pri- 
marily of  the  germ  cells ;  for  while  nothing 
is  more  similar  in  appearance  than  two 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        23 

germs,   there   is   in   reality   scarcely   any 
thing  more  different  than  their  contents. 
After    experiencing    the    insufficiency    of 
the  explanations  proposed  by  Darwin  and 
Lamarck    to    account    for    the    origin    of 
species,  —  whose  kinship,  descent,  and  evo- 
lution, however,   is  beyond  dispute,  —  we 
must  admit  that  the  r^eal  cause  of  species  1 
lies   hidden   within    the   cells,    the   inven-  1 
tion,  as  it  were,  of  some  primitive  germ  \ 
possessing   an   exceptionally  fruitful  indi- 
viduality. ^ 

Well,  then  if  we  proceed  to  examine 
a  city,  a  crowd,  or  an  army,  in  place  of 
the  sky  or  forest,  I  maintain  that  the 
above  reflections  can  be  applied  to  the 
growth  of  social  science  as  well  as  to  as- 
tronomy and  biology.  Here,  too,  men 
have  passed  from  hasty  generalizations, 
founded  on  splendid  analogies  that  were 
at  once  artificial  and  illusory,  to  general- 
izations supported  by  a  mass  of  minute 
facts,  whose  resemblance  to  one  another 
was  comparatively  clear  and  exact.  So- 


24  Social  Laws 

ciology  has  long  been  in  process  of  con- 
struction. The  first  incoherent  attempts 
were  made  when,  amid  the  distracting 
chaos  of  social  data,  men  discerned,  or 
believed  that  they  discerned,  something 
periodic  and^  regular.  An  early  groping 
after  sociology  appeared  in  the  ancient 
conception  of  a  great  cyclic  year,  at  the 
completion  of  which  everything,  in  both 
the  social  and  natural  worlds,  should  recur 
in  the  same  order.  In  place  of  this  er- 
roneously conceived  single  repetition  of 
the  whole,  which  was  welcomed  by  the 
fanciful  genius  of  Plato,  Aristotle  devel- 
oped in  his  Politics  certain  repetitions  of 
detail  (which,  though  often  true,  were 
vague  and  difficult  to  grasp)  concerning 
what  is  most  superficial,  or  certainly  most 
unimportant,  in  the  social  life,  namely, 
the  order  ^pf  succession  of  the  several 
forms  .of  government.  Arrested  at  this 
point,  the  evolution  of  sociology  began 
again  ab  ovo  in  modern  times.  The  ri- 
corsi  of  Vico  are  the  cycles  of  antiquity, 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        25 

taken  up  and  traced  out  anew,  with  some- 
what less  of  the  fantastic  element.  This 
hypothesis  and  that  of  Montesquieu,  on 
the  si^gposed  similarity  of  civilizations  de-_ 
veloped  in  the  same  climate,  are  good 
examples  of  the  superficial  and  illusory 
repetitions  and  resemblances  on  which 
the  science  of  sociology  had  to  feed  be- 
fore it  was  fitted  to  receive  more  substan- 
tial nourishment.  Chateaubriand,  in  his 
Essai  sur  les  revolutions,  drew  a  lengthy 
parallel  between  the  English  revolution 
and  the  French  revolution,  and  took 
pleasure  in  dwelling  on  even  the  most 
superficial  resemblances.  Others  founded 
elaborate  theories  on  absurd  analogies 
drawn  between  the  Punic  and  English 
character,  or  between  the  Roman  and 
British  empires.  This  attempt  to  confine 
social  facts  within  lines  of  development 
which  would  compel  them  to  repeat  them- 
selves en  masse  with  merely  insignificant 
variations,  has  hitherto  been  the  r.hj^f 
pitfall  of  sociology,  and  that,  whether 


26  Social  Laws 

under  the  more  rigid  form  conceived  by 
Hegel,  consisting  of  successions  of  triads, 
or  under  the  more  exact  and  scientific 
form  that  it  has  since  received  at  the 
hands  of  the  modern  evolutionists.  The 
latter,  in  discussing  the  transformations 
of  laws  (particularly  the  laws  of  family 
and  of  property)  and  the  transformations 
of  language,  religion,  industry,  and  art, 
have  ventured  to  formulate  general  laws 
that  would  confine  the  progress  of  so- 
ciety, under  these  different  aspects,  to  a 
constant  passing  and  repassing  along  suc- 
cessive portions  of  the  same  arbitrary 
path.  It  remained  to  be  discovered  later 
that  these  supposed  rules  are  honey- 
combed with  exceptions,  and  that  evolu- 
tion, whether  linguistic,  legal,  religious, 
political,  economic,  artistic,  or  moral,  is 
not  a  single  road,  but  a  network  of  routes 
with  many  intersecting  cross-ways. 

Fortunately,  screened  and  sheltered  from 
view  by  these  ambitious  generalizations, 
certain  less  venturesome  workers  strove, 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         27 

with  greater  success,  to  formulate  other 
more  substantial  laws  concerning  the  de- 
tails. Among  these  should  be  mentioned 
the  linguists,  the  mythologists,  and  above 
all  the  economists.  These  specialists 
in  sociological  fields  discovered  various 
interesting  relations  among  successive  and 
simultaneous  facts,  which  recurred  con- 
stantly within  the  limits  of  the  narrow 
domain  they  were  examining.  In  Adam 
Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations,  Bopp's  Com- 
parative Grammar  of  the  Indo-European 
Languages,  and  Dietz's  work,  to  cite  but 
three  instances,  we  find  a  mass  of  obser- 
vations of  this  sort,  in  which  are  pointed 
out  the  resemblances  running  through 
countless  human  actions  —  resemblances 
in  the  pronunciation  of  certain  conso- 
nants and  vowels,  in  buying  and  selling, 
in  the  production  and  consumption  of 
certain  articles,  etc.  It  is  true  that  these 
resemblances,  when  linguists  endeavored 
to  formulate  them '  further,  gave  rise  to 
very  imperfect  laws,  conforming  to  a  ma- 


28  Social  Laws 

jority  of  cases  only.  But  this  is  because 
the  authors  were  in  too  great  haste 
to  formulate  them,  and  did  not  wait 
to  remove  from  its  husk  of  partial 
truths  the  real  kernel  of  absolute  truth; 
to  wit,  the  fundamental  social  fact  which 
sociology  is  blindly  pursuing,  and  which 
it  must  attain  before  it  can  really  de- 
velop into  a  science. 

In  some  quarters  the  feeling  has  existed 
that  we  must  look  to  psychology  for 
any  general  explanation  of  the  laws 
and  pseudo-laws  of  economics,  language, 
mythology,  etc.  No  man  held  to  this 
view  with  greater  force  and  clearness 
than  JohnStuart  Mill  At  the  end  of 
his  Logic  he  represents  sociology  as  a 
species  of  applied  psychology.  Unfortu- 
nately he  did  not  analyze  the  concept 
carefully  enough  ;  and  the  psychology  to 
which  he  looked  for  the  key  to  social 
phenomena  was  merely  individual  psy- 
chology—  the  branch  which  studies  the 
in^erjelationsof  impressions  _anji  imagery 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        29 

in  a  single  mind,  believing  that  every- 
thmg_jwithm  this_domam  can  be  ex- 
plained  according  to  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion of  these  elements.  Thus  conceivec 
sociology  became,  a  sort  of  enlarged  anc 
externalized  English  associationism,  anc 
was  in  a  fair  way  to  lose  its  originality.1 
But  it  is  not  alone,  nor  chiefly  to  this 
ttitra-corebra.1  psychology  that  we  must 
look  for  the  fundamental  fact  of  soci^ 
ology,  whose  groupings  and  manifold 
combinations  make  up  our  so-called  sim- 
ple phenomena,  and  form  the  data  of 
the  particular  social  sciences ;  it  is  rather 
in  an  vzVz/<?r-cerebral  psychology,  which 
studies  the  rise  of  conscious  relations 
between  two  or  more  individuals,  that 
we  must  seek  it.  The  relation  of  one 
mind  with  another  is,  in  fact,  a  distinc- 
tive event  in  the  life  of  each ;  it  is  abso- 
lutely different  from'  all  their  relations 
with  the  rest  of  the  universe,  giving  rise 
to  certain  most  unexpected  states  of 
mind,  that  cannot  be  explained  at  all  ac- 


30  Social  Laws 

cording    to    the    laws     of     physiological 
psychology.  ^ 

This  relation  between  a  subject  and  an 
object  which  is  itself  a  subject  —  and  not 
a  perception  in  no  way  resembling  the 
thing  perceived  —  will  not  allow  the  ideal- 
istic sceptic  to  call  in  question  the 
reality  of  the  latter ;  on  the  contrary,  it 
means  that  we  experience  the  sensation 
of  a  sentient  thing,  the  volition  of  a 
conating  thing,  and  the  belief  in  a  be- 

1  The  experiments  that  have  been  made  on  hypnotic 
suggestion,  and  suggestion  in  the  waking  state,  already 
furnish  abundant  material  for  the  construction  of  an 
inter- cerebral  psychology.  I  may  be  allowed  to  refer 
the  reader  to  the  applications  of  this  still  embryonic 
psychology  which  I  have  proposed  throughout  my 
works ;  more  especially  to  the  chapter  in  my  Laws  of 
Imitation  (1890),  entitled:  What  is  a  society?  which 
appeared  previously,  in  November,  1884,  in  the  Revue 
philosophique ;  also  to  some  pages  of  my  Philosophie 
penale  (Philosophy  of  Punishment,  1890),  on  the 
formation  of  criminal  crowds  (in  the  chapter  on  Crime, 
p.  324  f.  ist  French  edition)  ;  my  report  entitled  Les 
crimes  des  foules  (The  Crimes  of  Crowds),  submitted  at 
the  Congress  for  Criminal  Anthropology  at  Brussels,  in 
August,  1892,  and  an  article  published  in  the  Revue  des 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         31 

lieving  thing,  —  the  perception,  in  short, 
of  a  personality  in  which  the  perceiving 
personality  is  reflected,  and  which  the 
latter  cannot  deny  without  denying  itself. 
This  consciousness  of  a  consciousness  is 
the  inconcussum  quid  which  Descartes 
sought,  and  which  the  individual  Self 
could  not  give  him.  Moreover,  this 
unique  relation  is  not  a  physical  impulse 
given  or  received,  nor  is  it  the  transmis- 
sion of  motor  energy  from  the  subject  to 

Deux  Mondes  for  December,  1893,  under  the  title  of 
Foules  et  sectes  (Crowds  and  Sects).  The  two  latter 
studies  were  reprinted  without  change  in  my  Essais  et 
melanges  sociologiques  (Sociological  Essays  and  Miscel- 
lanies), which  appeared  in  1895  (Storck  and  Masson, 
publishers,  Paris  and  Lyons).  —  I  may  observe,  by  the 
way,  that  the  passage  from  the  Philosophic  penale,  cited 
above,  which  is  merely  a  corollary  of  the  chapter  cited 
also  from  the  Laws  of  Imitation,  contains  in  substance, 
and  very  explicitly,  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of 
crowds  which  was  developed  afterward  in  the  two  other 
works  mentioned  ;  this  passage  was  published  prior  to 
the  many  interesting  works  that  have  recently  appeared 
in  France  and  abroad  on  the  psychology  of  crowds. 
While  this  does  not  detract  from  their  merit,  it  serves 
to  answer  a  certain  number  of  insinuations  against  me, 
which  I  have,  moreover,  fully  met  elsewhere. 


32  Social  Laws 

an  inanimate  object  or  vice  versa,  accord- 
ing as  we  are  dealing  with  an  active  or 
passive  state  ;  (it  is  rather  the  transmis- 
sion of  something  internal  and  mental,) 
which  passes  from  one  to  other  of 
the  two  subjects,  and  that,  curiously 
enough,  without  being  lost  or  in  the 
slightest  degree  diminished  in  the  first. 
But  what  manner  of  thing  is  it,  that  can 
thus  be  transmitted  from  one  mind  to 
another  when  they  (&ter  into  psychologi- 
cal relation  ?  Is  it  their  sensations  or  af- 
fective states  ?  Evidently  not ;  for  these 
are  essentially  incommunicable.  /The  only 
\i  material  that  two  subjects  can  communi- 
cate to  each  other  and  consciously  share, 
with  the  result  that  they  feel  themselves 
more  closely  united  and  more  similar 
thereby,  are  their  notions  and  volitions, 
their  conclusions  and  aims./  These  are 
jfonns  which  may  still  remain  the  same, 
In  spite  of  changes  in  content ;  they  are 
products  of  that  mental  elaboration  which 
reacts  almost  equally  well  to  any  sensory 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        33 

data.  Neither  does  such  a  form  alter 
perceptibly  when  it  passes  from  a  mind 
of  the  visual  type  to  one  of  the  auditory 
or  motor  type;  Thus  the  geometrical 
ideas  of  one  blind  from  birth  are  pre- 
cisely the  same  as  those  of  geometricians 
endowed  with  the  sense  of  sight.  And 
similarly,  a  plan  of  campaign  proposed 
by  one  general  whose  temperament  is 
choleric  and  melancholy  to  others  of  mer- 
curial and  sanguine  or  passive  and  phleg- 
matic dispositions  may  still  remain  the 
same,  if  only  the  plan  be  concerned  with 
the  same  series  of  operations,  and  be  de- 
sired by  all  with  equal  force,  in  spite  of 
the  special  and  distinctive  kinds  of  feel- 
ing that  move  each  one  separately  to 
desire  it.  The  strength  of  subjective 
tendency,  or  mental  eagerness,  which  I 
call  desire,  like  the  strength  of  intellect- 
ual grasp,  or  mental  adhesion  and  con- 
straint, which  I  call  belief,  forms  one 
homogeneous  and  continuous  stream. 
Though  variously  tinged  swith  the  differ- 


s4  Social  Laws 

ent  shades  of  affectivity  pertaining  to 
each  separate  mind,  it  nevertheless  flows 
identically  in  each,  now  spreading  and 
dividing,  now  uniting  and  contracting, 
and  passing  freely  from  one  person  to 
another,  and  from  one  perception  to  an- 
other in  each  person,  without  change. 

To  say  that  every  real  science  pos- 
sesses its  own  peculiar  domain  of  ele- 
mentary, countless,  and  infinitely  small 
repetitions,  is  equivalent  to  saying  that 
every  real  science  is  based  on  its  own 
special  qualities.  Quantity,  indeed,  im- 
plies the  possibility  of  one  or  more 
infinite  series  of  infinitely  small  resem- 
blances and  repetitions./  For  this  reason 
I  have  thought  it  well  to  insist,  elsewhere, 
on  the  quantitative  character  of  the  two 
mental  energies  which,  like  two  diverg- 
ing rivers,  water  the  two  opposite  slopes 
of  the  Self  —  its  intellectual  and  its  volun- 
tary activity.  If  we  deny  their  quanti- 
tative character,  we  declare  sociology  to 
be  impossible.  But  we  cannot  deny  it 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         35 

without  ignoring  the  evidence ;  and  a 
proof  that  the  quantities  in  question  are 
really  social  factors  is  seen  in  the  fact 
that  their  quantitative  character  becomes 
more  evident,  and  is  grasped  by  the 
mind  with  greater  clearness,  the  larger 
the  quantities  in  which  we  see  them,  as 
when  they  manifest  themselves  in  the 
shape  of  currents  of  popular  belief  or 
passion,  or  in  traditional  convictions  and 
obstinacies  of  custom,  embracing  large 
groups  of  men.  The  more  a  group  in- 
creases in  size,  the  more  the  rise  or 
fall  of  opinion,  whether  affirmative  or 
negative,  with  respect  to  a  given  object, 
becomes  capable  of  measurement.  Such) 
fluctuations  of  national  belief  or  volition, 
indicated,  for  example,  by  the  rise  or 
fall  of  shares  on  the  exchanges,  then\ 
become  comparable  to  the  changes  of 
temperature  or  atmospheric  pressure,  or 
to  the  varying  force  of  a  water-fall.  It 
is  for  this  reason  that  a  science  of  sta- 
tistics is  more  easily  developed  as  states 


36  Social  Laws 

grow  larger.  The  particular  aim  of  sta- 
tistics being  to  discover  and  separate 
real  quantities  from  the  confused  general 
mass  of  social  facts,  the/success  of  the 
science  is  greater  the  more  it  strives  to 
reach  beyond  the  particular  human  acts 
which  it  collects,  and  to  measure  the 
total  mass  of  beliefs  and  desire^  The 
statistics  of  stock-exchange  values  ex- 
press the  variations  of  public  confidence 
regarding  the  success  of  certain  enter- 
prises, such  as  the  solvency  of  a  certain 
borrowing  state,  and  the  changes  in 
public  desires  arid  interests,  to  which 
these  loans  or  enterprises  appeal.  In- 
dustrial and  agricultural  statistics  indi- 
cate the  importance  of  the  general  needs 
which  demand  the  production  of  certain 
articles,  or  the  probable  suitability  of  the 
means  set  in  operation  to  meet  the  de- 
mand. Judicial  statistics,  with  their  dry 
enumerations  of  trials  or  offences,  are  of 
interest  to  consult  only  because,  between 
their  lines,  we  read  the  yearly  increase 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        37 

or  decrease  in  the  amount  of  public 
desires  engaged  in  proscribed  or  criminal 
channels,  such  as  the  tendency  to  divorce 
or  theft;  here,  too,  we  see  the  degree  in 
which  public  hopes  are  affected  by  certain 
kinds  of  trial  or  crime.  The  statisticg^pf 
population  constitute,  in  most  respects, 
merely  a  biological  study,  having  to  do 
with  the  numerical  growth  of  the  race 
quite  as  much  as  with  the  duration  and 
progress  of  social  institutions.  But  they 
have  a  sociological  import,  in  that  they 
indicate  the  increase  or  decrease  of  the 
r^desire  for  paternity^maternit}^  and  matri- 
mony, as  wgll  as  jjLlhe-  pr€vailing__belief 
that  happiness  is  to  be  found  in  marriage 
and  the  formation  of  fertile  unions. 
^AUnder  what  conditions,  then,  is  it  legit- 
imate to  add  together  these  forces  of 
belief  and  desire  that  lie  stored  up  in 
different  individuals  ?  Evidently,  on  con- 
dition that  they  possess  the  same  object ; 
—  that  they  have  regard  to  the  same  idea 
to  be  asserted,  or  the  same  action  to  be 


38  Social  Laws 

executed.  And  what  brought  about  this 
convergence,  which  renders  the  individual 
energies  capable  of  combining  to  form 

L/*"  ^ 

a  social  unit  ?  Can  it  have  occurred 
spontaneously,  by  a  chance  encounter,  or 
by  some  sort  of  preestablished  harmony  ? 
Decidedly  not,  except  in  a  few  instances ; 
and  even  these  apparent  exceptions,  were 
there  time  to  follow  them  out,  would  be 
found  to  confirm  the  rule.  (This  minute 
inter-agreement  of  minds  and  wills,  which 
forms  the  basis  of  the  social  life,  even 
in  troublous  times, — this  presence  of  so 
many  common  ideas,  ends,  and  means, 
in  the  minds  and  wills  of  all  members  of 
the  same  society  at  any  given  moment, 
—  is  not  due,  I  maintain,  to  organic 
heredity,  which  insures  the  birth  of  men 
quite  similar  to  one  another,  nor  to 
mere  identity  of  geographical  environ- 
ment, which  offers  very  similar  resources 
to  talents  that  are  nearly  equal ;  it  is 
rather  the  effect  of  that  suggestion-imi- 
tation process  which,  starting  from  one 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena      ^39 

primitive  creaturepossessed  of  a  single 
idea  or  act,  passed  this  copy  on  to  one 
of  its  neighbors,  then  to  another,  and  so 
on.  Organic  needs  and  spiritual  ten- 
dencies exist  in  us  only  as  potentialities 
which  are  realizable  under  the  most 
diverse  forms,  in  spite  of  their  primitive 
similarity;  and,  among  all  these  possible 
realizations,  the  indications  furnished  by  . 
some  first  initiator  who  is  imitated  deter- 
mine which  one  is  actually  chosen. 

Let  us  return,  then,  to  the  fundamen- 
tal social  couple,  to  which  I  alluded  just 
now ;  not  the  couple  consisting  of  a  man 
and  woman  in  love,  for  this  couple,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  sexual,  is  a  purely  vital 
phenomenon ;  but  rather  a  couple  com- 
posed of  two  persons,  of  either,  sex,  one 
of  whom  exerts  a  mental  influence  upon 
the  other.  I  maintain  that  the  relation 
between  these  two  persons  is  the  one 
essential  element  in  the  social^lifg,  and 
that  it  always  consists,  at  bottom,  in  an 
imitation  Vpf  one  by_the  other.  But  this 


40  Social  Laws 

fact  must  be  correctly  interpreted,  lest 
it  fall  before  the  onslaught  of  foolish 
and  superficial  objections.  No  one  will 
deny  that  whatever  we  say,  do,  or  think, 
<6nce  we  are  launched  in  the  social  life, 
/  we  are  forever  imitating  some  one  else, 
unless,  indeed,  we  are  ourselves  making 
an  innovation  —  an  event  that  rarely  hap- 
pens ;  it  is  easy,  moreover,  to  show  that 
our  innovations  are,  for  the  most  part, 
combinations  erf  previous  examples,  and 
that  they  remain  outside  of  the  social 
life  so  long  as  they  are  not  imitated. 
There  is  not  a  word  that  you  say,  which 
is  not  the  reproduction,  now  unconscious, 
but  formerly  conscious  and  voluntary,  of 
verbal  articulations  reaching  back  to  the 
most  distant  past,  with  some  special  ac- 
cent due  to  your  immediate  surroundings. 
There  is  not  a  religious  rite  that  you 
fulfil,  such  as  praying,  kissing  the  icon, 
or  making  the  sign  of  the  cross,  which 
does  not  reproduce  certain  traditional  ges- 
tures and  expressions,  established  through 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         41 

/ 

imitation  of  your  ancestors.  There  is 
not  a  military  or  civil  requirement  that 
you  obey,  nor  an  act  that  you  perform  in 
your  business,  which  has  not  been  taught 
you,  and  which  you  have  not  copied  from 
some  living  model.  There  is  not  a  stroke 
of  the  brush  that  you-  make,  if  you  are  a 
painter,  nor  a  verse  that  you  write,  if  you 
are  a  poet,  which  does  not  conform  to  the 
customs  or  the  prosody  of  your  school,  and 
even  your  very  originality  itself  is  made  up 
of  accumulated  common-places,  and  aspires 
to  become  common-place  in  its  turn. 

Thus,   the   unvarying   characteristic   of 
every   social   fact   whatsoever   is   that    it 

is   imitaJiy£-^And  this   characteristic  be- 

•     "" 

longs  exclusively  toi  social  facts.  On  this 
point,  however,  a  specious  objection  has 
been  urged  against  me  by  Professor  Gid- 
dings,  who,  nevertheless,  with  remarkable 
ability,  frequently  adopts  my  own  socio- 
logical standpoint.  One  society,  he  de- 
clares, copies  another ;  even  enemies  will 
imitate  one  another;  we  borrow  each 


42  Social  Laws 

other's  armaments,  ruses  of  war  and  se- 
crets of  trade.  ( Hence,  the  domain  of 
imitativeness  goes  beyond  that  of  social- 
ity, and  cannot  be  a  special  characteristic 
of  the  latter.j  But  I  am  astonished  at 
such  an  objection  on  the  part  of  an  au- 

1  Giving  to  the  word  imitation  the  very  wide  mean- 
ing accorded  to  it  in  a  recent  and  already  celebrated 
book  on  Mental  Development  in  the  Child  and  the 
Race,  by  Mr.  Baldwin,  professor  of  psychology  at  Prince- 
ton University  (U.S.A.)  one  might(regard  imitation  as 
the  fundamental  fact,  not  only  of  social  and  psychologi- 
cal life,  but  of  organic  life  as  wellj  where  it  would 
appear  as  the  necessary  condition  of  habit  and  heredity. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  position  of  this  keen 
psychologist,  far  from  contradicting  my  own  view,  is  a 
most  striking  illustration  and  confirmation  of  it.  Imi- 
tation between'  man  and  man,  as  I  understand  it,  is 
the  consequence  of  imitation  between  one  state  and 
another  in  the  same  man  ;  the  latter  is  a  species  of 
internal  imitation  which  I  had  myself  previously  named 
habit,  and  is  evidently  distinguished  from  the  former 
by  characteristics  clear  enough  to  allow  of  their  differ- 
entiation. Professor  Baldwin,  who  is  first  of  all  a  bio- 
logical psychologist,  explains  very  correctly  the  organic 
and  mental  genesis  of  imitation,  and  his  task  comes 
to  an  end  where  that  of  the  psychological  sociologist 
begins.  It  is  a  pity  that  his  book  did  not  precede  my 
own  on  the  Laws  of  Imitation,  which  would  have 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        43 

thor  who  regards  the  struggle  between 
societies  as  a  potent  agency  looking 
toward  their  ultimate  socialization  and 
merger  into  a  broader  society  built  up  by 
their  very  battles.  For  is  it  not  obvious 
that,  to  the  extent  that  rival  or  hostile 
peoples  assimilate  their  institutions,  they 
themselves  tend  to  coalesce  ?  And  hence, 
while  it  is  perfectly  true  that  each  new 
act  of  imitation  between  individuals  al- 
ready associated  tends  to  preserve  and 

gained  by  using  his  analyses.  Nevertheless,  the  latter 
do  not  oblige  me  to  amend  in  any  way  the  laws  and 
arguments  formulated  in  my  work.  But  in  any  case 
his  book  is  the  best  answer  I  can  make  to  those  who 
accuse  me  of  extending  too  widely  the  meaning  of  the 
word  imitation.  Professor  Baldwin  proves  the  contrary 
by  extending  it  much  further  still.  I  learn,  as  these 
proofs  are  being  corrected,  that  Professor  Baldwin  has 
recently  applied  his  conceptions  to  sociology,  and  that 
by  an  independent  route  he  has  been  led  spontaneously 
to  a  position  very  analogous  to  that  developed  in  my 
Laws  of  Imitation.  [  The  work  by  Professor  Baldwin 
referred  to  is  his  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in 
Mental  Development  ( Macmillans ) .  In  the  second 
English  edition  of  that  work  the  author  speaks  of  the 
relation  of  his  researches  to  those  of  M.  Tarde. —  TR.] 


44  Social  Laws 

strengthen  the  social  bond,  it  is  no  less 
certain  that  such  an  act  between  indi- 
viduals not  yet  associated  prepares  them 
for  an  association  that  may  take  place 
in  the  future,  weaving  by  invisible  threads 
something  that  will  in  time  become  a 
palpable  bond.  As  regards  some  other 
objections  that  have  been  raised  against 
me,  I  need  not  stop  to  consider  them, 
since  they  arise  from  a  very  imperfect 
understanding  of  my  ideas.  They  will 
disappear  of  their  own  accord  if  one 
will  but  place  himself  squarely  at  my 
standpoint.  I  refer  the  reader  to  my 
works  for  the  elucidation  of  this  matter. 
But  it  is  not  enough  merely  to  recog- 
nize the  imitative  character  of  every 
social  phenomenon.  I  go  further,  and 
maintain  that  this  imitative  relation  was 
not,  in  the  beginning,  as  it  often  is  later,  I 
a  connection  binding  one  individual  to  a 
^confused  mass  of  men,  but  merely  a  re- 
[|lation  between  two  indjviduals,  one  of  '< 
whom,  the  child,  is  in  process  of  being 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        45 

introduced  into  the  social  life,  while  the 
other,  an  adult,  long  since  socialized, 
serves  as  the  child's  personal  model.  As 
we  advance  in  life,  it  is  true,  we  are 
often  governed  by  collective  and  imper- 
sonal models,  which  are  usually  not  con- 
sciously chosen.  But  before  we  speak, 
think,  or  act  as  "they"  speak,  think,  or 
act  in  our  world,  we  begin  by  speaking, 
thinking,  and  acting  as  "he"  or  "she" 
does.  And  this  he  or  she  is  always  one 
of  our  own  near  acquaintances.  Beneath 
the  indefinite  they>  however  carefully  we 
search,  we  never  find  anything  but  a 
certain  number  of  he's  and  she's  which, 
as  they  have  increased  in  number,  have 
become  mingled  together  and  confused. 
Simple  though  this  distinction  be,  it  is 
nevertheless  overlooked  by  those  who 
deny  that  individual  initiative  plays  the 
leading  r61e  in  any  social  institution  or 
undertaking.  These  writers  imagine  they 
are  stating  a  weighty  truth  when  they 
assert,  for  instance,  that  languages  and 


46  Social  Laws 

religions  are  collective  productions;  that 
crowds,  without  a  leader,  constructed 
Greek,  Sanscrit,  and  Hebrew,  as  well  as 
Buddhism  and  Christianity,  and  that  the 
formations  and  transformations  of  socie- 
ties are  always  to  be  explained  by  the 
coercive  action  of  the  group  upon  its 
individual  members  (so  that  the  latter, 
great  and  small  alike,  are  always  moulded 
and  made  subordinate  to  the  former), 
rather  than  by  the  suggestive  and  con- 
tagious influence  of  certain  select  indi- 
viduals upon  the  group  as  a  whole. 
In  reality,  such  explanations  are  quite 
illusory,  and  their  authors  fail  to  per- 
ceive that,  in  thus  postulating  a  collec- 
tive force,  which  implies  the  conformity 
of  millions  of  men  acting  together  under 
certain  relations,  they  overlook  the  great- 
est difficulty,  namely,  the  problem  of  ex- 
l  plaining  how  such  a  general  assimilation 
'  could  ever  have  taken  place.  But  this 
question  is  solved,  if  we  extend  the 
*  analysis,  as  I  have  done,  to  jthe  inter- 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        47 

rgrghral  relation  of  two 
reflecting  the  other.,,  Only  thus  can  we 
explain  the  partial  agreements,  the  beat- 
ing of  hearts  in  unison,  and  the  com- 
munions of  soul,  which,  once  brought 
about,  and  afterward  perpetuated  by  tradi- 
tion and  the  imitation  of  our  ancestors, 
exert  on  the  individual  a  pressure  that  is 
often  tyrannical,  but  oftener  still  most  salu- 
tary.1 It  is  this  relation,  then,  that  the 
sociologist  must  adopt  as  his  own  peculiar 
data,  just  as  the  astronomer  adopts  -  the 
relation  between  two  masses^ne  attracting 
and  the  attracted ;  it  is  here  that  he  must 
seek  the  key  to  the  social  mystery;  it  is 
from  this  that  he  must  endeavor  to  derive 
the  few  simple  but  universal  laws,  which 
may  be  distinguished  amid  the  seeming 
chaos  of  history  and  human  life. 

1  And  do  not  forget  this  simple  fact,  that  we  enter  upon 
the  social  life  at  a  very  early  age.  Hence,  the  child,  who 
turns  to  others  as  a  flower  turns  to  the  sun,  feels  the 
attraction  of  his  family  environment  much  more  than  its 
constraint.  And  in  the  same  way,  throughout  his  entire 
life,  he  continues  to  drink  in  these  examples  with  avidity. 


48  Social  Laws 

What  I  wish  to  call  attention  to  at 
present  is  that  sociology,  thus  under- 
stood, differs  from  the  older  conceptions 
that  passed  under  the  same  name  in  the 
same  way  that  our  modern  astronomy 
differs  from  that  of  the  Greeks,  or  that 
biology,  since  the  introduction  of  the  cell 
theory,  differs  from  the  older  natural 
history.1  ( In  other  words,  it  rests  on  a 
foundation  composed  of  real  and  ele-. 
mentary  resemblances  and  repetitions 
which  are  infinitely  numerous  and  ex- 
tremely exact ;  these  have  replaced  a 

1  This  conception  is,  in  fact,  almost  the  exact  opposite 
of  the  unilinear  evolutionists'  notion  and  of  M.  Durk- 
heim's.  Instead  of  explaining  everything  by  the  supposed 
supremacy  of  a  law  of  evolution,  which  compels  collec- 
tive  phenomena  to  reproduce  and  repeat  themselves  in- 
definitely  in  a  certain  order,  —  instead  of  thus  explaining 
lesser  facts  by  greater,  and  the  part  by  the  whole,  —  I 
explain  collective  resemblances  of  the  whole  by  the  mass- 
ing together  of  minute  elementary  acts  —  the  greater 
by  the  lesser  and  the  whole  by  the  part.  This  way  of 
regarding  phenomena  is  destined  to  work  a  transforma- 
tion in  sociology  similar  to  that  brought  about  in 
mathematics  by  the  introduction  of  the  infinitesimal 
calculus. 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        49 

very  small  number  of  erroneous,  or  at 
least  vague  and  deceptive  analogies  as 
primary  material  for  scientific  elabora- 
tion\  And  I  may  add,  also,  that,  while 
social  similarity  has  gained  in  extent 
and  depth  by  this  substitution,  social  dif- 
ferentiation has  gained  no  less  by  the 
change.  We  must,  from  now  on,  no 
doubt,  abandon  such  artificial  differences 
as  the  "philosophy  of  history "  estab- 
lished between  successive  peoples,  each 
of  which,  like  the  chief  actors  of  an 
immense  drama,  had  his  own  predeter- 
mined role  to  play.  Hence,  it  is  no 
longer  allowable  to  interpret  those  much- 
abused  expressions:  "the  genius  of  a 
people  or  race,"  "the  genius  of  a  lan- 
guage," or  "the  genius  of  a  religion,"  in 
the  way  that  some  of  our  predecessors, 
including  even  Rento  and  Taine,  under- 
stood them.  These  embodiments  of  col- 
lective character,  appearing  under  the 
guise  of  metaphysical  entities  or  idols, 
were  endowed  with  a  fictitious  personal 


50  Social  Laws 

identity,  which  was,  however,  rather  in- 
definite. Certain  predispositions,  supposed 
to  be  invincible,  for  some  particular  gram- 
matical types,  religious  conceptions,  or 
governmental  forms,  were  freely  attrib- 
uted to  them.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
were  supposed  to  have  an  insuperable 
repugnance  to  borrowing  conceptions  or 
institutions  from  certain  of  their  rivals. 
The  Semitic  genius,  for  instance,  was 
held  to  be  absolutely  irreconcilable  with 
polytheism,  parliamentary  government,  and 
the  analytic  scheme  of  modern  languages ; 
the  Greek  genius  with  monotheism;  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  genius  with  all 
our  European  institutions  and  concep- 
tions generally.  If  the  facts  protested 
against  such  an  ontological  theory,  they 
were  tortured  to  compel  them  to  ac- 
knowledge its  truth.  It  was  useless  to 
call  the  attention  of  these  theorists  to 
the  radical  transformations  which  a  prose- 
lyting religion,  a  language,  or  an  institu- 
tion such  as  the  jury  system,  undergoes, 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         51 

when  it  spreads  far  beyond  the  bounda-x 
ries  of  its  original  race  or  people,  in  spite 
of  invincible  obstacles  that  the  "  genius  " 
of  other  nations  or  races  may  seem 
to  rear  against  it.  They  replied  by  re- 
vising the  notion  and  distinguishing,  at 
least,  between  noble  and  inventive  races, 
which  were  alone  endowed  with  the  privi- 
lege of  discovering  and  spreading  discov- 
eries, and  races  born  to  be  in  subjection, 
which  had  no  understanding  of  language, 
religion,  or  ideas,  and  borrowed  this  mate- 
rial, or  appeared  to  borrow  it,  from  the 
former.  Moreover,  they  denied  that  such 
a  proselyting  conquest  of  one  civilization 
or  race  genius  over  another  could  pass 
certain  bounds,  as,  for  example,  in  the 
Europeanization  of  China  and  Japan. 
As  regards  the  last,  the  contrary  has 
since  proved  itself  true,  and  it  will  soon 
prove  true  of  the  Middle  Kingdom  also. 
Sooner  or  later,  one  must  open  his  eyes 
to  the  evidence,  and  recognize  that  the 
genius  of  a  people  or  race,  instead  of 


52  Social  Laws 

being  a  factor  superior  to  and  dominating 
the  characters  of  the  individuals  (who  have 
been  considered  its  offshoots  and  ephem- 
eral manifestations)(is  simply  a  convenient 
label,    or   impersonal   synthesis,    of   these 
individual  characteristics  3  the  latter  alone 
are  real,  effective,  and   ever  in  activity  ; 
they  are  in  a  state  of  continual  fermen- 
tation   in    the    bosom    of    every    society, 
thanks  to  the  examples  borrowed  and  ex- 
changed   with    neighboring    societies    to 
their    great    mutual    profit     The    imperA 
sonal,    collective    character    is    thus    the) 
product  rather  than  the  producer  of  thec 
infinitely  numerous  individual  characters  ;J 
composite    photograph,    and 


_ 

must  not  be  taken  for  their  mask.  We 
shall  certainly  lose  nothing  of  that  social 
picturesqueness  which  makes  the  histo- 
rian an  artist,  when,  having  cleared  up, 
rather  than  cleared  away,  this  phantas- 
magoria of  great  historic  actors  called 
Egypt,  Rome,  Athens,  etc.,  we  perceive 
behind  it  a  swarm  of  individual  innova- 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         53 

tors,  each  sui  generis,  stamped  with  his 
own  distinctive  mark,  and  recognizable 
among  a  thousand.  Hence  I  conclude, 
once  more,  that  in  adopting  this  socio- 
logical standpoint  we  shall  have  done 
precisely  what  all  the  other  sciences  have 
s  done  as  they  progressed,  namely,  replaced 
the  small  number  of  erroneous  or  un- 
certain resemblances  and  differences  by 
countless  real  and  exact  ones;  this  is  a 
great  gain  for  both  the  artist  and  the 
scientist ;  but  it  is  a  still  greater  gain  for 
the  philosopher,  who,  if  he  is  to  retain 
a  distinctive  function,  must  undertake  a 
synthesis  of  the  two. 

A  few  remarks  more.  So  long  as  none 
of  the  elementary  astronomical  facts,  such 
as  the  Newtonian  Law,  or  at  least  that 
of  elliptical  orbits,  had  been  discovered, 
there  were  many  heterogeneous  bits 
of  astronomical  knowledge, —  a  science  of 
the  moon,  selenology,  and  a  science  of 
the  sun,  heliology,  —  but  there  was  no 
astronomy.  So  long  as  there  had  been 


54  Social  Laws 

no  discovery  of  the  elementary  facts  of 
chemistry  (affinity  and  combination  in 
definite  proportions),  there  were  many 
bits  of  chemical  knowledge,  and  the  spe- 
cial chemistries  of  iron,  tin,  copper,  etc., 
but  no  science  of  chemistry.  So  long  as 
men  had  not  discovered  the  essential  fact 
of  physics,  the  undulatory  transmission  of 
molecular  movement,  there  were  many 
bits  of  physical  knowledge, — optics,  acous- 
tics, thermology,  electrology,  —  but  no 
physics.  Physics  became  physico-chem- 
istry,  the  science  of  all  inorganic  nature, 
when  the  possibility  was  seen  of  explain- 
gfir  ing  all  things  by  the  fundamental  laws  of 
mechanics;  that  is,  when  men  believed 
that  they  had  discovered  the  elementary 
inorganic  facts,  in  the  equality  and  contra- 
riety of  action  and  reaction,  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy,  the  reduction  of  all  forces 
to  forms  of  motion,  the  mechanical  equiva- 
lent of  heat,  electricity,  light,  etc.  Finally, 
before  the  discovery  of  the  analogies  exist- 
ing between  animals  and  plants  from  the 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         55 

standpoint  of  reproduction,  there  was  not 
a  single  botany  and  a  single  zoology,  but 
different  botanies  and  zoologies,  which 
might  have  been  named  hippology,  cyn- 
ology,  etc.  The  discovery  of  the  above- 
mentioned  resemblances  gave  only  partial 
unity  to  these  various  scattered  sciences  — 
these  disjecta  membra  of  the  coming  bi- 
ology. Biology  was  really  born  when  the 
cell  theory  ^appeared,  exhibiting  the  ele- 
mentary fact  of  life,  namely,  that  the  func- 
tions of  the  cell  (or  histological  element) 
and  its  proliferation  are  continued  by  the 
germ,  itself  a  cell,  so  that  nutrition  and 
generation  were  thus  seen  from  the  same 
angle  of  vision^**** 

And  now  we  are  about  to  construct,  in 
like  manner,  a  social  science,  to  succeed 
the  social  sciences.  For  there  were  social 
sciences,  at  least  in  outline,  —  the  begin- 
nings of  political  science,  linguistics,  com- 
parative mythology,  aesthetics,  and  ethics, 
together  with  a  political  economy  already 
well  advanced,  —  long  before  even  an  em- 


56  .  Social  Laws 

bryo  of  sociology  existed.  °  Sociology 
requires  a  fundamental  social  fact.  She 
requires  it  so  urgently  that,  so  long  as 
she  had  not  succeeded  in  discovering  any 
(possibly  because  the  fact  was  tearing  out 
her  eyes,  if  I  may  be  pardoned  the  expres- 
sion), she  was  dreaming  of  such  a  fact,  and 
imagining  it  in  the  forn\  of  one  of  those 
idle,  imaginary  resemblances  that  beset  the 
cradle  of  every  science ;  she  believed  her- 
self to  be  asserting  a  highly  instructive 
fact  when  she  pictured  society  as  a  great 
organism,  where  the  individual  (or,  accord- 
ing to  others,  the  family)  was  the  social  cell, 
and  every  f orm  -of  social  activity  repre- 
sented some  sort  of  cellular  function.  I 
have  already  made  many  efforts,  in  com- 
[  b*  pany  with  most  other  sociologists,  to  sweep 
away  this  obstructive  notion  from  the  path 
of  the  new  science.  Yet  a  word  further 
on  the  subject  may  be  in  place. 
\/^  Scientific  knowledge  feels  so  strongly 
the  need  of  relying  on  resemblances  and 
repetitions  before  all  else,  that,  when  none 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         57 

are  within  its  grasp,  it  actually  creates  i 
aginary  ones  to  supply  the  place  of  the 
real  ;£among  these  we  must  class  the  fam- 
ous simile  of  the  social  organism,  together 
with  many  other  symbolic  concepts  that 
have  attained  a  like  ephemeral  usefulness?^ 
At  the  starting-point  of  every  science,  as 
at  the  starting-point  of  every  literature,  al- 
legory plays  an  important  role.  In  math- 
ematics, we  find  the  allegorical  vision  of 
Pythagoras  and  Plato  preceding  the  solid 
generalizations  of  Archimedes.  Astrology 
and  magic  —  the  one  the  gateway  to  as- 
tronomy, the  other  the  early  babblings  of 
chemistry  —  are  founded  on  the  postulate 
of  universal  allegory ',  rather  than  that  of  uni- 
versal analogy ;  they  assume  a  pre-estab- 
lished harmony  between  the  positions  of 
certain  planets  and  the  destinies  of  certain 
men,  between  some  fictitious  act  and  some 
real  one,  between  the  nature  of  a  chemi- 
cal substance  and  that  of  the  heavenly 
body  whose  name  it  bears,  and  so  on. 
We  must  not  forget  the  symbolic  character 


58  Social  Laws 

of  primitive  proceedings,  for  example,  the 
actio  legis,  in  the  Roman  code,  that  early 
groping  after  jurisprudence.  We  should 
note  also  (since  theology,  like  jurispru- 
dence, became  a  science  some  time  ago, 
the  excessive  application  of  figurative 
meanings  to  biblical  stories  by  the  earlier 
theologians,  who  saw  in  the  history  of 
Jacob  a  copy  by  anticipation  of  the  history 
of  Christ,  or  regarded  the  love  of  the  hus- 
band and  wife  in  the  Song  of  Solomon  as 
symbolic  of  the  love  of  Christ  and  his 
church.  The  mediaeval  science  of  the- 
ology began  in  this  way,  just  as  modern 
literature  began  with  the  Romance  of  the 
Rose.  It  is  a  long  step  from  such  notions 
to  the  Sztmma  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinus. 
Even  down  to  the  present  century  we  find 
lingering  traces  of  this  symbolic  mysti- 
cism ;  they  appear  in  good  Father  Gratry's 
works,  now  long  forgotten,  yet  worthy  to 
be  resurrected  on  account  of  their  Fenelo- 
nian  grace  of  style.  Father  Gratry  be- 
lieved that  the  solar  system  symbolized 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         59 

the  successive  relations  of  the  soul  and 
God,  as  the  former,  according  to  his  no- 
tion, revolved  around  the  latter.  For  him, 
again,  the  circle  and  the  ellipse  symbolized 
the  whole  of  ethics,  a  science  which  he 
believed  to  be  inscribed  in  hieroglyphics 
upon  the  conic  sections. 

I  have  no  desire,  of  course,  to  compare 
these  eccentric  views  with  the  partly  sub- 
stantial and  always  serious  development 
which  Herbert  Spencer  and,  more  recently, 
M.  Rene  Worms  and  M.  Novicow,  follow- 
ing Comte,  have  effected  in  the  theory  of 
the  "social  organism."  I  appreciate  fully 
the  merit  and  temporary  usefulness  of  such 
work,  even  though  I  criticise  it.  But,  to 
generalize  now  what  precedes,  I  believe 
I  have  the  right  to  lay  down  the  follow- 
ing proposition :  (  The  advance  of  every 
science  consists  in  suppressing  external 
likenesses  and  repetitions,  —  that  is,  com- 
parisons of  the  peculiar  material  of  that 
science  with  other  things,  —  and  replacing 
them  by  internal  likenesses  and  repetitions, 


60  Social  Laws 

—  that  is,  comparisons  of  that  material 
with  itself,  as  it  appears  in  its  many  cop- 
ies and  under  its  different  aspects.  I  The 
notion  of  the  social  organism,  which  re- 
gards the  nation  as  a  plant  or  animal,  cor- 
responds to  that  of  vital  automatism,  which 
regards  the  plant  or  animal  as  a  piece  of 
mechanism.  It  is  not  this  hollow  and 
far-fetched  comparison  of  the  living  body 
with  a  piece  of  mechanism  that  has  ad- 
vanced biology,  but  rather  a  comparison 
of  plantswith  one  another,  animals  with 
one^  another,  and  living  bodies  with  one 
another.1  (So,  too,  it  is  not  by  comparing 
societies  with  organisms  that  sociology  has 
already  made  great  steps  in  advance  and  is 

1  Similarly,  it  was  not  the  Pythagorean  comparisons 
between  mathematics  and  various  other  sciences  that 
advanced  mathematics  ;  such  comparisons  were  abso- 
lutely sterile,  while  the  bringing  together  of  two  branches 
of  mathematics,  geometry  and  algebra,  under  the  guid- 
ance of  Descartes,  was  most  fruitful.  And  it  was  only 
when  the  infinitesimal  calculus  was  invented  and  men 
went  back  to  the  indecomposable  mathematical  element 
whose  continuous  repetition  explains  all,  that  the  im- 
mense fertility  of  mathematics  fully  appeared. 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        61 

destined  to  make  still  greater  ones  in  the 
future,  but  by  comparing  various  societies 
with  one  anothen;  by  noting  the  endless 
coincidences  between  distinct  national  evo- 
lutions, from  the  standpoint  of  language, 
jurisprudence,  religion,  industry,  art,  and 
custom ;  and  above  all  by  attending  to 
those  imitations  between  man  and  man 
which  furnish  an  analytic  explanation  of 
the  collective  facts.  | 

After  these   lengthy  preliminaries,  the 
time  has  come  when  it  would  be  in  place 
to  set  forth   the  general   laws  governing 
imitative   repetition,  which  are   to   sociol-^f 
ogy  what  the  laws  of  habit  and  heredity 
are  to  biology,  the  laws  of  gravitation  to  I 
astronomy,   and  the  laws  of  vibration  to  | 
physics.     But   I    have   fully   treated    this^ 
subject  in  one  of  my  works,  The  Laws  of 
Imitation,   to   which    I    may   refer   those 
who  are  interested  in  the  subject.     Nev- 
ertheless,  I    think    it  important   to   bring 
out    here    what    I    did    not    make    suffi- 
ciently   clear,    namely,   that    in    the    last 


62  Social  Laws 

analysis  all  these  laws  flow  from  a  higher 
principle — /the  tendency  of  an  example, 
once  started  in  a  social  group,  to  spread 
through  it  in  geometrical  progression,) 
provided  the  group  remains  homoge- 
neous. By  this  term  tendency,  however, 
I  do  not  mean  anything  mysterious;  on 
the  contrary,  it  denotes  a  very  simple 
thing.  When,  for  instance,  in  a  group, 
the  need  is  felt  of  expressing  a  new  idea 
by  a  new  word,  the  first  individual  who 
finds  an  expressive  image  fitted  to  meet 
that  need  has  only  to  pronounce  it, 
when  immediately  it  is  echoed  from  one 
neighbor  to  another,  till  soon  it  trembles 
on  every  lip  in  the  group  in  question, 
and  later  spreads  even  to  neighboring 
groups.  Not  that  we  mean  by  this,  in 
the  least,  that  the  expression  is  endowed 
with  a  soul  which  causes  it  to  send  forth 
rays  in  this  manner,  any  more  than  the 
physicist,  in  saying  that  a  sound-wave 
tends  to  radiate  in  the  air,  means  to 
endow  this  mere  form  with  a  personal, 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena         63 

eager,  and  ambitious  force.1  It  is  only 
another  way  of  saying,  in  the  one  case, 
that  the  motor  forces  inherent  in  the 
molecules  of  air  have  found,  in  this  vi- 
bratory repetition,  a  channel  into  which 
they  drain;  and,  in  the  other  case,  that 
/a  special  need  felt  by  the  human  beings 
of  the  group  in  question  has  found  sat- 
isfaction in  this  imitative  repetition^which 
enables  them,  as  a  concession  to  their 
indolence  (the  analogue  of  physical  in- 
ertia), to  escape  the  trouble  of  inventing 
for  themselvesj  However,  there  is  no 
doubt  of  the  tendency  to  spread  in  geo- 
metrical proportion,  though  this  ten- 
dency is  often  hindered  by  obstacles  of 
various  sorts,  so  that  it  is  quite  rare, 
though  not  extremely  so,  for  statistical 
diagrams  relating  to  the  spread  of  a 

1  Or  any  more  than  the  naturalist,  when  he  says  that 
a  species  tends  to  increase  in  geometrical  proportion,  re- 
gards the  type-form  as  possessing  an  energy  and  aim  in- 
dependent of  the  sun,  the  chemical  affinities,  and  the 
various  forms  of  physical  energy,  instead  of  being  simply 
their  channel. 


64  Social  Laws 

new  industrial  invention  to  show  a  reg- 
ular progression.  Now  what  are  the 
obstacles  referred  to?  There  are  some 
that  arise  from  differences  of  climate 
and  race,  but  these  are  not  the  most 
important.  The  greatest  impediment  to 
the  spread  of  a  social  innovation  and 
its  consolidation  into  a  traditional  cus- 
tom is  some  other  equally  expansive  in- 
novation which  it  encounters  during  its 
course,  and  which,  to  employ  a  physical 
metaphor,  interferes  with  it.  In  fact, 
every  time  any  one  of  us  hesitates  be- 
tween two  modes  of  verbal  expression, 
two  ideas,  two  beliefs,  or  two  modes  of 
action,  it  means  jfoa^  an  interference  be- 
tween two  imitation-rays  takes  place  in 
him;  these  rays  have  started  from  dif- 
ferent generating  centres,  often  widely 
separated  in  space  and  time  (namely, 
certain  individual  inventors  and  imitat- 
ors of  primitive  times),  and  have  spread 
onward,  till  they  reached  the  individual 
in  question  A  And  how  is  his  difficulty 


The  Repetition  of  Phenomena        65 

solved  ?  What  are  the  influences  that 
decide  his  course  ?  There  are 
ences,  as  I  have  said  elsewhere,  of 
two  kinds :  logical  ^nd  ext^alogjcal.  ^\ 
should  add  that  even  the  latter  are  logi- 
cal in  one  sense  of  the  term ;  for  while, 
between  two  examples,  the  plebeian  se- 
lects blindly  that  of  the  patrician,  the 
countryman  that  of  the  townsman,  and 
the  provincial  that  of  the  Parisian  —  a 
phenomenon  which  I  have  called  the 
descent  of  imitation  from  the  top  to  the 
bottom  of  the  social  ladder  —  this  very 
imitation,  however  blind  it  be,  is  influ- 
enced in  every  case  by  the  superiority 
attributed  to  the  model,  which  makes 
the  example  of  the  latter  appear  in  the 
eyes  of  the  form  to  possess  some  social 
authority  over  him.  The  same  is  true 
when,  as  between  his  ancestors  and  some 
foreign  innovator,  primitive  man  does 
not  hesitate  to  prefer  the  example  of 
the  former,  whom  he  esteems  infallible; 
and  the  same  is  true,  only  conversely, 


66  Social  Laws 

when,  in  a  similar  perplexity,  the  deni- 
zen of  our  modern  cities,  persuaded  in 
advance  that  the  new  is  always  prefer- 
able to  the  old,  makes  precisely  the 
opposite  choice.  Nevertheless,  the  case 
where  the  opinion  of  the  individual  is 
founded  on  reasons  extrinsic  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  models  compared  and  the 
two  ideas  or  acts  in  opposition,  should 
be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  case 
where  he  chooses  in  virtue  of  a  judg- 
ment resting  on  the  intrinsic  character 
of  these  two  ideas  or  volitions;  hence, 
the  term  logical  should  be  reserved  for 
the  influences  that  decide  him  in  the 
latter  case. 

I  need  not  discuss  this  question  further 
at  present,  since  in  the  next  chapter  I 
shall  have  occasion  to  speak  again  of 
these  logical  and  teleological  duels,  which 
constitute  the  fundamental  terms  of  social 
opposition.  /Let  me  only  add  here  that 
the  interferences  of  imitation-rays  are  not 
always  impediments  to  each  other's  pro- 


Tbe  Repetition  of  Phenomena         67 

gress ;  often  they  result  in  mutual  alli- 
ances, which  serve  to  accelerate  and  en- 
large the  radiation ;  sometimes  they  are 
even  responsible  for  the  rise  of  some 
generic  idea,  which  is  born  of  their  en- 
counter and  combination  within  a  single 
head,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  chapter  de- 
voted to  social  adaptation/ 


CHAPTER   II 

THE    OPPOSITION    OF    PHENOMENA 

-v 

THEORETICALLY,  the  repeti- 
tion aspect  of  phenomena  is  the 
most  important  one  to  consider; 
but  their  opposition  aspect  is 
of  greater  practical^ jnterest,  viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  scientific  applicability. 
Yet,  from  the  days  of  Aristotle  down  to 
the  present,  this  latter  has  been  either 
completely  misunderstood,  or  at  least 
hidden  from  view  amid  the  disordered 
mass  of  other  differences. 

Here,  as  in  the  former  case,  we  may 
say  that  the  progress  of  science  consists 
in  doing  away  with  the  small  number  of 
superficial  gross  oppositions  that  were 
perceived  or  imagined  at  first,  and  replac* 
68 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        69 

Ing  them  by  countless  profounder  .and 
subtler  oppositions,  that  are  exceedingly 
difficult  to  discover ;  and  that  it  involves 
the  substitution  of  internal  for  external 
oppositions  in  the  subject  under  discus- 
sion. We  may  further  add  that  it  also 
serves  to  clear  away  certain  apparent 
dissymmetries  or  asymmetries,  and  sub- 
stitute for  them  numerous  others,  deeper 

hidden  and  more  instructive. 

>fA-^ 

Consider  the  oppositions  existing  in  the 
realm  of  stars.  Day  and  night  and  heaven 
and  earth  were  the  first  antitheses  pro- 
posed ;  on  these  the  theological  cosmogo- 
nies, those  embryos  of  astronomy  and 
geology,  just  beginning  life,  or  striving 
to  begin  it,  subsisted.  The  next  opposi- 
tions to  appear  possessed  more  truth,  but 
they  were  still  misunderstood,  or  were 
entirely  subjective  or  superficial:  thus  we 
find  zenith  and  nadir  (which  is  merely  the 
old  antithesis  between  up  and  down  car- 
ried to  its  logical  conclusion);  the  four  car- 
dinal points  of  the  compass  set  over  against 


70  Social  Laws 

one  another  in  pairs  ;  winter  and  summer, 
spring  and  autumn,  morning  and  evening, 
midday  and  midnight,  the  first  and  last 
quarters  of  the  moon,  and  so  on.  All 
these  oppositions  were  retained,  it  is  true, 
even  after  the  science  grew  older ;  never- 
theless they  lost  much  of  their  original 
importance  and  significance.  The  west 
is  not,  for  savage  races,  as  it  is  for  us, 
merely  a  relative  direction,  defined  with 
respect  to  our  position  as  we  face  the  so- 
called  polar  stat ;  to  them  the  west  is  the 
region  of  happiness  after  death,  the  ever- 
lasting abode  of  souls ;  for  others,  the  east 
fulfils  this  same  role.  Hence,  their  ritual 
determines  the  direction  that  temples  and 
tombs  shall  face.  The  first  and  last  quar- 
ters of  the  moon  have  assuredly  not  the 
important  imaginary  meaning  attributed 
to  them  by  the  superstitious  tillers  of  the 
soil  in  primitive  times,  or  even  by  our 
own  peasants.  According  to  them,  the 
new  moon  is  the  direct  cause  of  rapid 
growth,  while  the  old  moon  hinders  the 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        71 

growth  of  whatever  is  planted  during  one 
or  other  of  its  two  phases.  This  is  a  ves- 
tige of  the  old  antithesis  between  dies 
fasti  and  dies  nefasti. 

Thus,  these  oppositions  have  been  pre- 
served, but  with  a  superficial  and  conven- 
tionalized meaning.  Others,  again,  have 
been  eliminated,  as,  for  example,  the  op- 
position between  celestial  and  terrestrial, 
and  between  sun  and  moon ;  while  the 
emphasis,  as  in  the  former  instances,  has 
been  transferred  to  other  oppositions, 
possessing  a  farjieeper  meaning.  First, 
the  discovery  of  the  elliptic,  parabolic, 
or  hyperbolic  character  of  the  orbits  de- 
scribed by  stars,  planets,  and  comets  led  to 
the  perception  of  the  complete  symmetry 
of  the  two  halves  of  the  orbit  on  either 
side  of  the  major  axis.  (That  is,  complete, 
aside  from  certain  perturbations  which  are 
reciprocal  repetitions  of  the  curves  of  one 
star  by  another,  within  the  same  system.) 
Next,  it  was  observed  that  the  ellipses  of 
the  planets*  courses  increased  and  de- 


72  Social  Laws 

creased  alternately,  with  great  regularity, 
oscillating  about  a  certain  position  of  equi- 
librium. Finally,  the  most  profound, 
widespread,  and  enduring^opposition  in 
astronomy,  and  the  basis  of  all  the  rest, 
is  the  equality  of  the  attraction  exerted 
upon  every  mass  and  molecule  and  that 
exerted  by  itJ  Each  attracts  and  is  at- 
tracted in  like  degree.  This  is  one  of  the 
most  beautiful  illustrations  of  the  physi- 
cal law  of  universal  opposition,  called  the 
law  of  the  equality  and  contrariety  of  ac- 
tion and  reaction. 

Physics  and  chemistry,  like  astronomy, 
began  with  pseudo-oppositions.  The  four 
elements  imagined  by  the  early  physicists 
were  contrasted  with  one  another  in  pairs : 
water  as  against  fire,  and  air  as  against 
earth.  Innate  antipathies  were  supposed 
to  exist  between  certain  substances. 
More  wholesome  ideas  respecting  the 
true  nature  of  physical  and  chemical 
opposition  were  reached  when  men  dis- 
covered the  characteristics  of  bases  and 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        73 

acids^and  the  sort  of  opposition  between 
them ;  still  more  so,  when  they  discovered 
the  two  opposite  kinds  of  electricity  and 
the  polarity  of  light.  The  concept  of 
polarity,  which  has  played  so  important 
a  role  in  physico-chemical  theories, 
marked  a  great  advance  over  previous 
conceptions,  until  it  was  itself  explained 
by  the  concept  of  undulations,  into  which 
its  effects  have  been  resolved,  or  are  in 
a  fair  way  to  be  resolved.  And  just  as 
light,  heat,  jinct  electricity  appear  to  be., 
spherical  or  linear  propagations  of  vibra- 
tions at  once  infinitely  ^mall  and  infinitely 
rarjid,  so  there  is  ajtendency  to  consider 
chemical_cgmbination  as_an  harmonious 
union  and  interlacing  of  waves.  But 
here  we  touch  on  the  domain  of  adapta- 
tion. Even  attraction  itself  has  often 
been  explained  as  due  to  the  impacts  of 
ether  vibrations.  However  this  may  be, 
it  is  nevertheless  certain  that  the  ellipti- 
cal orbits  of  the  stars  are  comparable,  ex- 
cept in  respect  to  dimensions,  to  physical 


74  Social  Laws 

vibrations,  since  the  molecules  follow  an 
elongated  elliptical  course,  and  a  rhythm 
of  undulation  exists  in  both  cases.  In 
short,  we  observe  how  the£field  of  oppo- 
sitions has  been  extended  and  broadened 
by  the  progress  of  science,  and  how,  in 
place  of  qualitative  oppositions,  there 
have  appeared  those  exact  and  rhythmic 
quantitative  oppositions  which  form  the 


texture  of  the  world-fabric??  The  won- 
derful symmetry  of  crystalline  forms  in 
every  chemical  substance  constitutes  a 
graphic  interpretation  and  visual  ex- 
pression of  the  rhythmic  oppositions 
between  those  countless  movements  of 
which  it  is  the  embodiment.  And  must 
we  not  also  look  to  this  rhythm  of  the 
internal  movements  of  a  body  for  the 
ultimate  explanation  of  MendelejefFs  law, 
which  shows  us  that  the  groups  of  sub- 
stances form  a  number  of  successive,  rising 
scales,  like  a  piano  from  whose  keyboard 
some  keys  here  and  there  are  missing, 
which  we  shall  replace  from  time  to  time  ? 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        75 

But  while  the  evolution  of  the  physi- 
cal sciences  revealed  certain  oppositions 
and  symmetries  that  were  at  once 
clearer,  more  profound,  and  more  satis- 
factory in  the  explanations  they  afforded, 
it  also  brought  to  light  certain  asymme- 
tries, lack  of  rhythm,  or  inoppositions,  of 
far  greater  importance.  It  showed,  for 
example,  that  in  all  our  solar  system 
there  is  no  planetary  body  with  a  retro- 
grade motion,  that  is,  with  a  motion  in 
the  opposite  direction  to  that  of  the 
general  run  of  planets;  the  only  excep- 
tion to  this  is  in  the  case  of  certain 
satellites.  The  form  of  the  nebulae 
revealed  by  our  telescopes  is  often 
unsymmetrical.  We  have  not  the 
slightest  reason  for  believing  that  any 
relation  of  symmetry  exists  between  the 
evolution  and  dissolution  of  a  solar 
system  (if,  indeed,  there  be  a  dissolution), 
or  between  the  formation  of  the  succes- 
sive geological  strata  in  a  planet,  and  its 
final  separation  into  fragments,  if  the  ideas 


76  Social  Laws 

\ 
of  M.  Stanilas  Meunier  on  this  point  be 

accepted.  With  all  the  progress  that 
astronomy  has  made,  the  scattering  and 
grouping  of  the  stars  in  the  heavens 
remains,  as  before,  a  mighty  example  of 
picturesque  disorder  and  randomness. 
Indeed,  this  spectacle  of  sublime  disorder 
appears  more  striking  as  greater  advances 
have  been  made  in  the  knowledge  of 
forces  in  equilibrium  and  symmetrically 
opposed,  which  form  their  apparent  con- 
stituents. What  astronomer  of  to-day 
would  dream,  like  the  ancients,  of  an  anti- 
world,  or  antichtkon,  where  everything 
exhibited  the  reverse  of  the  terrestrial 
order?  Again,  as  the  geography  of  our 
planet  becomes  better  known,  we  are 
more  than  ever  struck  with  the  absence  of 
symmetry  in  the  form  of  its  continents 
and  mountain  chains,  and  Elie  de  Beau- 
mont's notion  of  the  re'seau  pentagonal 
no  longer  attracts  any  one.  The  advance 
of  crystallography  has  brought  to  notice 
dissymmetries  hitherto  unperceived,  whose 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        77 

importance  have  been  set  in  relief  by 
the  work  of  Pasteur.  But  I  can  merely 
mention  this  subject. 

In  the  realm  of  life,  the  grosser  and 
more  obvious  oppositions,  such  as  life 
and  death,  youth  and  old  age,  were  the 
first  to  be  observed ;  these  were  the 
earliest  correspondences  noted  between 
animals  and  plants,  and  formed  the  rudi- 
ments of  general  biology.  Moreover,  it 
was  impossible  not  to  notice  the  sym- 
metry of  living  forms,  so  striking  and 
strange  because  of  its  universality.  Yet, 
here,  too,  fancy  gave  birth  to  a  host 
of  oppositions  unreal  or  without  value, 
ong  them  may  be  mentioned  the 
angels  and  demons,  both  of  which  were 
conceived  as  being  superior  species  of 
animals.  Similarly,  for  the  savage,  and 
sometimes  even  for  the  uncultured  man 
of  our  day,  the  most  important  opposi- 
tion in  the  realm  of  life  is  between 
things  that  are  gQod__to_  eat  and  those 
that  ar<e  not,  that  is,  between  nutritious 


78  Social  Laws 

and  poisonous  plants,  and  between  use- 
ful and  harmful  animals.  Here  we  have 
an  opposition  that  is  real  in  a  subjec- 
tive sense,  but  imaginary  in  so  far  as  it  is 
believed  to  hold  objectively,  as  it  is  by 
ignorant  men  of  all  races.  Physicians 
for  a  long  time  conceived  of  sickness 
and  health  as  two  exactly  opposite  states, 
and  believed  that  the  causes  of  sickness 
were  the  exact  reverse  of  the  causes  of 
health.  The  error  of  homoeopathy  was 
due,  at  bottom,  to  this  illusion.  Sickness 
and  health,  as  thus  conceived,  are  merely 
verbal  entities,  which  the  advances  of 
physiology  have  cast  aside;  pathological 
deviations  are  phases  of  the  physiological 
functions,  instead  of  being  opposed  to 
them.  The  dissolution  of  the  individual 
was  also  regarded  as  the  inverse  of  evo- 
lution, old  age  being  considered  as  a 
return  of  childhood.  This  view  was 
only  finally  eliminated  when  embryology 
brought  to  light  the  passage  through  a 
series  of  ancestral  forms,  which  have, 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        79 

obviously,    no    inverse    analogue    in    the 
successive  stages  of  senile  decay. 

Long  after  the  sciences  dealing  with 
life  were  organized,  physiologists  'still 
imagined  a  certain  artificial  opposition,  as 
well  as  a  scientific  one,  which  they  held 
existed  between  the  animal  and  vegeta- 
ble kingdoms.  In  their  eyes,  vegetable 
respiration  was  exactly  the  reverse  __of 
animal_respiration  ;  the_jormer  destroyed 
wr^at^  the  latter  produced,  namely,  the 
union  of  oxygen  and  carbon.  Compara- 
tive physiology,  as  developed  by  Claude 
Bernard  and  others,  demonstrated  the 
superficial  character  of  this  opposition, 
and  established  the  fundamental  unity  of 
the  two  kingdoms,  showing  them  to  be 
not  inverse,  but  divergent.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  growth  of  knowledge  elimi- 
nated these  false  or  vague  oppositions 
between  different  groups  of  beings, 
different  beings,  and  different  entities 
within  the  same  being,  and  substituted 
countless  real  though  infinitesimal  op- 


80  Social  Laws 

positions  in  the  inmost  nature  of  the 
tissues;  for  example,  the  oxidation  and 
deoxidation  of  each  cell,  or  the  gain  and 
loss  of  energy.  Here,  again,  opposition 
appears  most  fundamental  and  fruitful 
under  the  form  of  rhythm,  rather  than 
in  the  guise  of  strife. 

But  at  the  same  time,  certain  new  and 
more  subtle  dissymmetries  were  brought 
to  light.  To  cite  but  a  single  instance, 
the  study  of  the  cerebral  functions,  when 
it  demonstrated  the  localization  of  the 
speech  function  in  the  left  hemisphere, 
established  a  very  important  dissymmetry 
of  function  between  the  two  halves  of  the 
brain.  And  this  is  not  the  only  case 
where  symmetry  of  form  between  corre- 
sponding organs  of  the  two  sides  of  the 
body,  such  as  the  right  and  left  hand, 
the  right  and  left  eye,  etc.,  has  been 
found  to  cover  a  wide  dissymmetry  or 
asymmetry  in  their  function.  Besides 
this,  as  I  said  above,  that  very  ancient 
hypothesis,  so  plausible  in  appearance, 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        81 

that  the  dissolution  of  living  beings  and 
types  must  be  exactly  opposite  to  the 
manner  of  their  evolution,  was  forced  to 
surrender  before  the  advances  of  obser- 
vation. And  this  lack  of  symmetry 
between  the  two  opposite  slopes  of  life, 
—  its  ascent  and  descent,  —  whether  in 
individuals  or  in  the  species,  has  an  im- 
portant meaning;  for  it  goes  to  show 
that  life  is  not  a  mere  play  —  a  see-saw 
of  forces,  so  to  speak  —  but  rather  an 
act  of  going  forward,  and  that  the 
notion  of  progress  is  not  an  idle  one.  It 
enables  us  to  view  the  oppositions  of 
phenomena,  with  all  their  symmetries, 
struggles,  and  rhythms,  and  in  like  man- 
ner their  repetitions,  as  simply  instru- 
ments or  mean  terms  of  progress. 

Sociology  gives  rise  to  analogous  re- 
flections. In  the  beginning  (for  in  some 
respects  the  science  is  quite  ancient),  it 
started  as  a  mythology,  and  after  the 
manner  of  mythologies  it  was  satisfied 
with  explaining  everything  in  history  by 


82  Social  Laws 

fantastic  struggles,  or  imaginary  wars  of 
enormous  dimensions  between  good  and 
evil  deities,  gods  of  light  and  darkness, 
or  heroes  and  monsters.  But  metaphys- 
ics made  undue  use  of  contests,  quite  as 
much  as  mythology;  for  the  metaphysi- 
cians also  imagined  oppositions  between 
direct  and  reverse  series,  and  held  that 
developments  of  humanity  in  one  direc- 
tion were  followed  by  developments  in 
the  contrary  direction.  On  this  point 
Plato  and  the  Hindu  philosophers  join 
hands.  Hegel,  with  his  sweeping  gen- 
eralizations, his  marshalling  of  different 
races  under  the  banner  of  Antagonistic 
Ideas,  and  Cousin,  with  his  imaginary 
antithesis  between  Oriental  Infinity  and 
Greek  Finity,  are  excellent  examples  of 
the  sociological  antinomies  of  the  past. 
All  this  has  vanished ;  and  to-day,  espe- 
cially after  the  amazing  Europeanization 
of  Japan  within  the  past  few  years,  we 
do  not  even  venture  to  set  the  supposed 
immutability  of  the  Asiatics  over  against 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        83 

the   supposed    innate    progressiveness    of 
the   European  races. 

The  political  economists  have  already 
rendered  social  science  a  noteworthy  ser- 
vice, by  substituting  for  war,  as  the  key- 
note of  history,  the  factor  of  competition 
which  is  a  species  of  war  not  only  modi- 
fied and  mollified,  but  at  the  same  time 
dwarfed  and  manifolded.  Finally,  if  our 
point  of  view  be  adopted,  the  competi- 
tion of  desires  and  beliefs  must  be  re- 
garded as  constituting  the  basis  of 
what  political  economists  call  the  compe- 
tition between  consumers  and  the  com- 
petition between  producers.  Generalizing 
this  struggle,  and  extending  it  to  every 
form  existing  in  the  social  life,  —  lin- 
guistic, religious,  political,  artistic,  and 
moral,  as  well  as  industrial,  — we  see  that 
the  really  fundamental  social  opposition 
must  be  sought  for  in  the  bosom  of  the 
social  individual  himself,  whenever  he 
hesitates  between  adopting  or  rejecting  a 
new  pattern  offered  him,  whether  in  the 


84  Social  Laws 

way  of  phraseology,  ritual,  concept,  canon 
of  art,  or  conduct.  This  hesitation,  this 
miniature  internal  battle,  which  is  re- 
newed a  million  times  every  moment  of 
a  nation's  life,  constitutes  the  infinitely 
minute  and  infinitely  fruitful  opposition 
that  underlies  history.  It  is  producing  a 
peaceful  but  far-reaching  revolution  in  the 
realm  of  sociology. 

At  the  same  time,  and  from  this  same 
standpoint,  the  auxiliary  and  subordinate 
character  of  social  opposition  (even  in 
its  psychological  form)  is  shown  by  the 
appearance  of  a  large  number  of  asym- 
metries and  dissymmetries  that  did  not 
at  first  reveal  themselves.  I  find  it  nec- 
essary to  distinguish  (and  on  this  point 
I  find  no  one  to  contradict  me)  between 
the  reversible  and  the  irreversible  in 
every  species  of  social  fact ;  and  of 
these  the  irreversible  have  always  proved 
the  more  important  category ;  as,  for  ex-" 
ample,  the  series  of  discoveries  in  science 
and  the  industrial  life.  Again,  for  the 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        85 

very  reason  that  the  life  of  each  social 
individual  is  composed  of  such  numerous 
psychological  oppositions,  there  has  been 
a  real  accentuation  of  his  individual 
characteristics,  or  his  personality,  some- 
thing which  has  no  antithesis,  and  for 
which  the  so-called  genius  of  a  people, 
or,  if  you  prefer,  the  genius  of  a  lan- 
guage, or  a  religion,  is  merely  a  collec- 
tive and  abbreviated  form  of  expression. 
We  find,  also,  that  the  aesthetic  side  of 
the  social  life,  the  side  on  which  it  can 
neither  be  compared  nor  opposed  to  any- 
thing, is  supported  by  this  very  inter- 
play of  infinite  minute  oppositions,  which 
I  have  just  described. 

But  this  summary  glance  is  very  in- 
complete. It  is  important  to  examine 
more  closely  this  subject,  which  has  been 
so  little  explored,  though  deserving  of 
the  greatest  attention.  Let  us,  first  of 
all,  come  to  a  clear  understanding  with 
regard  to  the  different  meanings  of  the 
word  opposition.  In  my  work  on  Uni- 


86  Social  Laws 

versal  Opposition  I  proposed  a  definition 
and  a  classification  to  which  I  may  be 
permitted  to  refer.  Let  us  sum  the  mat- 
ter up  briefly  from  our  present  point  of 
view.  /Opposition  is  erroneously  con- 
ceived by  the  average  thinker  as  the 
maximum  degree  of  difference,  i  In  real- 
ity, it  is  a  very  special  kind  of  repeti- 
tion, namely,  of  two  similar  things  that 
are  mutually  destructive  by  virtue  of  their 
very  similarity.  (In  other  words,  oppo- 
sites  or  contraries  always  constitute  a 
couple  or  duality;  they  are  not  opposed 
to  each  other  as  beings  or  groups  of 
beings,  for  these  are  always  dissimilar 
and,  in  some  respect,  sui  generis ;  nor 
yet  as  states  of  a  single  being  or  of  dif- 
ferent beings,  but  rather  as  tendencies 
or  forces.  For,  if  we  regard  certain 
forms  or  certain  states,  such  as  concave 
and  convex,  pleasure  and  pain,  heat  and 
cold,  as  opposites,  it  is  by  reason  of 
the  real  or  assumed  contrariety  of  the 
forces  which  produce  these  states. 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        87 

Thus  we  see  that  it  is  necessary  to 
eliminate  from  the  start,  as  so  many 
pseudo-oppositions,  all  the  antitheses  of 
mythology  and  the  philosophy  of  history 
which  are  based  on  assumed  natural 
contrarieties ;  for  example,  the  contra- 
rieties between  two  nations,  two  races, 
or  two  forms  of  government  (such  as  re- 
public and  monarchy,  to  cite  certain 
Hegelians  in  this  matter);  or  between 
Occident  and  orient,  two  religions  (such 
as  Christianity  and  Mohammedanism),  or 
two  families  of  languages  (such  as  the 
Semitic  and  Indo-European).  These  con- 
trasts chance  to  be  partially  true,  if  we 
take  into  consideration  the  manner  in 
which  the  things  in  question  deny  or  af- 
firm the  same  notion,  and  desire  or  reject 
the  same  end,  under  certain  more  or  less 
ephemeral  circumstances.  But  if  the  an- 
tipathy of  these  things  for  each  other  be 
regarded  as  essential,  absolute,  and  innate, 
as  many  ancient  philosophers  seemed  to 
believe,  they  are  wholly  chimerical. 


88  Social  Laws 

Thus,  every  real  opposition  implies  a 
relation  between  two  forces,  tendencies, 
or  d%r£cti#QS.  But  the  phenomena  by 
means  of  which  these  two  forces  become 
actualities  are  of  two  kinds,  —  qualitative 
and  quantitative,  —  that  is,  they  may  be 
composed  of  either  heterogeneous  or 
homogeneous  parts.  A  series  made  up 
of  heterogeneous  factors  is  a  species  of 
evolution  that  can  always  be  conceived 
of  (whether  rightly  or  wrongly)  as  revers- 
ible, or  capable  of  going  back  by  -fol- 
lowing the  same  road  in  precisely  the 
opposite  direction.  For  example,  if  a 
chemist,  taking  a  piece  of  wood  and 
going  through  a  series  of  operations, 
ends  by  extracting  brandy  from  it,  this 
does  not  of  course  imply  that  it  would 
be  possible  to  reconstruct  the  piece  of 
wood  by  a  series  of  inverse  operations ; 
yet  if  this  is  not  a  possibility,  it  is  at 
least  conceivable.  And  this  was  the 
dream  of  the  ancient  philosophers  with 
respect  to  the  transformations  of  human- 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        89 

ity.  A  series  made  up  of  homogeneous 
factors  is  an  evolution  of  a  special  sort, 
known  as  increase  or  decrease,  wax  or 
wane,  rise  or  fall.  Without  entering  too 
minutely  into  the  facts,  we  must  notice 
how,  as  social  science  develops  with  the 
advance  of  civilization,  instances  of  exact 
and  measurable  oppositions  of  this  sort 
continue  to  appear  and  multiply,  giving 
us  fluctuations  of  the  stock  market 
and  statistical  diagrams  on  which  are 
registered  in  wave-like  cu  ves  the  rise 
and  fall  of  some  particular  security,  of 
some  particular  species  of  crime,  of  sui- 
cide, the  birth-rate,  marriage,  or  thrift  as 
measured  by  the  returns  of  the  savings 
banks,  insurance  companies,  etc. 

The  distinction  just  made  is  between 
oppositions  of  series  (evolution  and 
counter-evolution)  and  oppositions  of  de- 
gree (increase  and  diminution).  A  still 
more  important  category  to  be  considered 
consists  of  oppositions  of  sign,  or,  if  we 
prefer,  diametrical  oppositions.  Although 


90  Social  Laws 

these  last  are  often  confused  with  the 
preceding  in  the  language  of  mathematics, 
in  which  plus  and  minus  symbolize  in- 
crease and  diminution  as  well  as  positive 
and  negative  directions,  it  is  nevertheless 
true  that  the^  alternate  increasg^jind  de- 
crease  of  a  force  acting  always  in  the 
same  direction  constitutes  a  very  different 
sort  of  opposition_from_Jjiat-Qf---two  forces,\ 
one  of  which  acts  from  A  toward  B,  and 
the  other  from  B  toward  A,  both  along 
the  same  straight  line.  Similarly,  the 
contrast  between  the  increase  and  de- 
crease of  a  credit  balance  must  not  be 
confused  with  the  contrast  between  such 
a  credit  and  an  equal  debt;  and  the 
growth  or  diminution  of  the  tendency  to 
theft  or  crime,  in  a  given  society,  is  quite 
a  different  thing  from  the  antithesis 
between  this  tendency  and  the  tendency 
to  charity  and  philanthropy.  In  order 
to  give  at  once  a  psychological  explana- 
tion of  these  and  many  other  social  con- 
trasts, we  may  observe  that  an  increase 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        91 

followed  by  a  diminution  of  our  affirma- 
tive belief  in  a  notion,  whether  religious 
or  scientific,  legal  or  political,  is  quite  a 
different  matter  from  our  affirmation  fol- 
lowed by  our  rejection  of  this  same  idea, 
and  that  an  increase  followed  by  a  dimi- 
nution of  our  desire  for  something,  for 
instance  our  love  for  a  woman,  is  quite 
a  different  matter  from  a  desire  followed 
by  a  repugnance  to  the  same  object, 
such  as  our  love  toward  this  woman  and 
then  our  hatred  of  her.  It  is  certainly 
interesting  to  note  that  each  of  these 
subjective  quantities,  belief  and  desire, 
possesses  two  opposite  signs,  the  positive 
and  negative,  and  that  in  this  respect 
they  admit  of  comparison  with  objective 
quantities,  such  as  mechanical  forces 
which  act  in  opposite  directions  along  the 
same  straight  line.  Space  is  so  consti- 
tuted as  to  admit  of  an  infinity  of  couples 
whose  members  are  opposed  to  each 
other  in  direction,  and/our  consciousness 
is  so  constituted  as  to  admit  of  an  infinity 


92  Social  Laws 

of  affirmations  opposed  to  negations,  or 
an  infinity  of  desires  opposed  to  repug- 
nances, each  having  precisely  the  same 
object^  Except  for  these  two  unique  in- 
stances, whose  coincidence  is  remarkable, 
the  universe  would  know  neither  war  nor 
discord,  and  all  the  tragic  side  of  life 
would  be  both  impossible  and  incon- 
ceivable. 

^  One  observation  is  necessary,  however. 
The  oppositions  of  every  sort  —  of  series, 
degrees,  or  signs — may  take  place  between 
terms  that  find  expression  either  in  one 
and  the  same  being  (whether  molecule,  or- 
ganism, or  self),  or  in  two  different  beings 
(molecules,  masses,  organisms,  or  human 
consciousnesses).  But;  we  must  distinguish 
carefully  between  these  two  cases.  This 
is  of  primary  importance  for  the  sake  of 
another  distinction  that  is  no  less  essential, 
namely,  the  distinction  between  the  case 
where  the  terms  are  simultaneous  and  the 
case  where  they  are  successive.  In  the 
former  there  is  a  collision,  strife^and  then 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        93 

equilibrium ;  in  the  latter  there  is  alterna- 
tion and  rhythm.  In  the  former  there  is 
always  destruction  and  loss  of  energy ;  in 
the  latter  there  is  neither."'  Now  when  any 
oppositions  whatsoever,  whether  of  series, 
degrees,  or  signs,  occur  in  two  different 
beings,  they  may  be  either  simultaneous  or 
successive  —  either  strife  or  rhythm.  But 
when  both  of  their  terms  belong  to  one  and 
the  same  being,  body,  or  self,  they  can  only 
be  both  simultaneous  and  successive  if 
they  are  oppositions  of  signs.  As  for  the 
oppositions  of  series  and  degrees  under 
this  hypothesis,  they  admit  only  of  a  succes- 
sion or  alternation  of  terms.  For  instance, 
it  is  impossible  for  the  velocity  of  a  body 
moving  in  a  given  direction  to  increase  and 
diminish  at  the  same  time ;  it  can  only  do 
so  successively.  But  it  may  well  happen 
that  it  is  impelled  at  the  same  time  by  two 
distinct  forces  to  move  in  two  opposite 
directions ;  this  is  the  case  of  equilibrium, 
which  is  often  characterized  by  a  sym- 
metry of  opposite  forms,  notably  in  the  case 


94  Social  Laws 

of  crystals.  Similarly,  it  is  impossible  for 
the  love  of  a  man  for  a  woman  to  increase 
and  diminish  at  the  same  time :  such  a 
thing  can  only  occur  alternately;  but  it 
may  easily  occur  for  him  to  love  and  hate 
the  same  woman  at  the  same  time  —  an  an- 
tinomy of  the  heart  that  finds  illustration 
in  many  crimes  of  passion.  Again,  it  is  im- 
possible for  the  religious  faith  of  a  man 
to  increase  and  diminish  at  the  same  time : 
this  can  only  occur  successively ;  but  it 
may  easily  happen  that  he  has  in  his 
thoughts,  at  the  same  time,  though  often 
without  being  himself  aware  of  it,  a  vigor- 
ous affirmation  and  a  no  less  vigorous  if 
implicit  denial  of  certain  dogmas ;  that  he 
holds  at  once  a  certain  Christian  belief,  and 
a  certain  worldly  or  political  prejudice 
which  is  opposed  to  it.  Finally,  it  is  evi- 
dently impossible  for  one  and  the  same 
molecule  to  pass  through  a  certain  series 
of  chemical  transformations  and  the  in- 
verse series  at  the  same  time,  or  for  the 
same  man  to  be  experiencing  the  same 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        95 

psychological  states  in  two  opposite  orders 
at  the  same  time ;  that  can  only  occur  suc- 
cessively. But,  on  the  other  hand,  nothing 
is  more  common  than  to  observe,  in  a  sys- 
tem of  bodies,  astronomical  or  otherwise, 
one  body  passing  from  aphelion  to  perihe- 
lion, while  another  body  is  passing  at  the 
same  time  from  perihelion  to  aphelion ;  or 
one  body  that  is  accelerating  its  speed, 
while  another  is  slackening  it.  And  nothing 
is  more  common  than  to  observe,  in  a  soci- 
ety, one  person's  ambition  or  faith  increas- 
ing while  the  ambition  or  faith  of  another 
is  declining ;  or,  again,  one  person  who,  in 
making  a  round  trip,  passes  through  a 
certain  series  of  visual  impressions,  while 
another,  taking  the  opposite  route,  passes 
through  the  same  series  of  impressions  in 
the  inverse  order. 

A  discussion  of  each  of  the  species  of 
oppositions  here  pointed  out  would  carry 
us  beyond  our  limits.  We  must  be  satis- 
fied with  a  few  general  reflections.  I  First, 
then,  if  external  oppositions  exist  (for  so  we 


96  Social  Laws 

may  term  the  oppositions  of  tendencies 
between  different  beings  or  men),  they  are 
rendered  possible  by  the  fact  that  internal 
oppositions  (between  different  tendencies 
within  the  same  being  or  man)  exist  or  may 
exist/jThis  applies  to  oppositions  of  series 
and  degress  as  well  as  to  oppositions  of 
sign,  but  more  particularly  to  the  latter. 
If  certain  men  or  groups  of  men  are  devel- 
oping in  one  direction,  while  other  men 
or  groups  of  men  are  developing  in  the 
contrary  direction,  it  is  because  each  indi- 
vidual man  can  either  develop  or  counter- 
develop  in  this  way ;  as,  for  example,  in 
the  transition  from  naturalism  to  idealism, 
or  from  idealism  to  naturalism,  in  art,  and 
from  an  aristocracy  to  a  democracy,  or  vice 
versa,  in  government,  etc.  If  religious 
faith  is  on  the  increase  among  certain 
races  or  classes,  while  among  others  it  is 
on  the  decline,  it  is  because  the  conscious- 
ness of  each  individual  man  admits  of 
either  an  increase  or  a  diminution  in  the 
intensity  of  religious  faith.  Finally,  if 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        97 

there  exist  political  parties  and  religious 
sects  which  affirm  and  desire  what  other 
parties  and  sects  deny  and  reject,  it  is  be- 
cause the  mind  and  heart  of  each  individ- 
ual man  is  capable  of  containing  both  the ' 
yes  and  the  no,  the  pro  and  the  con,  with 
respect  to  any  given  concept  br  aim. 

"Nevertheless,  I  am  far  from  wishing 
to  identify  external  with  internal  contests. 
In  one  sense  they  are  incompatible ;  for 
it  is  only  when  the  internal  struggle  is 
ended,  when  the  individual,  after  hav- 
ing been  pulled  hither  and  thither  by 
contrary  influences,  has  made  his  choice, 
and  adopted  a  certain  opinion  or  resolu- 
tion rather  than  some  other  —  it  is  only 
when  he  has  made  peace  with  himself  — 
that  war  between  himself  and  those  who 
have  made  the  opposite  choice  becomes 
possible.  Nor  is  this  of  itself  sufficient 
to  bring  about  such  a  war.  The  individ- 
ual must  know,  in  addition,  that  the  others 
have  chosen  the  opposite  of  what  he  has 
himself  chosen.  Without  this,  any  ex- 


98  Social  Laws 

ternal  opposition  of  contraries,  whether 
simultaneous  or  successive,  would  be 
practically  non-existent,  for  it  would  pre- 
sent none  of  those  characteristics  that 
render  an  external  struggle  really  effec- 
tive. To  bring  about  religious  war  or 
strife,  it  is  essential  for  every  adherent 
of  one  faith  to  know  that  the  adherents 
of  some  other  faith  deny  exactly  what  he 
affirms  ;  and  this  negation  must  be  placed 
side  by  side  in  his  consciousness  with  his 
own  affirmation,  not  as  though  adopted 
imitatively,  but  rather  as  being  definitely 
rejected  by  him,  and  hence  redoubling 
the  intensity  of  his  own  belief.  To  bring 
about  industrial  competition,  as,  for  in- 
stance, among  the  bidders  at  the  sale  of 
a  house,  each  one  must  know  that  his 
desire  to  possess  the  building  is  opposed 
by  his  competitors,  who  wish  him  not  to 
get  it ;  and  he  will  desire  all  the  more  to 
get  possession  of  it,  if  he  knows  that  the 
rest  do  not  wish  him  to  do  so.  Without 
this,  mere  competition  would  be  fruitless, 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena        99 

and  political  economists  have  erred  here 
in  not  clearly  distinguishing  the  special 
case  where  there  exists,  in  the  minds 
of  the  competitors,  no  knowledge  at  all 
of  the  competition,  from  the  varying 
measure  of  that  knowledge,  as  shown 
in  the  infinite  number  of  degrees  that 
separate  complete  understanding  from 
complete  ignorance  of  the  fact. 

This  was  my  ground  for  saying,   as  I 
did   further   back,    that   the   fundamental 
social  opposition  must  be  sought,  not,  as 
one   might  be  tempted  to  think,  at  first 
sight,  in  the  relation ,  of  two  contrary  or 
contradictory    individuals,^  but    rather    in  \ 
those  logical  and  teleological  duals,  those  / 
curious   combats   between   thesis  and  an-/ 
tithesis,  between  willing  and  nilling,  whose) 
stage  is  the   consciousness  of   the   social 
individual.    Of  course  the  question  may  be) 
asked :  If  this  be  true,  how  does  this  social 
opposition  differ  from  any  purely  psycho- 
logical opposition?    ^To^this^j^  reply :    It 
differs  in  cause.  and_..still_m.or.e.  in  Deflect. 


100  Social  Laws 

First,  as  to  its  cause.  When  a  solitary 
individual  receives  from  his  senses  two 
apparently  contradictory  impressions,  he 
hesitates  between  two  sense  judgments, 
one  of  which  says  that  that  spot  down 
there  is  a  lake,  while  the  other  denies  it. 
Here  is  an  internal  opposition  of  purely 
psychological  origin,  a  thing  which  oc- 
curs but  seldom,  however,  j  Indeed,  we 
may  assert  without  fear  of  error  that 
every  doubt  or  hesitation  experienced  by 
even  the  most  isolated  man  belonging  to 
the  most  savage  of  tribes  is  due  to  an 
encounter  within  himself,  either  of  two 
rays  of  instances  which  come  together  and 
interfere  in  his  brain,  or  else  of  a  single 
ray  of  instances  which  runs  athwart  of 
some  sense  perception.*"?  In  writing,  I 
often  hesitate  between  two  synonymous 
phrases,  each  of  which  appears  prefera- 
ble to  the  other  under  the  given  circum- 
stances ;  here  it  is  two  rays  of  imitation 
"Ihat  interfere  within  me  —  I  refer  to  the 
two  human  series  which,  beginning  with 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      101 

the  first  inventor  of  each  of  these  phrases, 
have  reached  on  down  to  myself.  For, 
each  of  these  phrases  I  learned  from  some 
individual,  who  learned  it  from  some 
other,  and  so  on  up  to  the  first  one  who 
uttered  it.  (This,  let  me  say  again,  is  what 
I  mean  by  a  ray  of  imitation,  or  imitative 
ray;  and  the  sum  total  of  rap  'of  this 
kind  derived  from  any  tangle  invertor, 
originator,  or  innovator,  whose  -pattern  is 
reproduced,  is  what  I  call  an  imitative 
radiation.  Our  social  life  includes  a  thick 
network  of  radiations  of  this  sort,  with 
countless  mutual  interferences.)  Or,  take 
other  instances.  /  Suppose  I  am  a  judge, 
and  hesitate  between  a  view  based  on  a 
series  of  decrees  following  an  opinion 
promulgated  by  some  author,  such  as 
Marcade  or  Demolombe,  and  an  opposing 
view  resting  on  another  series  of  decrees 
emanating  from  some  other  commentator ; 
this,  again,  is  an  interference  of  two  imi- 
tative rays.  I  Similarly,  when  I  hesitate 
between  gas  and  electricity  as  a  means  of 


102  Social  Laws 

illuminating  my  apartment.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  a  young  peasant,  observing 
the  sunset,  is  at  a  loss  whether  to  believe 
his  schoolmaster,  who  assures  him  that 
the  fall  of  night  is  due  to  the  motion  of 
the  earth  and  not  to  the  motion  of  the 
sun,  or  the  testimony  of  his  senses,  which 
tell  him  ]  flic  contrary,  in  such  a  case  there 
is  but  a  single  imitative  ray,  which,  reach- 
ing out  through  his  schoolmaster,  unites 
him  with  Galileo;  nevertheless  this  is  suffi- 
cient to  render  his  hesitation,  his  own 
internal  opposition,  social  in  origin. 

But  it  is  above  all  in  its  effects,  or 
rather  in  its  lack  of  effectuality,  that 
purely  individual  opposition  differs  from 
the  fundamental  form  of  social  opposi- 
tion, though  the  latter  is  individual  also. 
Sometimes  the  individual's  hesitation  re- 
mains shut  up  within  himself,  and  is 
neither  reproduced  nor  tends  to  spread 
by  imitation  among  his  neighbors ;  in 
this  case  the  phenomenon  remains  purely 
individual.  But  more  often  doubt  itself 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      103 

is  almost  as  contagious  as  faith,  and  any 
person  who  becomes  sceptical  in  an  en- 
vironment that  is  fervent  through  force 
of  example,  is  soon  the  source  of  a 
scepticism  that  radiates  out  from  him 
and  about  him.  Can  we  deny,  in  this 
case,  the  social  character  of  the  internal 
strife  which  each  individual  of  this  group 
experiences  ? 

But  let  us  face  the  question  in  a  still 
more  general  way.  When  an  individual 
becomes  aware  of  a  contradiction  existing 
between  one  of  his  conclusions,  aims,  no- 
tions, or  habits,  —  such  as  a  dogma,  turn 
of  phraseology,  commercial^  procedure, 
species  of  arm  or  tool,  etc.,  —  and  the 
conclusion,  aim,  notion,  or  habit  of  some 
other  man  or  men,  one  of  Jjiree  tilings 
happens.  '  On  the  one  hand,  he  may 
allow  himself  to  be  completely  influenced 
by  the  other,  and  abruptly  abandon  his 
own  mode  of  thinking  or  acting  ;  in  this 
case  there  is  no  internal  strife,  the  vic- 
tory occurs  without  a  struggle,  and  pre- 


UNIVERSITY 


104  Social  Laws 

sents  one  of  the  many  instances  of  imita- 
tion which  make  up  the  social  life.  ^On 
the  other  hand,  our  individual  may  only 
half  submit  to  the  other's  influence ;  this 
is  the  case  we  were  considering  above, 
and  the  shock  is  here  followed  by  a 
diminution  of  its  force,  so  that  it  be- 
comes more  or  less  weakened  and  para- 
lyzed. ^Or,  finally,  he  may  actively  op- 
pose the  strange  action  or  habit,  —  the 
belief  or  volition  with  which  he  has  come 
in  contact,  —  and  assert  or  desire  all 
the  more  strenuously  what  he  asserted 
and  desired  before.  Yet,  even  in  this 
last  case,  where  he  rouses  all  the  strength 
of  his  conviction  or  passion  to  repel  an- 
other's example,  he  experiences  a  certain 
unrest,  an  internal  strife  —  though  of  an- 
other sort,  it  is  true,  and  as  inspiring  as 
the  former  was  enervating.  This  unrest, 
also,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  results 
from  an  over-excitement  and  not  a  par- 
alysis of  one's  individual  force,  is  likely 
to  spread  contagiously ;  and  this  is  what 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      105 

causes  the  splitting  up  of  a  society  into 
parties.  A  new  party  always  consists  of 
a  group  of  persons  who,  one  after  an- 
other and  copying  one  another,  have 
adopted  a  notion  or  course  contrary  to 
that  which  had  hitherto  reigned  in  their 
midst,  and  with  which  they  themselves 
had  been  imbued.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  new  dogmatism,  becoming  more  in- 
tense and  intolerant  as  it  spreads,  raises 
against  itself  a  coalition  of  those  who, 
remaining  faithful  to  tradition,  have  made 
exactly  the  opposite  choice,  and  thus  two 
fanatical  parties  find  themselves  face  to 
face. 

/"So  we  see  that,  whether  in  a  violent, 
dogmatic  form,  or  in  a  weaker,  sceptical 
one,  the  juxtaposition  of  two  opposite 
terms  is  social  in  character,  provided  it 
spreads  by  imitation.  Were  the  case 
otherwise,  we  would  be  compelled  to  say 
that  there  is  nothing  social  in  such  facts 
as  these :  the  rivalry  of  two  languages, 
as,  for  example,  French  and  German,  or 


106  Social  Laws 

French  and  English,  on  their  respective 
frontiers,  in  Belgium,  Switzerland,  and 
the  Channel  Islands ;  or  the  rivalry  of 
two  religions  which  are  neighbors.  One 
of  these  languages  or  religions  constantly 
encroaches  on  the  other,  as  a  result  of 
ceaseless  battles  waged,  not  between 
rival  human  beings,  but  within  each  in- 
dividual mind  and  consciousness,  between 
two  rival  phrases  or  faiths.  Is  there 
anything  that  presents  a  greater  soci- 
ological interest  than  these  alluvial  de- 
posits of  language  and  religion  ?  Psy- 
chological oppositions,  then,  work  them- 
selves out  in  a  social  way,  and  it  is  always 
proper  to  go  back  to  that  starting-point. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  quite  important  not 
to  confuse  the  two  forms  in  which  opposi- 
tion presents  itself,  —  the  one,  where  the 
struggle  of  the  two  juxtaposed  terms 
takes  place  in  the  individual  himself,  and 
the  other,  where  the  individual  adopts 
but  one  of  the  opposing  terms,  although 
the  two  are  placed  side  by  side  within 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      107 

him,  and  where,  consequently,  the  strug- 
gle occurs  only  in  his  relations  with  other 
men.  One  may  ask  himself  in  this  con- 
nection, as  I  asked  long  ago,  in  one 
of  my  first  articles,1  which  is  worse 
for  a  society:  to  be  divided  into  parties 
and  sects  fighting  over  opposing  pro- 
grammes and  dogmas,  and  into  nations 
continually  warring  with  one  another,  or 
to  be  composed  of  individuals  at  peace 
with  one  another,  but  each  individually 
striving  within  himself,  a  prey  to  scepti- 
cism, irresolution,  and  discouragement? 
Is  it  better  to  enjoy  this  superficial  peace, 
which  covers  up  a  state  of  fierce  and 
ceaseless  war  in  minds  wrestling  with 
themselves,  or  shall  we  admit  that 
the  bloodiest  wars,  even  religious  wars 
and  the  attacks  of  political  fever  which 
characterize  the  most  blood-thirsty  revo- 
lutions, are  preferable  to  that  torpor? 
Were  it  true  that  we  must  choose  be- 

1  An  article  incorporated  later  into  rny  Laws  of  Imi- 
tation, Ch.  I,  near  the  end. 


108  Social  Laws 

tween  these  two  solutions,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  social  problem  would  be 
exceedingly  difficult  to  settle.  And  does 
it  not  appear  to  be  true  ?  Does  it  not 
seem  as  though  the  moment  men  ceased 
to  make  war  upon  one  another  on  the 
battlefield,  or  to  fight  one  another  des- 
perately in  the  arena  of  industrial  or 
political  competition,  they  fell  into  the 
profound  uneasiness  characteristic  of 
anxious,  vacillating,  and  discouraged  souls, 
wavering  between  priests  and  doctors 
who  contradict  one  another,  between  the 
time-honored  maxims  of  a  lip-worshipped 
ethics  and  the  opposing  practices  of  an 
ethics  that  dares  not  as  yet  declare  it- 
self ?  And  when  men  put  an  end  to 
their  internal  divisions,  waverings  and 
discussions  concerning  opposing  doc- 
trines and  lines  of  conduct,  do  they  not 
range  themselves  into  two  camps,  ac- 
cording to  the  different  choice  they  have 
made,  and  proceed  once  more  to  fight 
one  another  ?  We  should  have  to  choose, 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      109 

then,  between  external  war  and  internal 
strife.  Such  would  seem  to  be  the  ulti- 
mate dilemma  confronting  those  who 
dream  of  a  perpetual  peace,  among  whom 
I  number  myself. 

Fortunately,  the  truth  is  not  so  sad 
and  discouraging  as  they  make  out. 
Observation  proves  that  every  condition 
of  strife,  whether  external  or  internal, 
always  aims  at,  and  ends  by  passing 
into,  a  decisive  victory  or  a  treaty  ol 
peace.  As  far  as  internal  strife  is  con- 
cerned, whether  we  call  it  doubt,  irreso- 
lution, anguish,  or  despair,  one  thing,  at 
least,  is  evident  :  tjns_^^__M..^tru^gle_ 


transient  crisis,  and  no   one   should   take 
it  upon  himself  jo_consider  it  the  normal_ 
affairs  ^or  to  judge   it  preferable 


(with  all  its  painful  agitations)  to  the  so- 
called  effeminate  peace  involving  regular 
work  under  the  guidance  of  a  decided 
will  and  a  securely  formed  judgment. 
And  as  regards  external  strife,  the  strug- 


110  Social  Laws 

gle  among  men,  can  it  be  otherwise  ? 
If  history  be  correctly  interpreted,  it 
shows  that  war  is  forever  developing 
in  one  particular  direction,  and  that  this 
course,  repeated  hundreds  of  times  and 
easy  to  disentangle  among  the  thickets 
and  undergrowth  of  history,  seems  to 
indicate  its  ultimate  disappearance,  after 
it  has  gradually  become  rarer.  In  fact, 
as  a  result  of  that  imitative  radiation, 
which  labors  constantly  and,  so  to  speak, 
clandestinely  to  enlarge  the  special  field 
of  social  phenomena,  all  the  latter  are 
in  process  of  enlargement,  and  war  is 
participating  in  the  movement.  From 
a  countless  number  of  very  small  but 
exceedingly  bitter  wars  between  petty 
clans,  we  pass  to  a  smaller  number  of 
somewhat  larger  and  less  rancorous  wars: 
first  between  small  cities,  then  between 
large  cities,  then  between  nations  that 
are  continually  growing  greater,  till 
finally  we  arrive  at  an  era  of  very 
infrequent  but  most  impressive  conflicts, 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      111 

quite  devoid  of  hatred,  between  colossal 
nations,  whose  very  greatness  makes 
them  inclined  to  peace. 

Let  me  stop  here  to  observe  that,  in 
thus  passing  from  the  small  to  the  great, 
and  from  very  numerous  instances  of 
the  small  to  very  rare  cases  of  the  great, 
the  evolution  of  war,  and  of  social  phe- 
nomena generally,  seems  to  contradict  the 
evolution  of  the  sciences  as  I  have  hith- 
erto described  it.  Yet,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  it  only  serves  afc  an  indirect  proof 
and  confirmation.  ^For  since  everything 
in  the  world  of  facts  proceeds  from  small 
to  great,  everything  in  the  world  of  ideas, 
which  reflects  it  as  though  reversed  in  a 
mirror,  naturally  proceeds  from  great  to 
small,  and  in  the  course  of  its  analysis 
comes  upon  the  elementary  facts  and  real  , 
explanations  only  at  the  end  of  its  journey.  / 

To  return  now  to  the  main  discussion. 
At  each  of  these  successive  stages  and 
expansions,  which  are  chiefly  processes  of 
tranquillization,  war  as  a  whole  has  dimin- 


112  Social  Laws 

ished,  or,  at  least,  been  transformed  in 
a  manner  tending  toward  its  ultimate 
disappearance.  Each  aggrandizement  of 
states,  as  they  grew  from  tribes  to  cities, 
and  from  cities  to  kingdoms,  empires, 
and  immense  federations,  meant  the  sup- 
pression of  warfare  in  a  region  ever 
more  widely  extended.  There  have  al- 
ways been  on  the  earth,  down  to  the 
present  day,  certain  regions,  sometimes 
quite  limited,  each  of  which  was  long  re- 
garded by  its  inhabitants  as  forming  a 
sort  of  universe  by  itself;  for  example, 
a  valley  shut  in  by  mountains,  a  large 
island,  a  bit  of  continent  nearly  cut  off 
from  the  rest,  and  later  on  the  entire 
circumference  of  an  inland  sea.  When 
this  miniature  universe  was  pacified  by 
a  series  of  conquests  which  put  every 
locality  in  it  under  the  same  yoke,  it 
seemed  as  if  the  final  end  sought  for  — 
universal  peace  —  were  attained.  Such  a 
momentary  respite  occurred  in  the  em- 
pire of  the  Pharaohs,  the  Chinese  Em- 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      113 

pire,  the  Peru  of  the  Incas,  certain  isles 
of  the  Pacific,  and  the  Roman  Empire. 
Unfortunately,  no  sooner  was  this  fascinat- 
ing goal  dimly  seen,  than  it  fled  farther 
away ;  the  earth  appeared  larger  than  had 
been  suspected ;  relations,  first  pacific, 
then  belligerent,  were  set  up  with  power- 
ful neighbors,  whose  very  existence  had 
hitherto  not  been  suspected;  these  must 
be  conquered  or  conquer,  if  the  world's 
peace  was  to  be  firmly  established.  '  The 
development  of  war  is,  in  fact,  a  gradual 
extension  of  the  area  of  peace.  But  this 
extension  cannot  go  on  indefinitely;  this 
flitting  mirage  cannot  forever  torment  our 
view,  since  the  globe  has  limits  and  we 
have  long  since  encircled  it.  (What  char- 
acterizes especially  our  own  epoch  and 
differentiates  it  widely,  in  a  sense,  from 
the  entire  past,  although  the  laws  of  his- 
tory apply  to  it  no  less  nor  more  than 
to  its  predecessors,  is  this :  that  now,  for 
the  first  time  in  history,  the  international 
polity  of  the  great  states  of  civilization 


114  Social  Laws 

embraces  within  its  purview,  not  merely 
a  single  continent,  or  two  at  most,  but 
the  whole  globe,  so  that  the  last  stage 
of  the  evolution  of  war  is  at  length  dis- 
covering itself,  in  a  vista  so  dazzling 
that  we  can  scarcely  believe  our  eyes ; 
the  end  of  this  vista  is  certainly  difficult 
to  attain,  but  it  is  a  real  end,  and  no 
deception  this  time,  and  it  can  no  longer 
move  away  as  we  approach  it.  Is 
there  not  something  in  this  fitted  to  in- 
spire every  heart  ?  After  establishing 
peace  on  the  borders  of  a  river,  such 
as  the  Nile  or  the  Amur,  and  on  the 
coasts  of  a  small  sea,  —  after  playing  first 
a  fluvial  and  then  a  Mediterranean  role, 
as  Metchnikoff  has  pointed  out,  and  as 
the  laws  of  imitative  radiation  explain  to 
perfection,  —  civilization  is  in  a  fair  way 
to  become  oceanic,  that  is  to  say,  world- 
wide; and  the  critical  period  of  growth 
being  now  past,  the  grand  harvest  season 
V  is  about  to  begin. 

It  is,  of   course,  true  that  when  war  is 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      115 

at  an  end  the  painful  struggles  among 
mankind  will  not  be  found  to  have  dis- 
appeared entirely.  There  are  other  forms 

of  strife  besides  war,  notably  competition. 

^ — 

But  what  has  just  been  said  applies  also 
to  competition,  which  is  a  social  oppo- 
sition of  the  economic  instead  of  the 
political  type.  Like  war,  competition  pro- 
ceeds from  the  small  to  the  great,  and 
from  very  numerous  instances  of  the 
very  small  to  very  infrequent  instances 
of  the  very  great.  "  Ever  since  its  incep- 
tion, competition  has  appeared  in  three 
forms :  as  among  the  producers  of  the 
same  article,  as  among  the  consumers 
of  the  same  article,  and  between  pro- 
ducer and  consumer  or  seller  and  buyer 
of  the  same  article.  For,  as  respects 
different  articles,  there  is  no  mutual  op- 
position of  desires ;  there  is,  rather,  a 
mutual  adaptation,  when  the  articles  in 
question  are  capable  of  being  exchanged. 
Since  we  touch  here  on  a  very  deli- 
cate question,  which  can  be  approached 


116  Social  Laws 

for  the  present  only  from  a  special  side, 
and  without  joining  either  the  party  of  col- 
lectivists  or  their  opponents,  let  us  make 
one  or  two  remarks,  whose  truth  is  not 
open  to  question.  Competition  is  an  am- 
biguous word  which  signifies  at.  once,  or 
in  turn,  joint  action  and  contest}  land  this 
is  why  a  dispute  goes  on  incessantly 
between  those  who,  seeing  only  the  op- 
position aspect  of  this  equivocal  phenom- 
enon, rightly  deprecate  it,  and  those  who, 
regarding  it  only  from  the  adaptation 
side,  laud  it  for  the  civilizing  inventions 
it  has  brought  about.  However,  it  is 
only  the  unfavorable  side  that  we  are 
considering  here. 

It  is  not  at  all  essential  that  the  de- 
sires of  the  different  consumers  or  the  dif- 
ferent producers  of  the  same  article  should 
conflict  or  contradict  one  another;  not 

1  The  English  word  competition  leans  decidedly  to 
the  latter  meaning;  the  French  word  concurrence,  which 
the  author  uses,  means  both  competition  and  concurrent 
action.  —  TR. 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      117 

even  when  the  desires  of  some  are  con- 
fronted with  the  desires  of  others.  The 
producer  and  the  buyer  are  always  in 
accord  to  this  extent,  that  one  wishes  to 
buy  what  the  other  wishes  to  sell;  true, 
it  is  not  always  at  the  same  price,  but 
there  is  always  some  price  that  brings 
them  into  agreement  and  ends  the  dis- 
pute between  them.  Nor  are  the  desires 
of  the  producers  in  any  respect  contra- 
dictory, so  long  as  each  has  his  own  par- 
ticular patronage  and  market,  inextensible 
for  the  time  being,  like  his  production; 
they  come  into  conflict  only  when,  with 
the  extension  of  the  facilities  of  produc- 
tion, each  desires  to  produce  more,  and 
to  appropriate  to  his  own  advantage  the 
production  of  others,  (it  is  true  that,  as 
civilization  results  in  a  constant  growth 
of  the  power  of  production,  this  strife 
between  co-producers  is  inevitable\  and 
bound  to  become  constantly  more  severe. 
Finally,  as  regards  the  desires  of  the 
consumers  of  a  given  ajticle,  we  may 


118  Social  Laws 

say  that,  far  from  being  mutually  injuri- 
ous, the  competitors  for  the  purchase  of 
an  article  more  frequently  aid  one  an- 
other, when  the  production  of  that  arti- 
cle is  of  such  a  character  as  to  proceed 
pari  passu  with  its  consumption :  thus, 
the  more  people  there  are  who  wish  to 
purchase  bicycles,  the  more  the  price  of 
bicycles  will  fall.  The  desires  of  the 
consumers  are  really  contradictory  only 
in  case  the  supply  of  the  article  in  ques- 
tion is  less  than  the  demands  for  it,  as 
frequently  happens  with  the  prime  neces- 
sities of  life  and  also  the  greatest  luxu- 
ries—  and  in  case  the  supply  cannot  be 
increased  as  rapidly  as  the  desire  for  it 
increases  through  the  contagious  influence 
of  fashion. 

To  return  to  our  previous  discussion, 
after  making  these  explanations,  it  sj^ould 
be  observed  that  each  of  the  three  kinds 
of  competition  here  distinguished  obeys 
the  law  already  pointed  out.  As  between 
buyer  and  seller,  the  petty  bargainings 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      119 

of  the  small  markets  of  primitive  times 
were  ceaseless  and  innumerable.  Grad- 
ually these  are  done  away  with,  but  only 
to  be  replaced  by  those  greater  sales  to 
which  the  imposition  by  the  municipal 
councils  of  a  municipal  tax  on  wheat  or 
meat  gives  rise.  When  these  are  abol- 
ished in  turn,  they  are  replaced  by  still 
greater  transactions,  and  by  discussions 
in  parliament  concerning  measures  which 
aim  to  promote  the  interests  of  the  mass 
of  producers  or  the  mass  of  consumers 
in  the  nation,  by  imposing  or  abolishing 
certain  customs  duties.  (The  so-called 
consumers'  cooperative  societies,  that  is, 
societies  in  which  the  consumer  and  pro- 
ducer are  one,  are  born  of  the  desire  to 
put  an  end  to  this  species  of  competi- 
tion and  they  develop  with  the  latter. 
Amogg  purchasers,  the  competition  goes 
on  increasing  also.1  1  In  small  primitive 

1  In  times  of  famine,  to-day,  there  is  not  a  sack  of 
flour  in  the  remotest  village  of  the  Crimea  or  America 
that  does  not  find  as  competitors  for  its  possession,  not 


120  Social  Laws 

markets  the  competition  for  a  sack  of 
flour  or  head  of  cattle  is  limited  to  a 
few  persons.  When  these  markets  begin 
to  extend  and  diminish  in  number,  these 
countless  little  competitions  end  either  in 
an  amalgamation  of  interests,  or  too  often 
in  little  local  monopolies,  and  are  suc- 
ceeded by  more  extensive  competitions, 
that  grow  constantly  more  extensive,  till 
they  also  culminate  either  in  important 
unions,  such  as  the  agricultural  syndi- 
cates, or  in  vaster  monopolies,  such  as  the 
gigantic  kartells  or  trusts  with  which  we 
are  all  familiar. 

But  let  us  turn  to  the  form  of  compe- 
tition which  has  been  most  studied,  and 
which  is  in  reality  the  fiercest,  because  it 

merely  a  few  persons  in  the  neighborhood,  as  formerly, 
but  the  merchants  of  all  the  European  nations.  Simi- 
larly, in  ordinary  times,  there  is  not  a  masterpiece  of 
art,  nor  an  old  book  in  the  most  obscure  of  French 
castles,  that  does  not  have  to  fear  a  contest  for  its  pur- 
chase, not  merely  among  a  few  amateurs  of  the  neigh- 
borhood or  province  or  of  all  France,  but  even  among 
the  billionnaires  of  America. 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      121 

is  the  most  clearly  perceived  ;  namely,  that 
between  producers.  It  begins  with  count- 
less rivalries  among  petty  merchants  who 
contend  over  miniature  markets,  originally 
side  by  side,  yet  almost  without  com- 
munication. But  as  the  latter,  breaking 
down  their  barriers,  pass  over  into  greater 
but  less  numerous  markets,  the  petty  rival 
shops  also  consolidate,  either  voluntarily 
or  perforce,  into  greater  but  less  numerous 
factories,  in  which  the  work  of  production, 
hitherto  a  prey  to  its  own  jealous  opposi- 
tion, is  now  harmoniously  coordinated ; 
and  the  rivalry  of  these  factories  repro- 
duces, on  a  larger  scale,  the  former  rivalry 
of  the  shops,  until,  with  the  gradual  ex- 
pansion of  the  markets,  which  tend  to 
become  a  single  market,  we  arrive  at  a 
stage  where  there  remain  merely  a  few 
giants  of  industry  and  commerce,  which 
are  still  rivals,  unless,  indeed,  they  also 
have  come  to  some  understanding. 

In  short,  competition  develops  in  con- 
centric circles,  which  are  continually  en- 


122  Social  Laws 

larging.  But  the  underlying  condition  and 
raison  d'etre  of  this  enlargement  of  com- 
petition is  the  enlargement  of  association. 
Of  association  or  monopoly,  our  opponents 
will  insist,  y  Granted ;  yet  monopoly  is  but 
one  of  two  solutions  which  the  problem  of 
competition  admits,  just  as  imperial  unity 
is  but  one  of  two  solutions  to  the  problem 
of  war.  The  former  problem  may  be 
solved  by  association  of  individuals,  as  the 
latter  is  capable  of  solution  by  a  federation 
of  peoples.  Moreover,  monopoly  itself,  as 
it  extends,  becomes  alleviated,  and  if,  in 
certain  kinds  of  production,  it  should  be- 
come universal,  —  the  goal  toward  which 
it  is  tending,  and  which  M.  Paul  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  is,  I  believe,  wrong  in  considering 
absolutely  and  forever  unattainable,1  - 

!  A  monopoly  is  always  partial  and  relative.  Un- 
doubtedly  M.  Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu  is  right  in  saying 
that  competition  never  results  in  an  absolute  and  complete 
monopoly  ;  and  the  instance  he  cites  of  the  great  stores, 
the  Bon  Marche,  for  example,  which,  after  overcoming 
the  competition  of  so  many  little  stores,  has  experienced 
new  competition  from  the  Louvre,  the  Printemps,  the 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      123 

it  would  probably  be  more  bearable,  often 
times,  than  the  condition  of  acute  compe- 
tition whose  place  it  takes.  Competition, 
then,  tends  either  to  monopoly  (at  least  a 
partial  and  relative  one)  or  to  the  associa- 
tion of  competitors,  just  as  war  leads  to 
a  crushing  of  the  vanquished,  or  to  the 
conclusion  of  a  fair  treaty  with  him  —  in 
either  case,  to  at  least  a  partial  and  rela- 

Samaritaine,  etc.,  seems  at  first  sight  convincing.  But  in 
reality,  within  a  certain  radius  and  to  a  certain  extent^ 
each  of  these  colossi  of  commerce  has  succeeded  in  mo- 
nopolizing a  field  for  which  thousands  of  petty  firms  were 
contending;  each  has  its  own  particular  following  in  the 
country  —  a  following  which,  for  some  reason  or  other, 
whether  caprice  or  fashion,  belongs  exclusively  to  itself. 
This  is,  most  frequently,  merely  for  the  reason  that  it  has 
the  reputation  of  excelling  its  rivals  in  the  quality  of  some 
particular  article.  Really,  this  so-called  competition 
between  great  stores  can  easily  be  moderated  and  toned 
down  by  mutual  understandings,  which  are  far  more  easy 
to  reach,  on  account  of  the  small  number  interested,  than 
in  the  case  of  the  more  numerous  smaller  firms  whose 
place  they  take  ;  and,  furthermore,  such  competition 
tends  more  and  more  to  become  a  mere  division  of  labor, 
or  rather  an  apportionment  of  partial  monopolies  which 
they  have  come  to  share  or  are  gradually  beginning 
to  share. 


124  Social  Laws 

live  pacification.  The  growth  of  conquer- 
ing states  led  to  this  same  result.  The 
great  modern  states,  taking  the  place  of 
the  mediaeval  fiefs,  inaugurated  a  reign  of 
peace  which  has  hitherto,  I  admit,  been 
incomplete  and  brief,  but  which  is  increas- 
ing in  extent  and  duration,  like  the  great 
armaments  of  the  present  day.  To  deny 
that  competition  passes  over  into  monopoly 
(or  into  association),  and  to  believe  that  we 
are  thereby  defending  competition  against 
those  who  decry  it,  is  simply  to  reject  the 
one  excuse  that  can  be  put  forward  in  its 
favor.  It  is  just  as  though,  in  order  to 
defend  militarism  against  the  attacks  that 
have  been  made  upon  it,  we  strove  to  de- 
monstrate that  war  did  not  bring  peace  in 

r 

its  train,  as  a  consequence  of  Victory.  War, 
it  is  true,  only  passes  over  into  peace  that 
it  may  spring  toxlife  again,  out  of  peace, 
on  a  far  grander  scale  ;  and  so,  too,  compe- 
tition only  resolves  itself  temporarily  into 
association  that  it  may  reappear  again,  out 
of  association,  in  the  form  of  rivalries  be- 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      125 

tween  associations,  corporations,  syndicates, 
and  so  on.  But  in  this  way  we  finally  ar- 
rive at  a  certain  limited  number  of  gigantic 
associations  which,  not  being  open  to  fur- 
ther growth,  can  only  associate  together, 
after  having  fought  one  another  awhile. 
l^A.  third  great  form  of  social  strife  is  dis- 
cussion. This  is  doubtless  implied  in  the 
preceding  ;  but,  if  war  and  competition  are 
discussions,  one  is  a  discussion  in  deeds  of 
blood,  the  other  a  discussion  in  deeds  of 
ruin.  Let  us  say  a  word  now  with  regard 
tq  verbal  discussion,  pure  and  simple. 
This,  too,  when  it  develops,  —  for  there  are 
any  number  of  little  private  discussions 
which,  fortunately,  do  not  develop,  but  die 
on  the  spot,  —  develops  in  the  way  just  de- 
scribed, though  here  the  process  is  far  less 
obvious.  It  is  only  after  the  mental  dis- 
cussion between  contradictory  ideas  within 
the  same  mind  has  ended  (this  should  not 
be  forgotten),  that  any  verbal  discussion  is 
possible  between  two  men  who  have  solved 
the  question  differently.  Similarly,  if  ver- 


126  Social  Laws 

bal,  written,  or  printed  discussions  between 
groups  of  men,  and  groups  that  are  ever 
widening,  takes  the  place  of  verbal  dis- 
cussion between  two  men,  it  is  because  the 
more  limited  discussion  has  been  brought 
to  an  end  by  some  relative  and  temporary 
agreement,  or  some  sort  of  unanimity. 
These  groups  are  first  split  up  into  an  end- 
less multitude  of  little  coteries,  clans, 
churches,  forums,  and  schools,  which  com- 
bat one  another ;  but  at  length,  after  many 
polemics,  they  are  welded  into  a  very  small 
number  of  great  parties,  religions,  parlia- 
mentary groups,  schools  of  philosophy, 
and  schools  of  art,  which  engage  one  an- 
other in  mortal  combat.  Was  it  not  thus 
that  the  Catholic  faith  became  gradually 
established  ?  In  the  first  two  or  three  cen- 
turies of  the  Church's  history,  countless 
discussions,  always  intense  and  often 
bloody,  were  waged  among  the  members 
of  each  local  church,  ending  in  their  agree- 
ing upon  a  creed;  but  this  creed,  dis- 
agreeing in  certain  particulars  with  those 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      127 

of  neighboring  churches,  gave  rise  to  con- 
ferences and  provincial  councils,  which 
solved  the  difficulties,  excepting  that  they 
occasionally  disagreed  with  one  another, 
and  were  forced  to  carry  their  disputes 
higher  up,  to  national  or  oecumenical  coun- 
cils. The  political  unity  of  ancient 
France,  under  a  monarchical  form  of  gov- 
ernment, was  similarly  brought  about ;  and 
the  political  unity  of  modern  France,  along 
democratic  lines,  is  in  process  of  construc- 
tion in  the  same  way.  What  I  may  call 
linguistic  unity  (that  is,  the  unity  of  na- 
tional language,  which  succeeds  rivalries 
among  dialects  and  provincialisms  that  re- 
sist the  purifying  tendency)  has  been  simi- 
larly established.  The  unity  of  legal  codes 
has  long  since  been  accomplished  in  an 
analogous  manner :  countless  local  customs 
have  arisen,  settling  thousands  of  individ- 
ual discussions  concerning  rights  (though 
not  all,  as  the  court  records  prove) ;  these 
customs,  coming  into  conflict  with  one  an- 
other, have  been  reconciled  by  certain 


128  Social  Laws 

sectional  customs,  which  have  finally  been 
replaced  by  uniform  legislation.  The 
unity  of  science,  operating  slowly  over  a 
wide  field,  through  a  succession  of  discus- 
sions, alternately  settled  and  reopened, 
among  scientists  and  scientific  schools, 
would  give  rise  to  similar  reflections. 

Among  these  various  forms  of  dis- 
cussion, one  in  particular  deserves  atten- 
tion, namely,  judicial  discussion  or  the 
trial  of  civil  suits.  J,Is  it  true  that  the 
scope  of  judicial  procedure  is  likewise 
enlarging,  and  by  this  very  growth  is 
rushing  to  its  own  extinction  ?  1  However 
strange  this  proposition  may  appear  at 
first,  it  is  certainly  true.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  clear  that,  among  primitive 
peoples,  trials  were  in  no  way  different 
from  private  wars ;  in  fact,  except  for 
the  presence  of  the  sovereign  judge,  the 
state,  most  of  the  differences  between 
litigants  would  have  ended  in  blows. 
Trials  are  modified  duels;  they  are  wars 
in  embryo.  And,  conversely,  wars  are 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      129 

law-suits  between  nations;  they  are  a 
litigation  that  has  attained  its  natural 
development,  through  the  absence  of  any 
supra-national  authority.  If,  then,  we 
compare  the  judicial  contests  of  to-day 
that  occur  before  tribunals,  with  those  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  where  the  parties  con- 
cerned were  armed  champions,  or  with 
the  earlier  ones  between  kindred  tribes, 
we  must  acknowledge  that  the^Jieat  of 

litigation     has     continually grown     less. 

And  I  may  add  that  it  has  grown  less 
by  reason  of  jthese.  very  extensions.  In 
fact,  we  may  say  that  the  scope  of  legal 
questions  has  been  extended,  as  local 
customs  gave  place  to  provincial  customs, 
and  finally  to  national  laws ;  at  each  step 
in  the  process  of  judicial  unification, 
every  kind  of  law-suit  (that  is,  every 
question  of  right)  leads  to  two  diamet- 
rically opposite  opinions,  and  thus  be- 
comes more  general  in  character.  Now 
it  is  through  just  such  a  process  of  gen- 
eralization that  every  kind  of  discussion 


130  Social  Laws 

finally  arrives  at  its  last  stage :  a  deci- 
sion of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  dries 
up  the  fountain-head  of  this  species  of 
suit.  How  many  fountain-heads  of  this 
sort  have  been  dried  up,  even  within  the 
present  century ! 

The  objection  may  possibly  be  raised 
that  as  races  become  more  civilized  they 
tend  more  and  more  to  discussion,  and 
that,  far  from  taking  the  place  of  private 
discussion,  our  public  discussions,  po- 
lemics of  the  press,  and  parliamentary 
debates  only  add  -fuel  to  them.  But 
such  an  objection  would  be  without 
force.  For  if  savages  and  barbarians 
discuss  little  (which  is  fortunate,  since 
most  of  their  discussions  degenerate  into 
quarrels  and  combats),  it  is  because  they 
scarcely  speak  or  think  at  all.  When 
we  consider  the  very  small  number  of 
their  ideas,  we  ought  to  be  surprised 
that  they  clash  so  often,  relatively 
speaking;  and  we  should  marvel  to 
find  men  with  so  few  different  interests 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      131 

so  quarrelsome.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
thing  which  we  ought  to  wonder  at,  but 
which  we  scarcely  notice,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  is  this :  /that  in  our  own 
cities,  despite  the  great  current  of  ideas 
sweeping  over  us  in  conversation  and 
reading,  there  are,  on  the  whole,  so  few 
discussions,  and  these  so  lacking  in 
warmth,  j  We  should  be  amazed  to  find 
that  men  who  think  and  talk  so  much 
contradict  one  another  so  seldom,  to  see 
that  they  accomplish  so  much  and  clash  so 
little;  just  as  we  should  wonder  at  see- 
ing so  few  carriage  accidents  in  our 
streets,  which  are  so  animated  and 
crowded,  or  at  seeing  so  few  wars  break 
out  in  this  era  of  complex  and  far-reach- 
ing international  relations.  What  is  it, 
then,  that  has  brought  us  into  agreement 
on  so  many  points  ?  It  is  the  three 
great  productions,  that  have  been  gradu- 
ally  wrought  out  by  centuries  of  discus- 
sion, namely,  Religion,  Jurisprudence, 
and  Science.  We  may  note,  also,  that 


132  Social  Laws 

in  a  civilized  country  public  discussions 
far  exceed  private  ones  in  importance, 
lively  interest,  and  earnestness,  even, 
while  in  a  barbarous  land  the  reverse  is 
true.  Our  parliamentary  sessions  are 
increasing  in  violence,  while  the  tone  of 
discussions  in  the  cafe  and  the  drawing- 
room  is  softening.1 

To  sum  up.  The  strife  of  opposition 
in  human  society,  in  its  three  principal 
forms  — war,  competition,  and  discus- 
sion—  proves  obedient  to  one  and  the 
same  law  of  development,  through  ever 
widening  areas  of  temporary  pacification, 
alternating  with  renewals  of  discord  more 
centrally  organized  and  on  a  larger  scale, 
and  leading  up  to  a  final,  at  least  partial, 
agreement.""?  It  would  appear  from  this 
—  and  we  Tiave  many  other  reasons  for 
the  conclusion — that  the  strife  of  op- 
position fulfils  the  role  of  a  middle  term 

1  The  reader  may  be  reminded  of  Bagehot's  treatment 
of  "  The  Age  of  Discussion  "  in  his  Physics  and  Politics. 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      133 

in  the  social,  as  it  does  in  the  organic 
and  inorganic,  worlds,  and  that  it  is 
destined  gradually  to  fade  away,  exhaust 
itself,  and  disappear,  as  a  result  of  its 
own  growth,  which  is  merely  a  progress 
toward  its  own  destruction.  / 

Indeed,  it  is  now  a  favorable  moment 
for  stating,  or  rather  restating  more  ex- 
plicitly, the  relation  between  those,  three 
great  scientific  aspects__of__the__iHiiverse 
which  I  call  the  Repetition^ j>ppositionf 
"and  T^Haptation  of  phenomena.  The 
last  two  arise  out  of  the  first,  and  the 
second  is  usually,  though  not  always, 
an  intermediary  ^between  the  first  and 
third.  It  is  because  physical  forces 
spread,  or  tend  to  spread,  in  a  geomet- 
rical ratio,  by  their  own  wave-like  repeti- 
tions, that  they  interfere,  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  combine  adaptively;  their  shocks 
of  interference  apparently  serve  only  as 
preparations  for  their  unions  of  interfer- 
ence, that  is,  their  combinations.  It  is 
because  living  species  tend  to  increase 


134  Social  Laws 

in  a  geometrical  ratio  by  the  hereditary 
repetition  of  individual  copies,  that  they 
interfere,  and  give  rise,  either  to  felici- 
tous and  fruitful  cross-breeds  or  to  the 
struggles  for  existence  so  carefully  studied 
by  the\parwinians,  who  regard  vital  in- 
terference only  from  its  sanguinary  side 
considering  it,  with  obvious  exaggeration, 
as  the  sole  or  chief  factor  in  the  crea- 
tion of  new  species,  that  is,  in  the  re- 
adaptation  of  old  species.  And,  similarly, 
it  is  because  certain  social  phenomena, 
such  as  a  dogma,  phrase,  scientific  prin- 
ciple, moral  maxim,  prayer,  industrial 
process,  or  the  like,  tend  to  spread  in  a 
geometrical  ratio  by  imitative  repetition, 
that  they  interfere  with  one  another  in 
a  felicitous  or  infelicitous  manner.  That 
is,  the  discordant  sides  of  their  nature 
come  together  in  certain  minds,  giving 
rise  to  logical  or  teleological  duels,  which 
constitute  first  germs  of  social  opposi- 
tions (wars,  competitions,  and  polemics); 
while  the  harmonious  sides  of  their  nature 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      135 

come  together  in  the  mind  of  the  genius, 
or  sometimes  even  in  the  ordinary  mind, 
producing  true  logical  syntheses,  inven- 
tions, and  fruitful  originations,  which  are 
the  source  of  all  social  adaptatipn. 

These  three  terms  constitute  a  circular 
series  which  is  capable  of  proceeding  on 
and  on  without  ceasing.  It  is  through 
imitative  repetition  that  invention,  the 
fundamental  social  adaptation,  spreads 
and  is  strengthened,  and  tends,  through 
the  encounter  of  one  of  its  own  imitative 
rays  with  an  imitative  ray  emanating  from 
some  other  invention,  old  or  new,  either  to 
arouse  new  struggles,  or  (perhaps  directly, 
perhaps  as  a  result  of  these  struggles)  to 
yield  new  and  more  complex  inventions, 
which  soon  radiate  out  imitatively  in  turn, 
and  so  on  indefinitely.  Observe  that  the 
logical  duel,  the  fundamental  term  in  the 
social  struggle  of  opposition,  like  logical 
synthesis,  the  fundamental  term  in  social 
adaptation,  requires  repetition  in  order 
to  become  social,  to  become  generalized, 


136  Social  Laws 

and  grow.  But  with  this  difference :  the 
imitative  spread  of  the  internal  condition 
of  discord  between  two  ideas,  or  even  of 
the  external  state  of  discord  between  two 
men,  one  of  whom  has  chosen  one  of 
these  ideas  and  the  other  the  other,  is 
bound  to  use  up  and  put  an  end  to  this 
discord  in  the  course  of  time,  since  every 
combat  is  exhausting  and  results  in  some 
victory;  whereas  the  imitative  spread  of 
the  state  of  harmony,  whether  internal 
or  external,  which  finds  expression  in  the 
lighting  up  of  a  new  beacon  of  truth,  is 
a  synthesis  of  our  previous  knowledge, 
or  a  communion  between  our  minds  and 
all  other  minds  that  see  its  beams,  and 
*  hence  has  no  reason  to  be  arrested,  but 
rather  becomes  strengthened  as  it  ad- 
vances. Thus,  of  the  three  terms  com- 
pared, the  first  and  third  far  surpass  the 
second  in  height,  depth,  importance,  and 
possibly  also  durations  The  only  value 
of  the  second  —  opposition  —  is  to  £rg^ 
yoke  a  tension — of — atfrfcagpnistic  forces 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      137 

fitted  to  arouse  inventive  genius ;  such  is 
a    military   invention    which,    by   placing    \ 
victory    in    one    camp,    temporarily   ends    / 
war;   an  industrial   invention  which,  hav-  / 
ing  been  adopted  or  monopolized  by  some  / 
one  among  the  various   industrial   rivals, ' 
insures  his  triumph,  and  temporarily  puts 
an   end   to  competition ;    or   some   philo- 
sophical, scientific,  legal,  or  aesthetic  inven- 
tion,   which    suddenly    puts    an    end    to 
countless   discussions,  though   at  the  risk 
of    giving   birth   to   new   ones    later    on. 
This  is   the  sole  value   of   opposition,  its 
only  raison  d'etre.      Yet   how  often  does 
the  invention  that  it  calls  for  fail  to  re- 
spond!    How  often   does  war   cut  down 
genius,   instead   of    raising   it   up !     How 
many  talents   are   rendered  worthless   by 
the  polemics  of   the  press,  parliamentary 
debates,  or  even  the  foolish  fencings  of 
congresses    and    associations !      All    that 
we  can  say  —  and  this  supports  the  con- 
clusions   above    reached  —  is    that     the 
historic   order   of    succession   in    prepon- 


138  Social  Laws 

derance,  among  the  three  forms  of 
struggle  mentioned,  is  precisely  the  order 
of  their  fitness  to  stimulate  inventiveness. 
Thus  .man  has  passed  from  an  era  where 
war  was  dominant  to  a  phase  where  com- 
petition predominated,  and  finally  to  an 
age  of  discussion.  Moreover,  as  society 
becomes  civilized,  exchange  develops 
faster  than  competition,  conversation 
faster  than  discussion,  and  international- 
ism faster  than  militarism. 

We  have  thus  far  spoken  only  of  the 
strife  oppositions,  that  is,  the  oppositions 
that  occur  between  simultaneous  terms 
which  collide.  As  regards  rhythmic  op- 
positions, which  consist  of  successive 
terms,  —  whether  qualities  or  quantities 
it  matters  not,  —  such  as  an  alternate 
rise  and  fall,  come  and  go,  etc.,  it  would 
seem  at  first  sight  as  if  these  were  less 
enigmatic  than  the  former,  inasmuch  as 
they  do  not  involve  any  paralysis  and 
mutual  destruction  of  forces.  But,  look- 
ing at  the  matter  more  closely,  we  see  that 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      139 

/this  come  and  go  of  forces,  which  act  in 
turn  for  and  against,  or  pronounce  alter- 
nately a  yes  and  a  no,  is  even  more  difficult 
to  understand  than  the  interaction  of 
two  forces  that  collide  and  then  come 
to  an  equilibrium.!  The  destructive  in- 
terferences present  at  least  an  appear- 
ance of  accident  and  unexpectedness, 
and  we  know  them  to  be  scarcely  sepa- 
rable from  creative  interferences,  such 
as  the  shadow  of  the  body;  not  to  men- 
tion the  fact  that  the  equilibration  or 
mutual  neutralization  of  opposite  tenden- 
cies in  us,  including  those  due  to  rival 
suggestions  from  without,  permit  our  natu- 
ral characteristics  to  come  to  light,  which 
is  perhaps  one  of  the  best  justifications 
of  the  phenomenon  of  strife.  But  rhythm 
appears  to  be  a  normal  play  of  forces 
which  voluntarily  accommodate  them- 
selves to  one  another,  whether  it  be  in 
qualitative  or  quantitative  rhythm.  In- 
deed, I  admit  that  I  would  be  filled  with 
a  Schopenhauerian  despair,  were  there 


140  Social  Laws 

serious  grounds  for  supposing  that  this 
come  and  go,  this  childish  see-sawing 
back  and  forth,  held  true  on  a  large  scale, 
that  the  process  of  dissolution  was  the 
exact  inverse  of  evolution,  regression  the 
inverse  of  progress,  and  that  everything 
proceeded  forthwith  to  begin  over  again, 
indefinitely,  without  any  resulting  coordi- 
nation. Fortunately,  this  is  not  the  case ; 
for  rhythm,  that  regular  and  somewhat 
exact  rhytlim  which  alone  is  worthy  of 
the  name,  appears  only  in  the  details  of 
phenomena,  as  a  conditioner  they  exact 
repetition,  and  through  this  of  their 
variation.^)  The  orbit  of  a  heavenly  body 
repeats  itself  only  by  reason  of  its  pass- 
ing to  and  fro  in  an  ellipse ;  similarly,  a 
sound-wave  or  a  light-wave  repeats  itself 
only  by  reason  of  its  rectilinear  or  circular 
or  elliptical  path  to  and  fro ;  the  contrac- 
tion of  a  muscular  element  and  the  inner- 
vation  of  a  nervous  element  are  propa- 
gated in  the  muscle  or  along  the  nerve 
only  by  means  of  a  minute  circular  process 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      141 

which  returns  again  to  its  own  starting- 
point  ;  and  Eajdwin  has  recently  shown 
that  imitation,  itself  is  a  "  circular_jreac- 
tion,"  and  that  it  may  be  denned  as  a 
"  brain-state  due  to  stimulating  conditions, 
muscular  reaction  which  reproduces  or 
retains  the  stimulating  conditions,  same 
brain-state  again  due  to  same  stimu- 
lating conditions,  and  so  on."  In  the 
work  from  which  this  quotation  is  taken, 
he  extends  the  meaning  of  the  word 
imitation  far  beyond  that  which  I  as- 
signed it;  and,  generalizing  the  term  in 
such  a  way  as  to  include  both  the  vital 
and  the  social  functions,  he  writes :  "  The 
self-repeating  or  circular  type  of  reaction, 
to  which  the  name  imitation  is  given  .  .  . 
is  seen  to  be  fundamental  and  to  remain 
the  same,  as  far  as  structure  is  concerned, 
for  all  motor  activity  whatever."  But 
repetition,  the  regular,  rhythmic  succession 
of  phenomena,  is  only  the  underlying 
condition  of  their  course  and  evolution, 
which  is  always  more  or  less  irregular 


& 

/A 

V  IT 


142  Social  Laws 

and  picturesque,  and  becomes  more  so  as 
it  progresses.  Now,  rhythmic  outgo  and 
return  exhibits  some  exactness,  it  is  true, 
but  only  in  its  order  of  succession,  not  in 
its  course.  This  is  the  case  even  with 
quantitative  rhythm,  including  those  gen- 
eral instances  of  rise  and  fall  that  statistics 
finds  a  means  of  measuring  along  the 
ath  of  a  civilization  in  process  of  develop- 
ment. It  is  exceedingly___3.eldom  that  the 
increase  and  decrease  observed  here  sfre 
equal  and  similar;  for  instance,  that  the 
ascending  curves  representing  wealth,  the 
price  of  securities  on  exchange,  religious 
faith,  education,  criminality,  etc.,  are  found 
to  be  oppositely  reflected  in  descending 
curves,  presenting  the  same  general  and 
special  characteristics.  This  is  well  known 
to  statisticians.  I  have  myself  noted  else- 
where the  irreversible  character  of  a  host 
of  social  evolutions,  which  are  the  most 
important  of  any.  I  need  not  return  to 
thaj.  question  here. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  opposition,  in 


The  Opposition  of  Phenomena      143 

its  two  great  forms,  reveals  and  accentu- 
ates  ever  more  clearly  its  own  auxiliary 
and_jntermediate  rhararter.^  As  ^rhythm,"" 
it  is  only  of  direct  service  to  repetition, 
and  of  indirect  service  to  variation,  and 
it  disappears  when  the  latter  appears. 
As  strife,  it  is  only  of  use  in  stimulating 
adaptation,  with  which  we  may  now  pro- 
ceed to  deal. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ADAPTATION  OF  PHENOMENA 

explanations  given  in  the 
two  preceding  chapters  have 
already  prepared  us  to  under- 
stand the  real  meaning  of  the 
word  adaptation,  which  expresses  the 
profoundest  aspect  under  which  science 
views  the  universe.  (Here,  again,  we  shall 
see  that  the  evolution  of  science,  in  any 
field  of  truth  whatsoever,  consists  in  a 
passage  from  the  great  to  the  small, 
from  the  vague  to  the  exact,  and  from 
the  false  or  superficial  to  the  true  and 
deep-rooted;  that  is,  it  consists  in  first 
discovering  or  imagining  a  vast  harmony 
of  the  whole,  or  a  few  grand  but  vague 
external  harmonies,  and  in  replacing  these 
144 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      145 

gradually  by  countless  internal  harmo- 
nies, forming  an  infinite  number  of  fruit- 
ful, infinitesimal  adaptations.  We  shall 
observe,  also,  that  the  evolution  of  real- 
ity, which  is,  here  as  elsewhere,  exactly 
the  reverse  of  that  of  thought  about  it, 
consists  in  a  ceaseless  tendency  on  the 
part  of  minute  internal  harmonies  to  ex- 
ternalize and  enlarge  themselves  more 
and  more.  Incidentally,  we  cannot  help 
noticing,  as  has  been  already  noted,  that, 
while  the  progress  of  knowledge  enables 
us  to  discover  new  and  deeper  harmo- 
nies, it  also  reveals  many  deeper  and 
hitherto  unobserved  incongruities. 

But  we  must  begin  first  with  a  few  defi- 
nitions or  necessary  explanations.  What 
is,  precisely,  an  adaptation,  or  natural  har- 
mony ?  Let  us  take  an  example  outside 
of  life,  where  the  teleological  connection 
between  the  organ  and  its  function  is 
so  obvious  as  not  to  require  explana- 
tion. Suppose  we  choose  the  basin 
of  a  river.  Here  we  find  a  mountain 


146  Social  Laws 

or  a  chain  of  hills  adapted  to  the  down- 
flow  of  the  river's  waters,  and  the  sun- 
beams adapted  to  the  uplifting  of  the 
ocean's  waters  to  the  clouds;  further, 
the  winds  are  adapted  to  transporting 
these  clouds  to  the  mountain  summits, 
where  they  fall  again  in  showers  and 
supply  the  springs,  brooks,  and  rivers 
which  are  tributary  to  the  one  great 
water-course.  Thus  we  find  here  an 
unstable  equilibrium,  a  circuit  of  acts 
that  are  interlaced  and  repeat  themselves 
with  variations.  A  living- being,  we  may 
say,  forms  a  similar  circuit,  only  a  much 
more  .complex  one;  and,  moreover,  the 
adaptation  in  him  is  not  one-sided,  as  in 
the  instance  cited,  but  reciprocal.  The 
organ  serves  to  fulfil  a  vital  func- 
tion, and  reciprocally  the  vital  function 
serves  to  maintain  the  organ ;  whereas,  in 
the  case  of  the  streams  upon  our  planet, 
the  mountain  is  adapted  to  the  flow  of  the 
waters;  but  the  flow  of  waters,  far  from 
effecting  the  preservation  of  the  mountain, 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      147 

has  the  effect  of  denuding  it,  and  gradually 
carrying  it  away.  And  so,  too,  there  is 
no  reciprocity  in  the  adaptation  of  the 
sun's  heat  to  the  irrigation  of  the  soil. 

It  is  always,  remember,  a  harmony 
that  is  repeated;  we  have  observed  it 
already,  let  us  point  out  other  instances. 
Every  planet  of  the  solar  system,  con- 
sidered mechanically,  that  is,  considered 
as  a  moving  point,  reveals  a  harmony 
between  its  inclination  to  fall  into  the 
sun  and  its  tendency  to  fly  away  at  a 
tangent;  this  would  constitute  an  oppo- 
sition, if  these  two  forces,  the  centripetal 
and  centrifugal,  tended  to  exert  themselves 
along  the  same  straight  line;  but  since 
they  act  at  right  angles  to  each  other, 
adaptation  ensues.  (In  this  way  oppo- 
sition and  adaptation  are  transformed, 
one  into  the  other,  in  nature.)1  Now  the 

1  A  waterspout  or  cyclone  is  likewise  an  atmospheric 
harmony,  a  circuit  of  acts  due  to  the  interworking  of  two 
forces  which  do  not  impede,  but  reenforce  each  other 
in  their  resultant. 


148  Social  Laws 

planet's  orbit  is  a  repetition,  the  varied 
repetition,  of  this  mechanical  adaptation. 
Again,  considered  geologically,  from  the 
standpoint  of  its  stratigraphic  and  phys- 
ico-chemical composition,  a  planet  is  a 
most  harmonious  adjustment  of  superim- 
posed strata ;  and,  if  we  may  believe  M. 
Stanislas  Meunier  on  this  point,  the  same 
adjustment  occurs  in  every  planet  and 
in  the  general  constitution  of  the  solar 
system  itself.  An  imaginary  cross-section 
of  the  earth,  from  centre  to  circumference, 
would  give  a  succession  of  incandescent 
layers,  followed  by  solid  layers,  then  liquid, 
then  gaseous,  each  essential  to  the  suc- 
ceeding one ;  and  this  order  of  succession 
corresponds  to  the  natures  of  the  planets 
that  we  find  if  we  start  from  the  sun 
as  centre  and  go  toward  the  limits  of  the 
system,  to  Neptune,  which  is  gaseous. 
However,  the  truth  of  this  analogy  is  of 
little  importance. 

Any  aggregation  whatsoever   is  a   col- 
lection   of     individuals     jointly     adapted, 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      149 

either  some  adapted  to  the  remainder 
or  all  to  a  common  function.  An  aggre- 
gate means  an  adaptate.  Moreover,  dif- 
ferent aggregates  which  have  relations 
with  one  another  may  be  coadapted; 
this  constitutes  an  adaptate  of  a  higher 
degree,  and  an  infinite  number  of  such 
degrees  may  be  distinguished.  For  the 
sake  of  simplicity,  let  us  distinguish 
merely  between  two  degrees  of  adapta- 
tion :  adaptation  of  the  first— degree  is 
that  which  the  elements  pf  the  system 
in  question  have  among  themselves;  ad- 
aptation of  the  second  degree  is  that 
which  unites  these  elements  to  the  sys- 
tems  that  surround  them,  that  is,  to  ) 

7  V* 

what  is  vaguely  denoted  by  the  term  en- 
vironment. The  adjustment  with  one's  self 
differs  greatly,  in  phenomena  of  every  sort, 
from  the  adjustment  with  others,  just  as 
self-repetition  (habit)  differs  from  the 
repetition  of  others  (heredity  or  imita- 
tion), and  as  self-opposition  (hesitation 
and  doubt)  differs  from  opposition  to 


150  Social  Laws 

others  (strife  or  competition.)  Often 
these  two  kinds  of  opposition  are  to  a 
certain  extent  mutually  exclusive.  Thus 
in  the  matter  of  political  organizations, 
it  has  frequently  been  observed  that  the 
most  self-consistent  —  those  that  are  the 
most  logically  deduced  and  that  present  in 
the  highest  degree  the  characteristics  of 
adaptation  —  are  least  adapted  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  their  inherited  and 
natural  environment ;  and,  conversely,  that 
the  most  practical  are  the  least  logical. 
The  same  remark  applies  to  grammars, 
religions,  the  fine  arts,  etc. ;  thus  the  one 
perfect  grammar,  the  only  one  whose  rules 
are  quite  without  exception,  is  the  grammar 
of  — •  Volapiik  !  It  applies  to  organisms 
as  well;  there  are  some  that  are  so  per- 
fect as  to  be  almost  incapable  of  living,  and 
that  would  be  better  fitted  for  life  if  they 
were  less  perfect;  for  perfectness  of  accom- 
modation may  detract  from  suppleness.1 

1  A  mental  intuition  or  idea  being  given,  the  intel- 
lectual progress  starting  from  this  idea  (which  is  usually 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      151 

These  preliminaries  settled,  let  us  point 
out  the  truth  of  the  two  propositions 
which  were  stated  above.  The  partisans 
of  final  causes  have  done  their  best  to 
discredit  the  notion  of  finality.  It  is 
nevertheless  true  that  the  first  babblings 
of  science  date  from  the  moment  when 
this  notion  was  introduced,  even  in  its 
mystical  and  least  rational  form,  into 
our  representation  of  the  world.  What 
did  primitive  consciousness  imagine,  as 
it  looked  upon  the  universe  of  stars  ? 
It  imagined  a  single,  vast,  fanciful  ad- 
aptation, born  of  the  so-called  geocen- 

a  mixture  of  truth  and  error)  may  proceed  in  two  differ- 
ent directions :  first,  in  the  direction  of  an  adaptation  of 
the  first  degree  merely,  that  is,  a  gradual  harmonizing  of 
that  idea  with  itself,  along  the  line  of  differentiation  and 
self-consistency.  This  is  the  course  taken  by  many  sys- 
tems of  philosophy  and  of  metaphysics.  Second,  in  the 
direction  of  an  adaptation  of  the  second  degree,  that  is, 
a  gradual  harmonizing  of  that  idea  with  the  material  re- 
ceived through  the  senses,  and  with  the  external  data  sup- 
plied by  perception  and  discovery  generally.  This  is 
the  course  taken  by  science.  In  the  first  case  the  ad- 
vance often  consists  in  passing  from  a  lesser  to  a  greater 
error. 


152  Social  Laws 

trie  illusion;  all  the  stars  (it  thought) 
existed  for  the  sake  of  the  earth;  the 
earth,  and  within  the  earth  a  single  city 
or  castle,  were  considered  to  be  the  focal 
point  of  the  whole  firmament,  and  the 
latter  was  supposed  to  be  busying  it- 
self solely  and  unceasingly  with  ephem- 
eral creatures  like  ourselves.  Astrology 
was  the  logical  outcome  of  this  magnifi- 
cent but  imaginary  adaptation  of  the  sky 
to  the  earth  and  man.  The  true  astron- 
omy not  only  abolished  this  absurd  har- 
mony, but  shattered  the  unity  of  the 
celestial  harmony  as  well,  breaking  it 
up  into  as  many  partial  harmonies  as 
there  are  solar  systems ;  the  latter  prove 
to  be  coherent  and  symmetrically  coordi- 
nated as  individuals,  but  bound  together 
by  exceedingly  vague  and  doubtful  bonds, 
being  grouped  in  shapeless  nebulas  and 
scattered  constellations,  presenting  a  spar- 
kling disorder.  Though  the  human  reason 
takes  greater  delight  in  order  than  in 
anything  else,  it  must  nevertheless  aban- 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      153 

don  its  attempt  to  discover  the  clearest 
marks  of  divine  coordination  in  that  all- 
embracing  world-group,  the  Cosmos,  the 
object  of  man's  deepest  admiration.  To 
find  such  marks,  we  must  descend  to  the 
solar  system,  and  there,  as  we  come  to 
know  this  little  universe  better,  it  is  the 
details,  rather  than  the  general  effect  of 
this  exquisite  grouping  of  masses,  that 
arouses  our  delight.  The  relations  of  the 
planets  to  one  another  do  not  strike  us 
with  as  much  astonishment  as  the  relation 
of  each  planet  to  its  satellites,  and  still 
more  the  geological  formations  on  the 
surface  of  each  sphere,  the  arrangement 
of  its  water-courses,  and  its  chemical 
composition,  all  of  which  reveal  so  exact 
an  agreement.  Henceforth,  the  religious 
mind  need  turn  no  longer  far  away  to 
the  vast  vault  of  heaven,  there  to  find 
and  worship  the  fathomless  wisdom  that 
moves  the  universe;  rather,  it  must  gaze 
into  the  chemist's  crucible,  and  there 
discern  the  mystery  of  those  physical 


154  Social  Laws 

harmonies  that  are  surely  the  most  exact 
and  marvellous  of  all  —  far  more  won- 
derful even  than  the  scattered  disorder 
of  the  stars :  I  mean  the  chemical  com- 
binations. If,  by  means  of  some  power- 
ful microscope,  we  could  perceive  the 
interior  of  a  molecule,  how  much  more 
fascinating  after  all  would  appear  the 
great  network  of  elliptical  and  circular 
motions  that  in  all  probability  make  it 
up,  than  the  extremely  simple  play  of  the 
great  celestial  tops ! 

If  we  pass  from  the  physical  world 
to  the  world  of  life,  there,  too,  we  find 
that  the  first  step  of  reason  was  to 
formulate  the  notion  of  a  single  grand 
adaptation  —  the  adaptation  of  the  whole 
organic  creation,  both  vegetable  and  ani- 
mal, to  the  ends  of  humanity,  for  its 
nourishment,  amusement,  or  protection,  or 
to  warn  it  of  secret  dangers.  Augury 
and  totemism,  which  are  found  among 
all  peoples  in  the  beginning,  originate 
in  this.  However  much  the  growth  of 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      155 

knowledge  has  dissipated  this  anthropo- 
centric  illusion,  something  of  it  still  re- 
mained in  that  erroneous  view,  so  long 
accepted  by  natural  philosophers,  which 
consisted  in  representing  the  palaeonto- 
logical  series  as  a  straight  ascent  toward 
man,  and  in  regarding  every  species, 
whether  extinct  or  living,  as  one  chord 
in  a  grand  concert  called  the  Divine 
Plan  of  Nature  —  an  ideal  and  regular 
structure,  with  man  at  the  top.  Pain- 
fully, and  by  dint  of  denials  accumu- 
lated by  observation,  mankind  was  led 
to  give  up  this  cherished  idea;  then  it 
was  recognized  that  Nature  does  not  exert 
her  wonderful  harmonizing  power  to  the 
greatest  degree  along  the  broad  lines  of 
the  evolution  of  beings,  —  a  ramified  and 
tortuous  path,  —  nor  yet  in  the  grouping 
of  these  different  species  into  zonal  flora 
and  fauna  (though  remarkable  adaptation 
is  exhibited  in  commensalism,  or  the  re- 
lations of  insects  with  the  flowers  of 
certain  plants);  but  that  it  is  exerted, 


156  Social  Laws 

rather,  in  the  details  of  each  organism. 
The  partisans  of  final  causes  have,  I 
believe,  diminished  the  value  of  the  no- 
tion by  making  an  erroneous  and  im- 
proper use  of  it,  though  not  an  exces- 
sive one,  for,  on  the  contrary,  I  should 
reproach  them  with  having  made  much 
too  restricted  a  use  of  it,  through  their 
unifying  turn  of  mind.  There  is  no 
single  end  in  nature  —  no  end  in  re- 
lation to  which  all  others  are  means ; 
but  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  ends 
which  are  seeking  to  utilize  ojiejarrDtherT 
Every  organism,  and  in  every  organism 
every  cell,  and  in  every  cell,  perhaps, 
every  cellular  element,  has  its  own  par- 
ticular Providence,  for  itself  and  in  itself. 
Here,  then,  as  before,  we  are  led  to 
consider  the  harmonizing  force  (certainly 
that  which  positive  science  has  a  right 
to  consider,  without,  however,  denying 
the  possibility  of  some  other),  not  as 
something  unique,  external,  and  superior, 
but  as  indefinitely  repeated,  infinitesimal, 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      157 

and  internal.  In  reality,  the  source  of 
all  these  harmonies  of  life,  which  become 
less  striking  the  farther  we  get  from 
the  starting-point  and  the  wider  the  field 
we  embrace,  as  the  fertilized  germ ;  this 
last  is  a  living  representation  of  the  in- 
tersecting lines  that  meet  in  it,  forming 
often  a  felicitous  cross-breed ;  it  is  the 
germ  of  new  talents,  which  are  destined 
to  spread  broadcast  and  propagate  them- 
selves in  turn,  thanks  to  the  survival 
of  the  fittest,  or  the  elimination  of  the 
least  fit. 

Let  us  pass,  now,  to  the  social  world. 
The  theologians,  who  have  ever  been  the 
most  prominent  sociologists,  though  with- 
out knowing  that  they  were  sociologists, 
frequently  picture  the  stream  of  the  his- 
tory of  all  peoples  of  the  earth  as  con- 
verging, from  the  beginnings  of  human- 
ity, toward  the  advent  of  their  own  cult. 
On  this  point  see  Bossuet.  In  vain  has 
sociology  endeavored  to  secularize  itself ; 
it  has  never  wholly  freed  itself  from 


158  Social  Laws 

this  sort  of  presupposition.  Comte 
brought  over  in  a  masterly  way  the 
thoughts  of  Bossuet,  whom  he  admired, 
with  reason ;  with  him,  the  entire  history 
of  mankind  converged  toward  the  era 
of  his  own  Positivism,  which  thus  be- 
came a  species  of  secular  neo-Catholi- 
cism.  In  the  eyes  of  Augustin  Thierry, 
Guizot,  and  other  philosophers  of  history 
who  flourished  about  1830,  the  whole 
course  of  European  history  appeared  to 
converge  toward  —  the  July  Monarchy! 
Certainly  it  is  not  sociology  that  Comte 
founded  ;  however  admirably  carried  out, 
it  is  merely  a  philosophy  of  history  that 
he  offers  us  under  this  title,  and  it 
is  the  last  word  of  the  philosophy  of 
history.  Like  all  the  systems  that  have 
been  designated  by  that  name,  his  con- 
ception unwinds  human  history  before  our 
eyes  like  a  twisted  skein;  or  rather  it  is 
a  confused  mass  of  many-colored  skeins ; 
it  appears  under  the  guise  of  a  single 
development,  the  sole  production  of  a 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      159 

sort  of  unique  trilogy  or  tragedy,  con- 
structed according  to  the  rules  of  its 
kind  —  where  everything  is  bound  to- 
gether, where  each  of  the  three  inter- 
locked pieces  is  composed  of  phases 
linked  to  one  another,  each  link  being 
adapted  to  and  riveted  exclusively  to  the 
succeeding,  and  where  the  whole  moves 
irresistibly  on  toward  the  final  climax. 
Spencer  has  made  a  great  step  in 
the  direction  of  a  healthier  understand- 
ing of  social  adaptation;  his  formula  of 
social  evolution  applies,  not  to  a  single 
drama,  but  to  a  considerable  number  of 
different  social  dramas.  The  evolutionists 
of  his  school,  in  thus  formulating  the 
laws  of  linguistic,  religious,  economic, 
political,  moral,  and  aesthetic  develop- 
ment, understand,  at  least  implicitly,  that 
these  laws  are  capable  of  governing,  not 
merely  the  single  succession  of  pke<^- 
ples  whose  privilege  it  is  to  be  called 
historic,  but  equally  well  all  peoples  trikt 
have  existed  or  are  to  exist  in  future. 


160  Social  Laws 

But  still,  in  a  multitude  of  forms,  though 
on  a  smaller  scale,  the  same  error  al- 
ways comes  to  light,  namely,  the  error  of 
believing  that,  in  order  to  see  a  gradual 


dawnof^  regularity,  order^jmd  logi 
social  phenomena,  we  must__go  outside  of 
the  details,  which  are  essentially  irregu- 
lar, and  rise  high  enough  to  obtain  a 
panoramic  view  of  the  general  effect ; 
that  the  source  and  foundation  of  every 
social  coordination  is  some  general  fact 
from  which  it  descends  gradually  to  par- 
ticular facts,  though  always  diminishing 
in  strength ;  in  short,  that  man  .acts,  but 
a  lawjof  eyolutiQa.. guides  'hi«i. 

I  hold  the  contrary,  in  a^certain^sense. 
Not  that  I  deny  the  existence  of  certain 
slopes  common  to  the  diverse  and  multi- 
form historical  evolutions  of  races,- which 
flow  like  rivers  into  the  same  basin ;  and  I 
am  well  aware  that,  while  many  of  these 
brooks  and  rivers  are  lost  en  route,  others, 
flowing  together,  one  after  another,  through 
a  thousand  eddies,  end  by  mingling  in  one 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena,,      161 

general  current,  which,  in  spite  of  its  divi- 
sion into  different  branches,  does  not  seem 
likely,  in  future,  to  empty  out  through  sev- 
eral different  mouths.  But  I  see,  too,  that 
the  real  cause  of  this  vast  river,  the  final 
outcome  of  these  various  streams,  in  other 
words,  of  this  final  preponderance  of^a 
single  line  of  social  evolution  (that  of  the 
so-called  Mstoric  races),  is  the  series  of  sci- 
entific discoveries  and  industrial  inventions 
that  have  gone  on  ceaselessly  accumulat- 
ing and  making  use  of  one  another ;  these 
have  become  bound  together  in  a  system 
or  bundle,  whose  real  logical  interrelation, 
though  not  without  intricacies  of  its  own, 
seems  vaguely  repeated  in  the  interrela- 
tion of  the  races  which  have  contributed 
to  its  formation.  If  we  follow  up  this 
great  scientific  and  industrial  stream,  we 
find  its  source  in  the  mind  of  every  genius, 
whether  obscure  or  celebrated,  who  has 
added  some  new  truth,  some  new  means  of 
activity,  to  the  enduring  legacy  of  human- 
ity, and  who  has  made  the  relations 


162  Social  Laws 

among  mankind  more  harmonious  by  this 
contribution,  by  promoting  community  of 
thought  and  collaboration  of  effort.  And 
so,  in  opposition  to  the  philosophers  of 
whom  I  have  been  speaking,  I  maintain 
that  the  details  of  human  events  alone 
contain  striking  adaptations ;  that  the 
basis  of  those  harmonies  which  are  less 
noticeable  in  a  vaster  domain  here  comes 
plainly  to  view,  and  that  the  more  we  rise 
from  a  small  but  closely  united  social 
group,  such  as  the  family,  the  school,  the 
workshop,  the  rural  church,  the  con- 
vent, or  the  regiment,  to  the  city,  the 
province,  or  the  nation,  the  less  complete 
and  striking  does  this  solidarity  become. 
So,  too,  there  is  generally  more  logic  in  a 
phrase  than  in  a  discourse,  and  more  in 
a  single  discourse  than  in  a  succession 
or  group  of  discourses;  there  is  more 
in  one  special  rite  than  in  a  whole 
religion,  in  one  point  of  law  than  in  a 
whole  legal  code,  in  one  particular  scien- 
tific theory  than  in  the  whole  body  of 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      163 

science;  and  there  is  more  in  a  single 
piece  of  work  executed  by  one  workman 
than  in  the  sum  total  of  his  performances. 
This  is  true,  be  it  observed,  unless  some 
powerful  personality  intervenes  to  govern 
and  overrule  the  interrelation  of  events. 
The  latter,  however,  tends  to  occur  more 
and  more  frequently,  since  civilization  is 
distinguished  by  the  facilities  it  offers  for 
the  realization  of  special  schemes  of  social 
reorganization ;  and  in  this  case  it  does 
not  always  hold  true  that  the  harmony* 
of  an  aggregate  is  in  inverse  ratio  to  its 
mass.  Often,  indeed,  the  greater  mass 
may  be  the  more  harmonious,  and  this 
occurs  more  and  more  frequently.  For 
instance,  the  French  administrative  sys- 
tem, organized  by  the  despotic  genius 
of  Napoleon,  is  quite  as  well  adapted  to 
its  own  general  end  as  any  of  the  least  of 
its  wheels  is  to  its  own  particular  end. 
The  Prussian  system  of  state  railways  is 
as  well  adapted  to  its  higher  strategic  end 
as  any  of  its  stations  can  possibly  be  to  its 


164  Social  Laws 

own  commercial  or  other  ends.  The 
systems  of  Kant,  Hegel,  and  Spencer  are 
all  as  consistent  in  their  general  coordina- 
tion as  any  of  the  little  partial  theories 
that  serve  as  their  material.  A  well-codi- 
fied scheme  of  legislation  may  exhibit  as 
much  order  in  the  arrangement  of  its  sec- 
tions and  chapters  as  any  of  the  partial 
laws  that  it  embodies  presents  in  its  vari- 
ous interrelations.  Finally,  when  a  reli- 
gion has  been  moulded  into  an  aggressive 
theology,  the  concatenation  of  its  dogmas 
may  be,  or  appear  to  be,  more  logical  than 
each  of  them  taken  separately.  Yet,  as  is 
easy  to  see,  these  facts,  though  apparently 
contrary  to  those  formulated  above,  really 
vie  with  them  in  demonstrating  that  the 
individual  mind  is  the  source  of  all  social 
harmony.  For  these  excellent  coordina- 
tions must  have  been  conceived  long 
before  they  could  be  executed;  they  ex- 
isted in  the  form  of  an  idea  hidden  in  a 
few  cerebral  cells,  long  before  they  began 
to  cover  so  wide  a  domain. 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      165 

Shall  we  not  say,  then,  that  the  funda- 
mental social  adaptation  is,  in  the  last 
analysis,  that  of  two  men,  one  of  whom 
answers,  by  word  or  deed,  the  question 
of  the  other,  whether  silent,  spoken,  or  ' 
tacit?  I  call  it  a  "question,"  for  the  sat- 
isfaction of  a  need,  like  the  solution  of  a 
problem,  is  the  answer  to  a  question.  Shall 
we  not  say,  then,  that  this  fundamental 
harmony  consists  in  the  relation  between  L 
two  men,  one  of  whom  teaches,  while  the 
other  learns  —  one  of  whom  commands, 
while  the  other  obeys  —  one  of  whom 
produces,  while  the  other  buys  and  con- 
sumes—  one  of  whom  is  actor,  poet,  or 
artist,  while  the  other  is  spectator,  reader, 
or  amateur;  or,  better,  that  it  consists  in 
the  relation  between  two_who  work— lo- ,  2 
gether  to^  produce  the  sanie^result  ?  Cer- 
tainly ;  for  this  relation,  though  it  implies 
the  relationship  of  two  men,  one  of  whom 
is  pattern,  the  other  copy,  is  really  quite  , 
distinct  from  it. 

In    my    judgment,    however,   we    must 


166  Social  Laws 

carry  the  analysis  still  farther,  and,  as 
I  have  already  intimated,  seek  the  fun- 
damental social  adaptation  in  the  brain 
and  individual  mind  of  the  inventor.  In- 
vention, if  we  limit  the  term  to  that  which 
is  destined  to  be  imitated  (for  what  remains 
locked  up  in  the  mind  of  its  creator,  has 
no  social  value), — invention,  I  say,  is  a 
harmony  among  ideas,  which  is  the  parent 
of  all  the  harmonies  among  men.  In 
order  that  any  exchange  between  producer 
and  consumer  may  come  about,  and  still 
more,  in  order  that  any  gift  may  be  made 
to  the  consumer  of  the  thing  produced 
(for  exchange  is  mutual  giving,  and  as 
such  is  preceded  by  one-sided  giving)/the 
producer  must  first  have  experienced  two 
notions  simultaneously  :  that  of  a  need  on 
the  part  of  the  consumer  or  donee,  and 
that  of  a  means  fitted  to  satisfy  it>  With- 
out the  internal  adaptation  of  these  two 
ideas,  the  external  adaptation,  first  called 
gift  and  then  exchange,  would  be  im- 
possible. Similarly,  the  division  of  labor 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      167 

among  a  number  of  men,  when  they  appor- 
tion among  themselves  the  different  parts 
of  a  single  operation,  hitherto  executed 
by  one  man,  would  not  have  been  possi- 
ble if  the  latter  had  not  first  conceived  of 
all  these  different  works  as  parts  of  the 
same  whole,  or  means  toward  the  same 
end.  At  the  basis  of  every  association 
among  men,  I  repeat,  there  is  originally 
an  association  among  the  ideas  of  the 
same  man. 

Let  it  not  be  objected  that  this  adapta- 
tion of  some  ideas  to  others  only  deserves 
to  be  called  social  when  it  expresses  itself 
in  an  adaptation  of  some  men  to  others; 
for  it  is  often  expressed  otherwise,  and 
one  might  even  say  that  the  other  manner 
of  expression  tends  to  prevail.  After  the 
labor  of  a  single  man  has  been  replaced 
in  a  certain  .case  by  a  division  of  work 
among  several,  it  frequently  happens  that 
a  new  invention  causes  all  parts  of  the 
operation  to  be  performed  by  a  single 
machine.  In  this  case,  the  division  of 


168  Social  Laivs 

labor  and  the  association  of  tasks  among 
men  plays  merely  the  role  of  a  middle 
term  between  the  association  of  ideas  in 
the  mind  of  the  first  author  of  the  pro- 
duction and  the  association  of  devices 
in  the  machine.  Here  the  happy  thought 
is  not  embodied  in  the  group  of  workers, 
but  materialized  in  the  bits  of  iron  or 
wood.  And  this  sort  of  case  tends  to 
become  more  general  with  the  improve- 
ments in  the  manufacture  of  machinery. 
Suppose,  to  take  an  impossible  case,  that 
all  human  productions  were  thus  per- 
formed by  machinery.  There  would  be 
no  more  division  of  labor,  since  there 
would  be  no  labor,  or  almost  none,  left; 
and  we  might  even  say  that  there  was  no 
real  social  harmony  left;  yet  there  would 
be  a  still  greater  degree  of  social  unity ; 
and  this  unity,  which  is-iar  more  desirable 
t]ian  that_harmnny,  would  be  the  result 
of  a  countless  number  of  infinitely  small 
cerebral  adaptations.  Where  can  we  find 
any  more  powerful  social  factors  than 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      169 

these  phenomena,  however  individualistic 
they  be? 

We  have  just  observed  that  the  de-  ^ 
velopment  of  sociology,  here  as  else- 
where, has  brought  it  down  from  the 
dizzy  heights  of  grand  but  vague  causes, 
to  real  and  precise  acts  of  infinitesimal 
size.  We  have  now  to  demonstrate,  or 
rather  point  out  (for  there  is  no  time 
for  detailed  examination),  that  the  evolu- 
tion of  social  facts,  reversing  the  order  of 
social  science,  consists  in  their  gradual 
passage  from  a  host  of  very  small  har- 
monies to  a  lesser  number  of  greater  ones, 
and  then  to  a  very  small  number  of  very 
great  ones,  till,  in  some  indefinite  future, 
the  culmination  of  social  progress  is 
reached  in  a  single,  all-embracing  civili- 
zation, which  is  also  the  most  harmo- 
nious possible.  It  should  be  understood 
that  this  law  of  gradual  enlargement  is 
not  here  supposed  to  include  the  ten- 
dency of  an  invention  or  group  of  inven- 
tions to  diffuse  themselves  by  imitation; 


170  Social  Laws 

this  would  be  a  return  to  the  law  of 
imitation  with  which  we  are  already  fa- 
miliar. Nor,  yet,  is  it  concerned  with  the 
constant  growth  which  this  imitative  ra- 
diation fosters  in  the  social  harmony 
which  is  called  the  division  of  labor,  but 
which  should  more  properly  be  called 
the  solidarity  of  all  labor.  Supposing 
a  certain  industry  to  remain  the  same, 
with  no  further  advances,  the  social  co- 
operation that  results  therefrom  will  grow 
according  as  the  needs  of  consumption  to 
which  it  responds,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  acts  of  production  by  which  it  re- 
sponds to  them,  on  the  other,  are  spread 
by  imitation  beyond  the  region,  at  first 
circumscribed,  in  which  it  originally  ap- 
peared. However  important  may  be  the 
phenomenon  of  the  growth  of  'markets, 
which  is  the  usual  precursor  of  the  fed- 
eration of  peoples,  this  is  not  here  under 
discussion;  indeed,  it  is  unusual  for  this 
extrinsic  growth  to  occur  without  some 
intrinsic  industrial  progress. 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena       171 

It  is  this  intrinsic  growth  that  we  have 
to  discuss,  that  is,  the  tendency  of  a 
given  invention  or  social  adaptation  to 
become  larger  and  more  complex  by 
adapting  itself  to  some  other  invention 
or  adaptation,  and  thus  create  a  new 
adaptation,  which,  through  other  encoun- 
ters and  logical  combinations  of  the  same 
sort,  leads  to  a  higher  synthesis,  and 
so  on.  These  two  growths  of  invention 
—  its  growth  in  extension  by  imitative 
diffusion,  and  its  growth  in  comprehension 
by  a  series  of  logical  combinations  —  are 
certainly  quite  distinct,  but,  far  from  be- 
ing mutually  exclusive,  and  despite  the 
opposition  between  the  extension  and 
comprehension  of  notions  in  other  re- 
spects, they  present  a  united  front  and 
prove  inseparable.  Any  mental  associa- 
tion of  two  inventions  that  gives  rise  to  a 
third,  —  as,  for  instance,  the  notion  of  the 
wheel  and  the  notion  of  the  domestica- 
tion of  the  horse,  which,  after  spreading 
independently  of  one  another  for  cen- 


172  Social  Laws 


turies,  perhaps,  finally  coalesced  and  har- 
monized in  the  notion  of  the  cart,  —  any 
such  association  required  necessarily  the 
functionofirnitatioriTO  bring  the  notions 
together  within  the  same  mind,  just  as 
previously,  for  the  appearance  of  each, 
its  elements  had  to  be  brought  to  the 
mind  of  its  author  by  the  radiation  of 
various  examples.  And,  further,  every 
new  synthesis  of  inventions  requires, 
generally,  an  imitative  radiation  of  wider 
scope  than  the  preceding.  There  is 
a  constant  interweaving  of  these  two 
growths :  the  unifying  growth  of  imita- 
tion and  the  systematizing  growth  of 
invention.  The  bond  that  binds  them 
together  lacks  universality,  no  doubt;  for 
a  long  succession  of  difficult  theorems 
may  unroll  themselves  in  the  brain  of 
an  Archimedes  or  a  Newton,  without  the 
aid  of  any  elements  contributed  by  other 
scientists  during  the  interval  between 
each  two  discoveries;  yeti  it  is  so  usual 
a  bond  that  we  always /expect  to  find 


The  Adaptation  of  Phnqmna 

the  extent  of  the  social  field,  the  com- 
pleteness of  social  communications,  and 
the  breadth  and  depth  of  nationalities,  as 
well  as  states,  increasing  pari  passu  with 
the  wealth  of  languages,  the  architectural 
beauty  of  theologies,  the  cohesion  of  the 
sciences,  the  complexity  and  codification 
of  laws,  the  spontaneous  organization  or 
legal  supervision  of  industries,  the  system 
of  finance,  the  complexity  and  coordina- 
tion of  government,  and  the  refinements 
and  varieties  of  literature  and  the  fine  arts. 
Here,  again,  we  must  be  careful  not  to 
confuse  the  growth  of  education  (a  mere 
phenomenon  of  imitation)  with  the  prog- 
ress of  science  (a  phenomenon  of  adapta- 
tion), as  is  so  often  done  ;  nor  the  growth 
of  industrialism  with  the  progress  of  in- 
dustry itself;  nor  the  growth  of  morality 
with  the  progress  of  ethics;  nor  the 
growth  of  militarism  with  the  progress  of 
the  military  art ;  nor  yet  the  growth  of  a 
language,  meaning  thereby  its  territorial 
expansion,  with  the  progress  of  that  Ian- 


174  Social  Laws 

guage,  in  the  sense  of  increased  refine- 
ment of  its  grammar  and  enrichment  of 
its  vocabulary.  If  science  continues  to 
progress  while  education  ceases  to  spread 
further,  the  result  is  not  the  same  as  if 
education  spread  while  science  remained 
stationary,  and  we  cannot  combine  the 
two  cases  by  vaguely  naming  each  an 
increase,  or  growth  of  illumination.  On 
the  contrary,  they  are  two  things  that  lack 
any  common  standard.  Every  gain  of  sci- 
ence, every  truth  added  to  her  hoard,  or 
adaptate  of  propositions  that  harmonize 
with  one  another,  is  not  a  mere  sum- 
mation, but  rather  a  multiplication,  and 
mutual  confirmation;  while  every  scholar 
added  to  the  aggregate,  every  new  brain 
copy  added  to  the  edition  of  taught  sci- 
ence, is  merely  one  unit  more  in  the  pile. 
To  be  exact,  we  must,  of  course,  see  in  this 
something  more  than  mere  addition;  for 
the  community  of  intellect  that  results 
from  the  similarity  of  the  education  given 
to  different  children  increases  the  confi- 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      175 

dence  of  each  in  his  own  knowledge,1  and 
this  also  is  a  social  adaptation,  and  not  one 
of  the  least  precious. 

But  before  going  further,  we  must  pause 
to  make  a  number  of  important  observa- 
tions. In  the  first  place,  let  us  note  how 
much  clearer  and  more  exact  the  notion 
of  adaptation  becomes  when  we  pass  from 
the  physical  world,  and  even  the  world  of 
life,  to  the  social  world.  For,  do  we  know 
precisely  what  constitutes  the  adaptation 
of  an  acid  molecule  to  the  basic  molecule 
with  which  it  combines  ?  —  or  the  adap- 

1  It  should  be  noted  in  passing  that  this  similarity  of 
education  is  complete  only  in  the  primary  schools,  that 
it  is  less  so  in  the  secondary  schools,  in  spite  of  the  uni- 
formity of  requirements  for  the  bachelor's  degree,  and 
that  it  is  still  less  so  in  the  higher  schools  or  colleges, 
where  a  wide  disagreement  of  teaching  frequently  appears. 
And  the  subordinate  and  mediate  character  of  Contra- 
diction and  Discussion  is  revealed  also  in  the  fact  that 
the  higher  education,  where  they  flourish,  always  tends  to 
degenerate  into  secondary  education,  where  they  are  far 
less  marked,  and  then  into  primary  teaching,  where  they 
disappear  entirely.  The  contradictions  among  scientists 
serve  no  purpose  except  to  bring  out  certain  adaptations 
of  truths,  for  the  future  use  of  the  rural  schoolmaster, 


176  Social  Laws 

tation  of  a  grain  of  pollen  to  the  ovule 
which,  after  being  fertilized  by  it,  gives 
birth  to  a  new  individual,  the  founder,  per- 
haps, of  a  new  race  ?  We  certainly  do 
not  know  anything  definite  about  it.  It 
is  true  that,  when  two  sound-waves  inter- 
fere, and  instead  of  destroying  each  other, 
are  of  mutual  assistance,  so  that  they  pro- 
duce a  reenf  orcement  of  the  sound  or  some 
unexpected  timbre  effect,  we  understand 
somewhat  better  the  nature  of  the  phe- 
nomenon ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this 
mere  reenforcement  of  the  sound  or  pro- 
duction of  a  new  timbre  is  an  original 
creation  only  from  the  standpoint  of  our 
subjective  sensations  of  hearing,  and  has 
nothing  in  common  with  the  objective  in- 
novation resulting  from  chemical  combi- 
nation. Similarly,  when  two  animal  or 
vegetable  species  come  together  in  such  a 
way  that  each  serves  as  the  other's  aid  or 
parasite,  this  clear  case  of  mutual  assist- 
ance among  living  things  gives  rise  simply 
to  an  increase  of  their  well-being  and 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      177 

number,  and  must  not  be  confounded  with 
the  phenomenon  of  fertilization,  which 
remains  extremely  obscure.  But,  when  a 
felicitous  interference  occurs  between  two 
imitative  radiations,  whatever  its  nature, 
our  reason  can  always  grasp  its  meaning. 
It  may  consist  merely  in  a  mutual  stimula- 
tion, as  when  the  increased  use  of  the 
Auer  gas-jet  favored  an  increased  use  of 
gas,  or  when  the  wider  diffusion  of  the 
French  language  favored  a  wider  diffu- 
sion of  French  literature,  which  in  turn 
favored  the  spread  of  the  former.  It 
may  also  happen  that  this  interference 
proves  of  great  efficacy  and  gives  rise  to 
some  new  invention,  a  centre  from  which 
new  rays  of  imitation  start;  thus  the  use 
of  copper,  encountering  one  day  the  use 
of  tin,  suggested  the  idea  of  making 
bronze ;  and  so,  too,  the  knowledge  of  alge- 
bra .and  geometry  suggested  to  Descartes 
the  algebraic  expression  of  curves.  But 
in  the  latter  case,  as  in  the  former,  we  see 
clearly  that  adaptation  is  either  a  logical  \j 


178  Social  Laws 

or  a  teleological  relation,  and  that  it  can 
always  be  referred  to  one  or  other  of  these 
two  types ;  sometimes,  as  in  the  case  of 
Newton's  Law,  or  any  scientific  law  what- 
soever, it  is  a  synthesis  of  ideas  which  for- 
merly seemed  neither  to  confirm  nor  to 
contradict  one  another,  and  which  now 
prove  to  be  mutually  confirmatory,  as  con- 
sequences of  the  same  principle ;  or,  again, 
as  in  the  case  of  some  industrial  machine, 
it  is  a  synthesis  of  acts  which  were  for- 
merly strangers  to  one  another,  and  now, 
being  brought  together  in  some  ingen- 
ious way,  serve  as  common  means  to  a 
single  end.  The  invention  of  the  cart 
(itself  a  complex  affair,  as  we  know),  the 
discovery  of  iron,  the  discovery  of  the  mo- 
tive power  of  steam,  the  invention  of  the 
piston,  and  the  invention  of  the  rail,  — 
all  these  inventions,  which  once  seemed  for- 
eign to  one  another,  have  been  brought  to- 
gether in  the  invention  of  the  locomotive. 
In  the  second  place,  whether  we  take 
a  synthesis  of  acts,  or  some  invention, — 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      179 

industrial  or  scientific,  religious  or  aes- 
thetic, —  in  short,  whether  we  are  dealing 
with  the  theoretical  or  the  practical,  the 
fundamental  process  that  enters  into  its 
make-up  is  always  what  may  be  called 
logical  association  by  pairs;  for,  what- 
ever be  the  numbgr^of^  notions  or  actions 
that  ajheory  or  a  machine  synthesizes, 
there  are  never  more  than  two  elements 
combined  at  a  time,  and  adapted  \o  one 
another,  in  the  mind  of  the  inventor,  or 
any  of  the  inventors  thalrassisted,  in  turn, 
in  its  production.1  In  his  recent  work  on 
Semantic •,  M.  Brdal,  speaking  of  language, 
makes  an  acute  observation,  which  lends 
support  to  this  general  principle  :  "  What- 
ever be  the  length  of  a  compound  word/* 
he  says,  "  it  never  includes  more  than  two 
terms.  This  is  no  arbitrary  rule ;  it  comes 
from  the  nature  of  our  intellect,  which 

1  See,  in  my  Laws  of  Imitation,  the  chapter  on  the 
Logical  Laws  of  Imitation,  especially  p.  175  and  p.  195  f. 
(French  edition)  ;  and  in  my  Social  Logic,  the  chapter 
on  the  Laws  of  Invention. 


ISO  Social  Laws 

always  associates  its  notions  in  pairs/* 
In  another  passage,  referring  to  the 
schematic  figures  by  means  of  which 
James  Darmesteter  endeavors  to  make 
clear  "to  the  eye  the  development  of  the 
significance  of  words  through  various 
channels,  the  same  author  says:  "We 
must  remember  that  these  complex  fig- 
ures have  no  value,  except  for  a  single 
linguist;  for,  whoever  invents  a  new 
meaning  for  a  word,  forgets,  for  the  time 
being,  all  its  previous  meanings  except 
one,  so  that  associations  of  ideas  always 
occur  in  pairs."  And  in  this  they  corre- 
spond to  oppositions  of  ideas,  as  we  have 
observed.  It  would  be  easy,  though  of 
course  it  would  take  too  long,  to  show 
how  general  this  process  really  is,  by  ex- 
amining in  turn  the  manner  in  which  each 
discovery  or  improvement  was  added  to 
some  previous  discovery,  whether  in  the 
scientific,  legal,  economic,  political,  artistic, 
or  moral  spheres.  Rather,  let  us  indicate 
here  why  it  is  so,  that  is,  how  the  phe- 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      181 

nomenon  is  rendered  possible  and  neces- 
sary 

'it  is  due  chiefly  to  this.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  course  of  the  mind's  activity, 
its  fundamental  procedure,  consists  in 
passing  from  one  idea  to  another,  and 
uniting  the  two  by  means  of  a  judgment 
or  volition  —  a  judgment  which  exhibits  the 
idea  of  the  attribute  as  implicated  in  that 
of  the  subject,  or  a  volition  which  regards 
the  idea  of  the  means  as  implicated  in  that 
of  the  end.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
the  mind  passes  from  some  judgment  to 
another  which  is  more  complex,  or  from 
some  volition  to  another  which  is  more 
comprehensive,  it  is  because,  by  dint  of 
mental  repetition  in  that  dual  form  of  self- 
imitation  called  memory  or  habit,  a  judg- 
ment is  compressed  into  a  notion,  so  that 
its  two  terms,  coalescing,  are  welded  to- 
gether and  become  indistinguishable,  and 
a  volition  or  aim  is  transformed  into  a 
reflex  involving  ever  less  of  consciousness.^" 
By  this  inevitable  transformation,  which 


182  Social  Laws 

operates  socially  on  a  large  scale,  under 
the  revered  titles  of  traditioruand  cuotom, 
our  former  judgments  are  fitted  to  enter, 
under  the  guise  of  notions,  into  the  sub- 
stance of  some  new  judgment,  and  our 
former  aims  into  the  substance  of  some 
new  aim.  From  the  lowest  to  the  highest 
operation  of  our  understanding  and  will, 
this  process  occurs  unaltered.  No  theo- 
retical discovery  is  anything  but  the  union, 
in  a  judgment,  of  an  attribute-  (that  is, 
of  earlier  judgments)  with  some  new  sub- 
ject; and,  similarly,  no  practical  discovery 
is  other  than  the  voluntary  union  of  a 
means  (that  is,  an  end  formerly  desired 
for  its  own  sake)  with  a  new  end.  Thus 
by  an  alternation,  at  once  most  simple  and 
most  fruitful,  of  contrary  transformations 
which  succeed  one  another  ad  infinitum, 
yesterday's  judgment  or  end  becomes 
simply  to-day's  notion  or  means,  and  will 
pass  over  into  to-morrow's  judgment  or 
end,  which  is  destined,  in  turn,  to  suc- 
cumb to  the  same  process  of  consolidation, 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      183 

and  so  on.  Through  this  rhythm,  which 
is  at  once  social  and  psychological,  there 
have  gradually  been  raised  the  many 
grand  structures  of  accumulated  discov- 
eries and  inventions  that  so  excite  our 
admiration  :  our  languages,  religions,  sci- 
ences, codes,  and  administrative  systems, 
as  well  as  our  military  organization,  in- 
dustries,, and  arts. 

When  we  consider  one  of  the  greater 
social  phenomena,  such  as  a  grammar,  a 
code,  or  a  theology,  the  individual  mind 
appears  so  trivial  a  thing  beside  these 
monumental  works  that  the  idea  of  re- 
garding it  as  the  sole  artisan  concerned  in 
the  erection  of  these  enormous  cathedrals 
seems  to  some  sociologists  quite  absurd ; 
and  one  may  readily  be  excused  if,  with- 
out perceiving  that  he  thereby  abandons 
all  attempt  at  explanation,  he  is  drawn 
into  saying  that  these  works  are  eminently 
impersonal;  yet  there  is  but  a  step  from 
this  position  to  that  of  my  illustrious  oppo- 
nent, M.  Di\rkheim,  who  insists  that  they 


184  Social  Laws 

are  not  functions  of  the  individual,  but  his 
factors^  and  that  they  have  an  existence 
independent  of  human  personality,  and 
rule  man  with  despotic  might,  by  the  op- 
pressive shadow  which  they  cast  over 
him.'l/'But  how  have  these  social  realities 
come  into  being?  (I  say  realities,  for, 
although  I  oppose  the  idea  of  a  social 
organism,  I  am  far  from  challenging  the 
concept  of  certain  social  realities,  concern- 
ing which  some  understanding  must  be 
reached.)  I  see  clearly  that,  once  formed, 
they  impose  themselves  upon  the  indi- 
vidual, sometimes,  though  rarely,  with 
constraint,  oftener  by  persuasion  or  sug- 
gestion or  the  curious  pleasure  that  we 
experience,  from  childhood  up,  in  saturat- 
ing ourselves  with  the  examples  of  our 
myriad  surrounding  models,  as  the  babe 
in  imbibing  its  mother's  milk.  This  I  see 
clearly  enough ;  but  how  were  these  won- 
derful monuments  constructed,  and  by 
whom,  if  not  by  men  and  through  human 
efforts  ? 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      185 

As  regards  the  structure  of  science, 
probably  the  most  imposing  of  human 
edifices,  there  is  no  possible  question.  It 
was  built  in  the  full-  light  of  history,  and 
we  can  follow  its  development  almost  from 
the  very  outset  down  to  our  own  day. 
Our  sciences  began  as  a  scattered  and  dis- 
connected collection  of  small  discoveries, 
which  were  afterward  grouped  into  little 
theories  (each  group  being  itself  a  discov- 
ery); and  the  latter  were  welded,  later, 
into  broader  theories,  to  be  confirmed  or 
amended  by  a  host  of  other  discoveries, 
and  finally  bound  firmly  together  by  the 
arches  of  hypotheses  built  over  them  by 
the  spirit  of  unification :  this  manner  of 
progress  is  indisputable.  There  is  no  law 
nor  scientific  theory  (any  more  than  there 
is  a  system  of  philosophy)  that  does  not 
bear  its  author's  name  still  legibly  written. 
Everything  here  originates  in  the  individ- 
ual; not  only  the  materials,  but  the  gen- 
eral design  of  the  whole,  and  the  detail 
sketches  as  well ;  everything,  including 


v 


186  Social  Laws 

what  is  now  diffused  among  all  cultured 
minds,  and  taught  even  in  the  primary 
school,vbegan  as  the-secret  of  some  single 
mind,  whence  a  little  flame,  faint  and 
flickering,  sent  forth  its  rays,  at  first  only 
within  a  narrow  compass,  and  even  there 
encountering  many  obstructions,  but,  grow- 
ing brighter  as  it  spread  further,  it  at 
length  became  a  brilliant  illumination. 

Now,  if  it  seems  plainly  evident  that 
science  was  thus  constructed,  it  is  no 
less  true  that  the  construction  of  every 
dogma,  legal  code,  government,  or  eco- 
nomic regime  was  effected  in  the  same 
manner ;  and  if  any  doubt  be  possible  with 
respect  to  language  and  ethics,  because 
the  obscurity  of  their  origin  and  the  slow- 
ness of  their  transformations  remove  them 
from  observation  through  the  greater  part 
of  their  course,  is  it  not  highly  probable 
that  their  evolution  followed  the  same 
path?  For,  it  is  by  minute  accretions 
of  image-laden  expressions,  picturesque 
phrases,  and  new  words,  or  words  new  in 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      187 

meaning,  that  our  language  enriches  it- 
self to-day ;  and,  though  each  of  these  in- 
novations is  usually  unsigned,  it  is  none 
the  less  due  to  some  personal  initiative, 
imitated  by  first  one  and  then  another ;  and 
these  happy  expressions  which  swarm  in 
every  language  are  just  what  different  lan- 
guages, brought  into  mutual  relation,  are 
continually  borrowing  from  one  another, 
to  enlarge  their  vocabulary,  and  render 
their  grammar  more  flexible,  and  at  the 
same  time  more  complicated.  So,  too,  it 
is  through  a  series  of  petty,  individual 
revolts  against  the  accepted  ethics,  or 
through  petty,  individual  additions  to  its 
precepts,  that  this  system  of  ethics  under- 
goes a  gradual  modification.  Thus  we 
have  advanced  by  successive  stages,  from 
a  remote  era,  when  languages  w£re  count- 
less in  number,  but  poverty-stricken,  and 
each  spoken  by  a  single  populace,  tribe,  or 
town,  and  when  ethical  codes  were  very 
numerous,  dissimilar,  and  simple,  to  an 
epoch  when  a  small  number  of  very 


,188  Social  Laws 

wealthy  languages,  and  very  complex 
codes  of  morality,  contend  for  future 
supremacy  on  the  ea^rtfer 

One  thing,  however,  must  be  granted 
to  the  opponents  of  the  theory  of  indi- 
vidual causes  in  history;  namely,  that 
writers  have  frequently  made  the  mistake 
of  speaking  of  great  men  when  they 
should  have  spoken  of  great  ideas,  which 
often  appear  in  very  unimportant  men, 
or  of  the  trivial  ideas  and  infinitesimal 
innovations  contributed  by  each  of  us  to 
the  common  work.  For,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  all,  or  nearly  all  of  us,  have  had  a 
share  in  the  building  of  these  enormous 
structures  that  overshadow  and  protect 
us ;  each  one  of  us,  however  orthodox  he 
be,  has  his  own  religion,  and  each,  how- 
ever precise,  his  own  language  and  ethics ; 
the  most  commonplace  of  scientists  has 
his  own  science,  and  the  most  bureau- 
cratic of  officials  his  own  system  of  ad- 
ministration. And  just  as  each,  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  adds  his  own 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      189 

little  invention  to  the  enduring  heritage 
of  social  material  of  which  he  is  the 
temporary  repository,  so,  too,  each  has  his 
own  imitative  radiation  in  a  sphere  more 
or  less  contracted,  which,  nevertheless, 
suffices  to  prolong  his  discovery  beyond 
his  own  ephemeral  existence  and  pass 
it  on  to  future  workmen  who  may  make 
some  definite  use  of  it.  Imitation,  which 
socializes  the  individual,  also  perpetuates 
good  ideas  from  every  source,  and  in  the 
process  of  perpetuating  them  brings  them 
together  and  makes  them  fertile. 

It  may  possibly  be  urged,  then,  that, 
given  the  eternal  nature  of  things,  in  con- 
junction with  the  human  mind,  itself  an 
enduring  object,  human  science  was  bound 
inevitably  to  reach,  sooner  or  later,  by  it 
matters  not  what  path  of  individual  dis- 
covery, the  stage  in  which  we  now  see  it, 
and  the  stage  in  which  our  grandchildren 
will  see  it;  that  its  future  form,  bright 
and  glorious,  was  already  predetermined 
from  the  earliest  perceptions  of  the  sav- 


190  Social  Laws 

age ;  and,  hence,  that  the  r61e  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  brilliant  accident  of  genius 
are  of  slight  importance,  or  lose  their  im- 
portance every  day,  as  we  approach  that 
ideal  reality,  of  Platonic  attractiveness, 
whose  outline  we  are  now  beginning  to 
discern.  But  such  an  objection,  if  true, 
must  be  generalized,  and  it  would  then 
follow  that  some  irresistible  attraction, 
divinely  planned  and  invisible,  must  be 
driving  all  humanity  onward,  by  a  cer- 
tain chain  of  satisfactions  and  needs,  born 
successively  of  one  another,  to  the  same 
final  political  goal,  whether  economic  or 
otherwise,  and  to  the  same  constitution, 
industrial  system,  language,  and  legisla- 
tion?\/Hitherto  this  view  has  proved  most 
contrary  to  fact;  for,  the  more  the  differ- 
ent civilizations — Christian,  Buddhistic,  or 
Mohammedan  —  which  divide  the  earth 
between  them  have  developed,  the  more 
marked  have  become  their  distinctions  and 
dissimilarities.  What  pleases  me  especially 
in  this  theory  is  its  idealism ;  but  it  is 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      191 

not  sufficiently  idealistic,  and  hence  mis- 
represents that  view.  For  it  is  not  a  sin- 
gle idea,  nor  a  small  number  of  ideas, 
hovering  in  mid-air,  that  move  the  world ; 
rather,  there  are  thousands  upon  thousands 
striving  for  the  distinction  of  having  led 
it.  The  ideas  that  stir  up  the  world  are 
the  ideas  of  the  actors  upon  its  stage,  each 
one  of  whom  has  fought  to  effect  the  tri- 
umph of  his  own  ideas  in  some  dream  of 
local,  national,  or  international  reconstruc- 
tion, which  developed  as  it  realized  itself, 
and  sometimes  grew  bolder  even  after  it 
was  vanquished.  Each  character  in  his- 
tory is  the  model  of  a  new  humanity,  and 
his  entire  personality  and  individual  efforts 
are  but  the  expression  of  that  incipient 
universal  which  he  bears  within  himself. 
And  of  these  countless  ideas,  these  great 
patriotic  or  humanitarian  projects,  that 
wave  above  the  struggling  mass  of  hu- 
manity like  great  banners  mutually  rent 
asunder,  one  alone,  possibly,  out  of  myri- 
ads, is  destined  to  survive ;  but  even  this 


192  Social  Laws 

must  have  been  personal  in  origin,  burst- 
ing forth,  some  time,  from  the  head  or 
heart  of  some  man.  I  am  willing  to  grant 
that  this  triumph  was  necessary ;  but  its 
necessity,  which  appeared  afterward,  and 
which  no  one  saw  in  advance,  or  could 
have  foreseen  with  certainty,  is  merely  a 
verbal  expression  for  the  superiority  of 
the  individual  efforts  enlisted  in  support 
of  this  particular  conception.  Final  cause 
and  efficient  causes  are  mingled  here,  and 
there  is  no  good  reason  for  distinguishing 
/them. 

It  is  because  the  material  and  plans 
of  every  social  construction  are  all  indi- 
vidual contributions,  that  I  am  unwilling 
to  admit  the  despotic  and  resistless  na- 
ture of  the  constraint  placed  upon  the 
individual,  which  has  been  considered 
the  essential  and  distinctive  character- 
istic of  social  phenomena.  Were  this 
the  case,  the  sphere  of  truth  could  never 
grow,  and  these  structures  could  never 
have  been  built;  for,  in  each  of  the  sue- 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      193 

cessive  steps  of  growth  through  the  ad- 
dition of  some  innovation  (such  as  a 
new  word,  proposed  law,  scientific  the- 
ory, industrial  process,  etc.),  the  new- 
comer obtains  admittance,  not  by  force, 
but  by  gentle  persuasion  and  suggestion. 
Observe  the  manner  in  which  the  pala- 
tial edifice  of  science  has  grown.  Some 
theory  is  long  discussed  in  the  sphere 
of  higher  learning,  before  it  spreads  in 
the  form  of  a  more  or  less  probable  hy- 
pothesis, and  at  length  descends  into  the 
sphere  of  secondary  education,  where  it 
is  more  rigorously  accepted;  but,  gener- 
ally, it  is  only  after  such  a  theory  reaches 
the  sphere  of  primary  education  that  it 
becomes  quite  dogmatic,  and  exerts,  or 
endeavors  to  exert,  the  far  from  despotic 
coercion  already  referred  to  on  the  minds 
of  its  youthful  adherents,  who  lend  them- 
selves to  this  coercion  with  the  greatest 
willingness.  This  means,  in  other  words, 
that  its  present  imperative  character  has 
arisen  by  virtue  of  its  former  persuasive- 
o 


194  Social  Laws 

ness,  and  the  whole  through  imitative 
diffusion.  The  same  holds  true  of  any 
industrial  innovation  that  spreads;  it  is 
the  caprice  of  a  chosen  few  before  it 
becomes  a  public  need  and  forms  part 
of  the  necessities  of  life.  For  the  lux- 
uries of  to-day  are  the  necessities  of  to- 
morrow, in  the  same  way  that  the  higher 
education  of  to-day,  becomes  the  second- 
ary or  primary  instruction  of  to-morrow. 

This  great  problem  of  social  adapta- 
tion ought  really  to  be  traced  out  along 
numerous  other  lines ;  some  of  these  I 
have  sketched  in  my  work  on  Social  Logic, 
to  which  I  may  refer  here.  But  we  must 
set  a  limit  somewhere.  I  need  scarcely 
insist  upon  the  fact,  unfortunately  only 
too  plain,  that,  as  these  adaptations  mul- 
tiply and  become  more  definite,  at  the 
same  time  certain  distressing  and  per- 
plexing social  inadatoations  come  to  light, 
which  justify  so  many  of  man's  com- 
plaints. However,  we  are  now  in  a  bet- 
ter position  to  explain  why  the  natural 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      195 

harmonies,  as  well  as  the  natural  sym- 
metries, are  rarely  perfect,  and  why  we 
find  accompanying  them  and  mixed  up 
with  them  certain  disharmonies  and  dis- 
symmetries which  sometimes  contribute 
to  the  production  of  higher  adaptations 
and  oppositions^  It  is  because  perfect 
adaptation  and  perfect  opposition  are  but 
the  two  limits  of  an  infinite  series,  be- 
tween which  are  countless  intermediary 
positions.  Between  the  absolute  confirm- 
ation of  one  proposition  by  another,  and 
an  absolute  contradiction  between  the 
two,  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  par- 
tial contradictions  and  partial  confirma- 
tions, without  counting  the  infinite  number 
of  degrees  of  affirmative  and  negative 
belief.  Invention  is  a  question  followed 
by  an  answer.  But  for  each  question 
set  a  thousand  answers_are__gossibleL_of 
all  possible  degrees  of  completeness  and 
exactness.  To  the  question  concerning 
the  need  of  sight,  not  merely  has  the 
human  eye  responded,  but  throughout  na- 


196  Social  Laws 

ture  there  are  all  the  various  eyes  of 
insects,  birds,  and  molluscs.  And,  simi- 
larly, to  the  question  concerning  the 
need  of  recording  speech,  the  Phoeni- 
cian alphabet  was  not  the  only  one  to 
respond. 

At  the  basis  of  every  society  we  find 
a  host  of  answers,  both  great  and  small, 
to  the  various  questions  proposed,  and 
\  a  host  of  new  questions  arising  out  of 
these  very  answers ;  and  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  we  find  also  a  large  number 
of  struggles,  great  or  small,  between 
the  advocates  of  various  solutions.  Sjirife 
is  merely  a  coming  together  of  harmo- 
nies; but  this  kind  of  encounter  is  not 
the  only  relation  that  exists  between  har- 
monies ;  their  most  common  relation  is 
agreement  —  the  production  of  a  supe- 
rior harmony.  Every  moment,  whether 
we  are  speaking  or  working  at  any 
task  whatsoever,  we  both  feel  a  need  and 
satisfy  it;  and  it  is  these  series  of  satis- 
factions or  solutions,  that  make  up  con- 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      197 

versation  and  labor,  as  well  as  domestic 
and  international  politics,  diplomacy,  and 
war, — in  short,  all  forms  of  human  ac- 
tivity. The  constantly  renewed  efforts 
of  the  individuals  in  a  nation  to  adapt 
their  language  to  their  passing  thoughts1 
are  what  cause  the  gradual  modification 
and  transformation  of  speech,  and  the 
birth  of  new^  languages,.  If  a  record 
could  have  been  kept,  as  Abb6  Rous- 
selot  endeavored  to  do  in  a  small  sec- 
tion of  Charente,  of  all  these  successive 
efforts,  we  would  be  able  to  note  the 
exact  number  of  fundamental  linguistic 
adaptations  that  have  been  integrated 
into  a  modification  of  the  sound  or  sense 
of  words.  Similarly,  all  men,  but  espe- 
cially those  who  feel  that  they  are  most 
ill-adapted  to  their  environment  and  to 
themselves,  are  constantly  endeavoring  to 
adapt  their  dogmas  and  religious  pre- 
cepts to  their  needs  and  knowledge,  and 
to  adapt  their  customs  and  laws  and 

1  On  this  subject  see  M.  BreaPs  Semantic. 


198  Social  Laws 

even  their  moral  code  to  the  same; 
and  these  constant  efforts  result  in  a 
gradual  accumulation  of  slight  improve- 
ments.1 Then,  too,  from  time  to  time, 

1  If  we  wish  to  make  sociology  a  truly  experimental 
science  and  stamp  it  with  the  seal  of  absolute  exact- 
ness, we  must,  I  believe,  generalize  the  method  of  Abbe 
Rousselot  in  its  essential  features,  through  the  collabo- 
ration of  a  great  number  of  trustworthy  observers.  Let 
twenty,  thirty,  or  as  many  as  fifty  sociologists,  from 
different  sections  of  France  or  any  other  country,  write 
out  with  the  greatest  care  and  in  the  greatest  possible 
detail  the  succession  of  minute  transformations  in  the 
political  or  industrial  world,  or  some  other  sphere  of 
life,  which  it  is  their  privilege  to  observe  in  their  native 
town  or  village,  beginning  with  their  own  immediate 
surroundings.  Instead  of  limiting  themselves  to  vague 
generalities,  let  them  note  in  full  the  specific  instances 
of  the  rise  or  fall  of  religious  or  political  faith,  of  mo- 
rality or  immorality,  of  luxury,  comfort,  and  whatever 
modifications  of  political  or  religious  belief  have  occurred 
under  their  eyes  since  they  reached  the  age  of  reason, 
beginning  with  their  own  family  and  circle  of  friends. 
Let  them  strive  to  the  utmost,  like  the  noted  linguist 
already  mentioned,  to  trace  out  the  individual  sources 
of  the  slight  diminutions,  augmentations,  or  transforma- 
tions of  ideas  and  tendencies  which  have  spread  through 
a  certain  group  of  men,  and  which  are  expressed  by 
imperceptible  changes  in  language,  gesture,  toilet,  and 
other  customs.  Let  this  be  done,  and  within  such  a 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      199 

some  great  inventor  or  some  great  har- 
monizer  arises. 

Disharmonies    are    to    harmonies    what 
dissymmetries  are  to  symmetries  and  va- 

highly  instructive  body  of  monographs  there  cannot 
fail  to  appear  certain  most  important  truths  —  truths 
most  valuable  for  the  sociologist  and  statesman  to  know. 
These  narrative  monographs  would  differ  radically  from 
our  present  descriptive  monographs,  and  would  be  far 

more  enlightening.  /To  understand  social  conditions,  we 

"  » 

must  seize  social  changes  in  detail  as  they  pass;^vhile 

the  converse  is  not  true.  For,  however  much  we  ac- 
cumulate instances  of  the  concurrence  of  social  con- 
ditions in  every  country  of  the  world,  the  law  of  their 
formation  does  not  appear,  or  rather,  it  is  covered  up 
by  the  mass  of  collected  evidence.  But  any  one  who 
knew  thoroughly,  in  exact  detail,  the  changes  of  custom 
on  some  particular  points,  in  a  single  country  and 
during  ten  years,  could  not  fail  to  lay  his  hand  upon 
a  general  principle  of  social  transformation,  and  con- 
sequently upon  a  principle  of  social  formation,  that 
would  apply  to  every  land  and  to  all  time.  In  such  a 
research  it  would  be  well  to  take  up  a  very  limited 
number  of  questions  :  for  instance,  it  might  first  be 
asked,  by  whom  and  how  the  custom  was  originally  intro- 
duced and  generalized,  among  the  peasants  of  certain 
rural  districts  in  southern  France,  of  not  saluting 
the  well-to-do  proprietors  of  their  neighborhood;  or 
through  what  influences  the  belief  in  sorcery,  the 
were-wolf,  and  the  like,  begin  to  disappear. 


200  Social  Laws 

nations  to  repetitions.  l^It  is  from  the 
midst  of  estact  repetitions,  absolute  con- 
trasts, and  perfect  harmonies,  that  the 
best  examples  of  general  diversity, 
picturesqueness,  and  disorder  appear, 
namely,  the  individual  characteristics  of 
things.^  The  expression  of  a  man  or 
woman's  face,  refined  by  the  influences 
of  the  social  life  and  the  intense,  com- 
plex, and  ceaseless  life  of  imitation,  is  a 
small  and  fleeting  phenomenon.  Yet 
there  is  nothing  so  important  as  just 
this  fugitive  shade  of  expression.  And 
no  painter  has  succeeded  in  catching  it; 
no  poet  or  novelist  has  recalled  it 
to  life,  no  matter  how  hard  he  has 
striven  in  the  attempt.  The  thinker  has 
no  right  to  smile  at  sight  of  their 
long-continued  endeavors  to  grasp  this 
almost  tangible  thing,  which  never  has 
been,  and  never  can  be,  recalled.  There 
is  no^sctence  of  the  individual,  but  art 
is  wholly  of  the  individual.  And  the 
scientist,  remembering  that  the  life  of 


The  Adaptation  of  Phenomena      201 

the  universe  depends  entirely  on  the 
fruition  of  personal  individuality,  would 
be  compelled  to  reflect  on  the  artist's  labor 
with  a  humility  mingled  with  some  envy, 
did  he  not  himself,  by  stamping  his  per- 
sonal seal  on  his  own  general  notion  of 
phenomena,  always  impart  to  that  notion 
an  aesthetic  value,  the  real  raison  d'etre 
of  his  thought. 


CONCLUSION 


V 


T  is  now  time  to  conclude ;  but, 
in  concluding,  let  us  sum  up 
the  principal  positions  to  which 
we  have  been  led,  and  seek  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  their  con- 
junction. We  observed  that  all  science 
subsisted  on  similarities,  contrasts  (or 
symmetries),  and  harmonies,  that  is,  on 
repetitions,  oppositions,  and  adaptations ; 
and  we  asked  what  was  the  law  of  each 
of  these  three  terms,  as  well  as  their  re- 
lation with  one  another.  We  have  seen 
that,  in  spite  of  its  natural  and  a  priori 
apparently  legitimate  tendency  to  choose 
the  greatest,  most  widespread,  and  most 
imposing  phenomena  to  explain  the  less 
marked,  the  human  mind  has  been  ir- 
resistibly led  to  discove^the  underlying 

202 


Conclusion  203 

principle  of  every  order  of  things  in  the 
most  hidden  facts,  whose  depths,  it  is 
true,  remain  unsounded.  This  discovery 
ought  to  cause  great  surprise ;  yet  it  does 
nothing  of  the  sort,  for  the  habit  of 
scientific  observation  has  made  us  thor- 
oughly familiar  with  such  reversals 
of  the  order  imagined  by  our  earlier 
thought.  Thus  the  law^of  •rffiE6^*011' 
whether  we  mean  by  this  the  undulatory 
and  rotatory  repetition  of  the  physical 
world,  the  hereditary  and  habit-like  repe- 
tition of  the  world  of  life,  or  the  imita- 
tive repetition  of  the  social  world,  implies  a 
tendency  to  move  along  a  path  of  steady 
growlfr,  from  a  comparatively  infinitesi- 
mal to  a  comparatively  infinite  scale. 
The  law  of  opposition  is  in  no  way  dif- 
ferent ;  it  consists  in  a  tendency  to  en- 
largd  in  an  ever  widening  sphere,  be- 
ginning with  a  certain  point  in  the 
world  of  life ;  this  point  is  the_brain  of 
some  individual,  and  more  specifically  a 
cell  in  this  brain,  where  a  contradiction 


204  Social  Laws 

between  two  beliefs  or  two  desires  is  pro- 
duced by  an  interference  between  imi- 
tative rays  from  without.  Such  is  the 
fundamental  social  opposition,  which  is 
the  moving  principle  of  the  bloodiest 
wars,  in  the  same  way  that  the  funda- 
mental social  repetition  is  the  specific 
fact  of  the_££istence  of  some  first  imita- 
tor,, who  forms  the  starting-point  of  a  great 
epidemic  of  custom.  Finally,  the  law 
of  adaptation  is  similar;  the  fundamental 
social  adaptation  is  some  individual  inven- 
tion that  is  destined  to  be  imitated,  that 
is,  the  felicitous  interference  of  two  imi- 
tations, occurring  first  in  one  single  mind  ; 
and  this  harmony,  though  quite  internal 
in  origin,  tends  not  only  to  externalize 
itself  as  it  spreads,  but  also  to  unite 
with  some  other  invention,  in  a  logical 
couple,  thanks  to  this  imitative  diffusion, 
and  so  on,  until,  by  successive  complica- 
tions and  harmonizations  of  the  harmo- 
nies, the  grand  collective  works  of  the 
human  mind  are  constructed,  —  a  gram- 


Conclusion  205 

mar,  a  theology,  an  encyclopaedia,  a  code 
of  laws,  a  natural  or  artificial  organiza- 
tion of  labor,  a  scheme  of  aesthetics  or 
a  system  of  ethics. 

Thus,  in  a  word,  everything  undoubtedly  /^ 
starts  with  the  infinitely  minute;  and  we 
may  add  that  it  probably  returns  thither ; 
this  is  its  alpha  and  omega.  Everything 
that  constitutes  the  visible  universe,  the 
universe  accessible  to  observation,  pro- 
ceeds, as  we  know,  out  of  the  invisible  and 
inscrutable,  —  out  of  a  seeming  nothing- 
ness, —  whence  all  reality  emerges  in  an 
inexhaustible  stream.  If  we  reflect  'on 
this  curious  phenomenon,  we  shall  be  as- 
tonished at  the  strength  of  the  prejudice, 
both  popular  and  scientific,  which  makes 
every  one,  whether  he  be  a  Spencer  or 
the  first  man  we  chance  to  meet,  regard 
the  infinitesimal  as  insignificant,  that  is,  as 
homogeneous,  neutral,  and  possessed  of 
neither  soul  nor  individuality.  How  per- 
sistent an  illusion  this  is !  And  it  is  all 
the  more  inexplicable  because,  like  every- 


206  Social  Laws 

thing  else,  we,  too,  are  destined  soon  to 
return,  through  death,  to  this  despised 
infinitesimal  from  whence  we  are  sprung 
—  which  may  be  (who  knows?)  the  real 
beyond,  that  haven  in  the  hereafter,  so 
vainly  sought  for  amid  the  infinities  of 
space.  However  this  may  be,  what  reason 
have  we  for  concluding  a  priori,  without  a 
knowledge  of  the  world  of  elements,  that 
the  visible  world,  the  great  world  about 
us,  is  the  sole  scene  of  thought  and  seat 
of  the  various  phenomena  of  life  ?  How 
can  we  imagine  such  a  thing,  when  every 
moment  we  see  some  personal  being,  with 
peculiar  and  radiating  characteristics, 
springing  forth  from  the  inmost  recesses 
of  a  fertilized  egg  and  from  the  in- 
most recesses  of  a  certain  part  of  that 
egg  —  a  part  that  grows  constantly 
smaller,  almost  to  the  vanishing-point, 
in  proportion  as  we  get  a  better  view 
of  it?  Can  we  imagine  this  limiting 
point,  the  source  of  such  important 
differences,  to  be  itself  undifferentiated  ? 


Conclusion  207 

I  am  aware  of  the  objection  that  will  be 
raised  in  the  supposed  law  of  the  instabil- 
ity of  the  homogeneous.  But  this  law  is 
false  and  arbitrary;  it  was  conceived 
merely  for  the  sake  of  reconciling  the 
notion  that  what  is  indistinguishable  to 
our  eyes  is  really  undifferentiated,  with  the 
evidences  of  diversity  among  phenomena 
and  the  exuberant  variations  that  appear 
in  the  organic,  psychological,  and  social 
spheres.  JThe  truth  is  that  only  the 
heterogeneous  is  unstable^  while  the  homo- 
geneous is  essentially  stable./  The  stability 
of  phenomena  varies  directly  with  their 
homogeneity.  The  only  perfectly  homo- 
geneous thing  (or  apparently  so)  in  nature 
is  the  space  of  geometry,  which  has  not 
altered  since  Euclid.  Will  it  be  main- 
tained that  some  very  minute  germ  of 
heterogeneity,  introduced  into  a  relatively 
homogeneous  aggregate,  like  yeast  in  a 
cake,  is  bound  to  bring  about  a  grow- 
ing differentiation  ?  This  I  dispute  ;  for  in 
an  orthodox  land,  where  religious  or  politi- 


208  Social  Laws 

cal  opinions  all  agree,  a  heresy  or  dissent- 
ing view  that  is  introduced  has  far  more 
chance  of  being  absorbed  or  expelled  in 
short  order  than  of  growing  at  the  expense 
of  the  dominant  church  or  political  party. 
f  I  do  not  deny  the  law  of  differentiation 
)  in  its  organic  or  social  bearings ;  but  it  is 
sadly  misunderstood  if  it  prevents  us  from 
I  seeing  the  law  of  increasing  unification  that 
mingles  with  it  and  cooperates  with  it.  In 
reality,  the  differentiation  in  question  is. 
the  very  adaptation  that  we  have  been  dis- 
cussing :  thus,  for  instance,  the  division  of 
labor  in  our  social  organizations  is  merely 
a  gradual  association  or  coadaptation  of 
different  labors  by  means  of  successive 
inventions.  Confined  to  the  household 
first  of  all,  it  proceeded  to  repeat  and 
enlarge  itself  unceasingly.  It  extended 
itself  first  to  the  city,  where  various  house- 
holds, formerly  similar  to  one  another, 
though  each  differentiated  within  itself, 
became  more  unlike  one  another,  though 
each  more  homogeneous  in  itself.  Later 


Conclusion  209 

on,  it  became  national,  and  at  length  inter- 
national. 

At  is  not  true,  then,  that  differences 
increase  in  number ;  for,  if  new  dif- 
ferences appear  every  instant,  old  dif- 
ferences vanish  at  the  same  time;  and 
taking  this  into  consideration,  we  have  no 
reason  for  supposing  that  the  sum  total 
of  differences  (if,  indeed,  it  be  possible 
to  add  together  things  which  have  no 
element  in  common)  has  really.,  increased 
in  the  universe.^  But  something  far  more 
important  than  a  mere  increase  of  differ- 
ence is  constantly  taking  place,  namely, 
the  differentiation  of  the  differences  them- 
selves. The  process  of  change  is  itself  11 
undergoing  a  change,  in  a  direction  that 
is  taking  us  from  an  era  of  the  crudest 
juxtaposition  of  differences,  such  as  star- 
tling and  unblended  colors,  to  an  era  of 
harmoniously  shaded  differences.  What- 
ever may  be  thought  of  this  particular 
view,  it  is  nevertheless  inconceivable, 
upon  the  hypothesis  of  a  homogeneous 


210  Social  Laws 

substance  subject  from  eternity  to  the 
levelling  and  coordinating  influences  of 
scientific  laws,  how  a  universe  such  as 
ours,  luxuriating  in  surprises  and  ca- 
price, could  ever  have  come  into  exist- 
ence. What  can  spring  from  a  perfectly 
similar  and  perfectly  coordinated  system, 
except  a  world  eternally  and  superlatively 
uniform  ?  r  And  so,  in  place  of  the  usual 
conception  of  the  universe  as  being  formed 
(like  an  enormous  sand-heap)  of  ele- 
ments quite  similar  at  bottom,  whence 
diversity  sprang  in  some  unaccountable 
manner,  I  propose  this  conception  of  my 
own,  which  represents  it  as  the  realiza- 
tion of  a  host  of  elementary  potential- 
ities,1 each  possessing  individuality  and 
ambition,  and  containing  in  itself  its  own 
distinctive  universe,  the  object  of  its 
dreams./  For  an  infinitely  greater  num- 
ber of  fundamental  projects  miscarry 

1  On  this  subject  see  the  study  entitled  Monadology 
and  Sociology,  in  my  Essais  et  Melanges  (Paris  and 
Lyons,  Storck  £  Masson,  1895). 


Conclusion  211 

than  ever  reach  full  development;  and 
the  great  struggle  for  existence,  through 
which  the  least  adapted  beings  are  elimi- 
nated, is  waged  between  competing  dreams 
and  rival  projects,  rather  than  different 
beings.  Thus  the  mysterious  basement 
of  the  phenomenal  world  may  be  quite 
as  rich  in  differences,  though  differences 
of  another  sort,  as  the  upper  stories  of 
visible,  superficial  realities. 

Yet,  after  all,  the  metaphysical  theory 
that  I  have  just  indicated  is  of  slight 
importance  in  comparison  with  the  expost 
that  precedes  it,  and  I  merely  put  for- 
ward this  hypothesis  in  parenthesis,  with 
the  remark  that,  even  if  it  be  rejected, 
the  more  solid  and  more  positive  argu- 
ments presented  above  still  remain  stand- 
ing. It  merely  permits  us  to  gather 
within  a  single  heading  the  two  appar- 
ently different  kinds  of  fact  that  we  have 
met  with  in  the  course  of  our  journey: 
namely,  the  facts  pertaining  -to  the  reg- 
ular succession  of  repetitions,  struggles, 


212  Social  Laws 

and  harmonies  in  the  universe,  —  in  other 
words,  the  regular  side  of  the  universe, 
which  is  the  subject-matter  of  science,— 
and  those  relating  to  the  more  uncouth 
aspect  of  the  universe,  which  art  delights 
continually  to  seize  and  reproduce,  and 
which  satisfy  (as  it  would  seem)  an  eter- 
nal craving  for  diversity,  picturesqueness, 
and  disorder,  through  the  operation  of 
this  same  universal  assimilation,  symme- 
trization,  and  harmonization.  It  is  the 
easiest  thing  in  the  world  to  understand 
this  apparent  anomaly,  if  we  grant  that 
the  sub-phenomenal  differences  of  things 
are  forever  striving,  not  to  efface  them- 
selves, but  to  blossom  out  and  appear  at 
the  surface.  Then,  everything  is  ex- 
plained. The  mutual  relations  of  our 
three  terms  —  repetition,  opposition,  and 
adaptation  —  are  easily  understood,  when 
we  consider  successive  repetitions  as  op- 
erating sometimes  in  favor  of  adaptation, 
which  they  spread  and  develop  by  their 
own  interferences,  sometimes  in  favor  of 


Conclusion  213 

opposition,  which  they  arouse  by  inter- 
ferences of  another  sort.  And,  similarly, 
we  may  believe  that  all  three  of  these 
factors  work  together  to  effect  the  ex- 
pansion of  universal  variation  in  its  high- 
est, widest,  and  profoundest  individual 
and  personal  forms. 

OCTOBER,  1897. 


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